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Executive Summary  
 
The EEA Financial Mechanism (2009-2014) have committed  € 160,4 million to support seventeen 
NGO Programmes in sixteen countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Spain. The overall objective of the EEA Grants NGO Programmes is strengthened civil society 
development and enhanced contribution to social justice, democracy and sustainable development in 
each of the beneficiary countries. As of 30 of June, 2014, 957 projects in total of € 53,793,561 have 
been supported mainly in the fields of democracy, citizen participation, human rights, social justice and 
empowerment, sustainable development and provision of basic welfare services.  
The mid-term evaluation of the NGO Programmes funded by the EEA Financial Mechanism (2009-
2014) is an independent formative evaluation. Its objective was two-fold: 1) to assess the progress and 
needs for improvement of the current Programmes, and 2) to inform policies for the next financial 
period. The evaluation covered all countries except Croatia1 and was implemented in the period May-
September 2014 by a team of CREDA Consulting consisting of 11 experts based in the different 
beneficiary countries. In total 630 respondents participated in the assessment including representatives 
of the Operators, the FMO, the FMC, the NFPs, supported NGOs, other NGOs and researchers of civil 
society, as well as other donors. The only country where we could not interview the NFP was Hungary 
because at the time of the evaluation there was no National Focal Point. 
 
Main findings and Lessons  
Strategic relevance 
(1) The NGO Programmes are a timely and highly relevant response to critical contextual issues and 
particular gaps within civil society in the beneficiary countries. They are viewed by the NGOs as 
“oxygen for real civic work”, keeping alive the civic meaning of the NGO sectors across Europe. The 
Programmes support the enhanced role of civil society in countering negative trends across Europe of 
rising xenophobia, discrimination, populism and growing social frustration and mistrust in the 
democratic institutions.  
(2) In the majority of the beneficiary countries the EEA and Norway Grants is the primary or the only 
donor in areas of NGO work related to functional democracy, human rights, watchdog and advocacy 
initiatives.  
(3) The NGO Programmes have met the political concern of the donors to provide support to the NGO 
sectors in the beneficiary countries. They have invested in expanding the capacity of individual NGOs 
and the overall NGO sectors as catalysts of civic engagement, advocacy and voicing out civic interests. 
However, even though considerable in funding size, the EEA Grants NGO Programmes were able to 
respond only partially to the enormous demand from the field by supporting in average about 10% of 
the coming proposals in the different countries. 
(3) The Programmes are diverse in size, strategic approach and focus, but bridged by a common 
objective and an overall set of priorities and outcomes. Their major strength is the focus on the 
effective functioning of the NGO sector to mobilize citizens, expand collaborations and partnerships, 
and to interact effectively with governments for changes on the societal level. Their major challenge 
was the delayed start of the programmes implementation. This confined the initial five year 
commitment to around three years for actual implementation.  
(4) The level of cooperation and strategic coherence among the NGO Programmes and the other EEA 
Norway Grants Programmes is low or missing in the majority of the beneficiary countries. This will 
                                                 
1 The NGO Programme in Croatia was approved in April 2014.  
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limit the effectiveness of putting in practice the cross cutting principles of the EEA and Norway Grants 
of good governance and sustainable development. Civil society and NGOs are a natural part of these 
cross cutting principles and need to be part of the programming in the relevant other areas, in addition 
to the specialized NGO Programme.  
Management set-up 
(1) The EEA NGO Programmes are modeling an innovative and effective approach to management of 
public funds outsourced to organizations independent from the governments. The selected Operators - 
individual non-profit organization or partnerships, are legitimate and highly visible actors for social 
change recognized for their professionalism and integrity. They are viewed by stakeholders as more 
effective in managing public funds than government entities due to their commitment, experience and 
knowledge of civil society.  
(2) The majority of Operators of the NGO Programmes (13) are directly contracted by the Financial 
Mechanism Office, the Secretariat in Brussels for the EEA and Norway Grants (FMO), and only four 
are contracted through the National Focal Points (NFPs). Based on the evaluation, direct contracting by 
the FMO is more efficient and effective. It provides a streamlined mode of communication and 
reporting, and it ensures strategic coherence across countries. 
(3) The FMO now has a more demanding role as a Programme Operator, with direct oversight of 
thirteen Fund Operators in the beneficiary countries. Contracting and assistance was generally 
effective. But under the stress of a shortened timeframe and insufficient human resources the oversight 
of the Programmes was dominated by controls for procedural compliance and management of risks 
rather than focusing on results and impact.  
(7) A major challenge to the effectiveness of implementation was the lack of fit between the EEA Grants 
legal framework and procedures and the nature of the NGO Programmes. Designed for large-scale 
government Programmes, the EEA Grants procedures were not always flexible enough to 
accommodate innovation needed for civil society development. With no single specific document 
regulating the NGO Programme, the clarifications regarding some of the rules and procedures has been 
time consuming for both the FMO and the Operators. 
Efficiency of Operations  
(1) The project application process was effective and efficient, ensuring outreach to different segments 
of civil society in the beneficiary countries. A great number of the Operators had differentiated 
approaches to small, medium and large grants. In some cases there were simplified conditions for small 
and micro projects, which made funding accessible to small and less developed NGOs. 
(2) The evaluation of projects was effective and efficient and done in a transparent way. The common 
procedures for all countries were tightly prescribed to guarantee transparency by outsourcing the main 
weight of the project evaluation to external experts. The selection process was observed by 
representatives of the FMO, the donors and the government. 
(3) The role of the Selection Committee and the Operator however was unclear - to rubberstamp 
outside evaluators scoring, or to strategically review it according to the portfolio and/or Programme 
strategy. More successful were those Programmes that applied innovation within the rules to the extent 
possible to ensure strategic quality of the selection process. 
(4) Overall the role of the Operators is largely limited to technical re-granting of the fund. The success 
of the calls for proposal depended on the ability of the NGO sectors to respond with quality and 
innovative initiatives. Such capacity was limited especially with small organizations, as well as in some 
areas and at the level of NGO sector systemic change. A more proactive role of the NGO Operators is 
needed to stimulate new ideas and capacities of the NGOs and the NGO sector. Dedicated 3% of the 
management fee to the Operators for capacity building was insufficient and could cover mostly project 
specific capacity development related to application and grant management only.  
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(5) Despite the challenges the NGO Programmes were very efficient. In the first year and a half since 
their official start, the NGO Programmes have reviewed 8916 applications and approved 957 projects 
for a total value of € 53,793,561 in all countries except the Czech Republic and Greece, where selection 
was still in the process at the time of the evaluation. The number of projects supported by the NGO 
Programmes comprises about 60% of all projects supported by the other EEA and Norway Grant 
Programmes. NGOs consider the NGO Programmes as much more efficient than other public funding 
programmes. 
Effectiveness 
(1) The NGO Programmes effectively allocated funds to projects in the defined priority areas and 
supported the relevant outcomes. More than 84% of the awarded funding is in support to project 
initiatives strengthening the roles and capacity of civil society in various aspects of democracy, human 
rights, antidiscrimination, gender equality, youth empowerment, social inclusion and empowerment of 
vulnerable groups, good governance and sustainable development. About 16% of the allocated funds 
support welfare and basic service provision to the most vulnerable groups as defined in this Programme 
area.  
(2) While it is too early to measure the final effectiveness and impact of supported projects, the finding 
of the evaluation is that many are meaningful and will be activating important change processes at 
different levels. Supported organizations are diverse and include different segments of civil society - 
leading national organizations (advocacy, watchdog, human rights, etc.) as well as small local 
organizations. The ratio among these differs per country. The high commitment and motivation of 
supported NGOs are promising in terms of the potential to contribute towards the selected outcomes in 
a sustainable way.  
(3) At the level of organized civil society the main contribution of the Programmes is growing civic 
infrastructure – contributing to strong civic organizations, networks, coalitions and joint action. 
Initiatives that link established national NGOs with local grassroots organizations are especially 
effective in providing capacity in critical areas of democracy and human rights. Very important is the 
investment in the ability of NGOs to activate citizens and represent their interests vis-à-vis 
governments. 
(4) Sustainability of civic organizations remains a fragile area that needs targeted attention. Strong 
civic organizations will be needed in the long term. A culture of survival is blocking the vision and 
energy of NGOs for change and innovation. The support of the Programmes towards sustainability of 
the NGOs and the NGO sector is still sporadic. There is a need of investment in developing new 
thinking and capacity of NGOs for diversifying funding beyond only projects by raising public trust, 
support and donations and developing income generation initiatives that can make NGOs independent.  
(5) At the level of the broader society, the Programmes contributed both to the strategic positioning 
and visibility of civil society as well as to growing citizens’ capacity to act at local and community 
levels. A number of the supported initiatives are putting important core values of democracy, social 
justice and human rights on the agendas of communities, politicians and the general public. This has 
started seeding new attitudes, but change can only be expected in the long term. At local level the 
initiatives work on nurturing engagement of citizens to demand for their rights to be upheld, to 
volunteer, to embrace causes, and to hold governments accountable. This is especially important for 
growing social capital of active citizens and groups, as well as to make NGOs more constituency-
based.  
(6) At the regional and European level the NGO Programmes have a lot of potential, yet need further 
attention. The Programmes were actively involved in the European Campaign No Hate Speech of the 
Council of Europe as a strategic partner of the EEA and Norway Grants. The regional meetings and 
exchange among the Operators were very valuable, as well as learning and networking among project 
promoters and with NGOs from Donors countries.  
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(7) In terms of bilateral relations, 112 projects in the different countries are bridging civil societies 
from Donor and beneficiary countries. They are valued, but mostly driven by project applications, with 
limited time to develop real partnership relations. This, together with the complicated procedures 
hampers their effectiveness. The Bilateral relations fund needs rethinking and redesigning towards 
more strategically-driven and issue-led initiatives stimulating regional networking and innovation 
among NGOs from multiple countries.  
 
Recommendations for the 2009-14 Financial Mechanism 
(1) Keep the consistency of strategy designs in the remaining two years of implementation in order to 
ensure optimizing its effectiveness upon completion of the Programmes.  
(2) Develop further the operational capacity of all those involved in the project evaluation process 
(selection committee, individual evaluators etc.) by improved communication mechanisms among 
them, training provision, follow up assessment of the process to identify lessons learnt and clarity 
on the role of the Selection Committee. 
(3)  Increasing  the strategic communication and visibility of the Programmes needs to  become a 
priority for the remaining two years of the implementation and wherever possible more resources 
need to be allocated for communication activities 
(4) Use current Operators as a strategic stakeholder group to inform the strategy for the next 
Financial Mechanism. Regional events planned within the complementary actions can also serve to 
discuss critical areas related to common gaps of civil society development that inform strategically 
the new financial mechanism.  
(5) Improve the learning system of the current NGO Programmes by facilitated discussions with the 
Operators on the overall strategic framework and the outcomes and indicators system of learning 
(6) Review of the Capacity Building matrix and its further use for measuring change by a working 
group involving Operators, as well as some of their partners in providing capacity development 
(predefined projects or others). 
 
Recommendations for the Next Financial Period  
Programme Scope and Modalities 
(1) Continue and expand the size of support to the NGO Programmes in the beneficiary countries to 
better respond to the enormous demand and to build on the created momentum of multiple 
processes of change that has started.  
(2) Provide for five years implementation of the Programmes in order to ensure their effectiveness 
and impact. Options include: seven year commitment of the Programmes with five years for 
actual implementation, or earlier start of the negotiation of the Programmes, if possible in 2015 
after the last projects are funded, not waiting until projects are finalized in April 2016. 
(3) Ensure strategic place and coordination of the support of civil society as part of the overall EEA 
and Norway Grants funding linked with the crosscutting principles of good governance and 
sustainable development. 
(4) Consider introducing a quota for thematic small grants schemes within other EEA and Norway 
Grants Programmes to stimulate better cross sector collaboration and joint work of NGOs and 
institutions. These schemes could be entrusted to be managed by independent non-profit actors, 
including the Operators of the NGO Programme if they have the capacity for that in addition to 
managing the NGO Programme.  
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(5) Close the gap between the two financial periods by introducing a Bridging Fund facility for 
action grants to civil society.  
(6) Continue the good practice of stakeholder consultations in the different beneficiary countries to 
ensure responsiveness of strategies to the needs of civil society. 
(7) Continue the current strategy priorities with some optimization based on learning from the 
current Financial Mechanism. Strengthening the functional capacities of civil society as a 
safeguard of democracy needs to remain the core of the new strategy. Critical aspects are 
expanding the constituency base, effective communication to build public support, enhancing the 
policy influence capacities (advocacy, watchdog, monitoring), collaboration and joint action, and 
sustainability of civic organizations. 
(8) Keep the scope of the Programmes broader and more open to accommodate diverse needs and 
opportunities, but require clear justification of the chosen focus and approaches of the suggested 
strategy of the Operators from the beneficiary countries in the process of strategy approval.  
(9) Simplify and streamline the overall strategic framework with clear links among priorities. We 
suggest that leading outcomes are consolidated in three outcome areas (engaged citizens, 
strengthened NGOs and civic infrastructure and enabling environment).  
(10) We propose to keep the current programme areas (improving the formulation) and to include 
“Sustainability of the NGO Sector” in the core areas as a focused investment in systemic change 
and sustainability. The “Welfare and basic service provision” needs to be redefined into a more 
focused area of “Social inclusion and empowerment of vulnerable groups” that will grow NGOs 
capacity for advocacy and empowerment of vulnerable groups which will respond  better to the 
objective of the Programmes. 
(11) Horizontal concerns need to be integrated as priorities in the relevant areas of the Programme. 
They will be met most effectively if they are present as specific measures within the core areas of 
democracy, human rights and equality. 
(12) Continue the approach of strengthening the plurality of civic action by targeted support to 
leading national NGOs in key areas and to small local and grassroots organizations as well as 
stimulating the linkage among them. To stimulate accessibility of the funds to local 
organizations, additional criteria to encourage applications from priority regions and targeting the 
local level of intervention in some of the Programme calls can be introduced. 
(13) Envisage further diversification of grants per type of NGOs depending on their role in the 
strategy implementation and their needs for capacity development. Options to consider: 1) longer 
term strategic grants for institutional support of leading NGOs or networks ( focus on funding 
strategies not funding of projects); 2) project grants (combining capacity development and 
activity grants); 3) small seed funds to support grassroots initiatives of small local NGOs and 
informal groups combining action grants with intensive coaching for capacity development; 4) 
action grants to support quick and visible civic response to emerging issues. 
(14) Earmark separate funds for strategic capacity development of the civil society sector, including 
proactive capacity building, networking, targeted discussions and other work with the entire non-
profit sector (not only grantees).  
(15) A possibility to consider is the introduction of a New Initiatives Seed fund at the discretion of the 
Operator – providing seed money to stimulate a proactive search of innovative solutions of key 
identified issues by convening NGOs, informal groups and other stakeholders. 
(16) Support regional projects (within the targeted EEA countries) by allocating a certain percentage 
of the funds under each outcome to such projects (e.g. involving a minimum of 3 partners from 3 
different countries). 
(17) Consider redesigning the bi-lateral funds for the NGO Programmes in a more coordinated, 
strategic manner by introducing two types of measures 1/ strategic regional measures investing 
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in issue-based networks and multi-country initiatives involving NGOs from the donors countries 
and NGOs from more than one beneficiary countries and 2/ bi-lateral exchange and study trips 
for groups of NGOs from the beneficiary countries to the donors countries and visa versa; 
awareness raising and learning initiatives; study visits among the beneficiary countries facing 
similar problems with involvement of partners from donor countries to assist the process of 
exchange and learning. 
Management Set Up 
(1) Promote the Civil Society Programme into a Global Civil Society Fund hosted by the FMO and 
managed by strategic implementing partners/Operators in the beneficiary countries. This will 
foster the potential of the Programmes as a strategic European regional fund with country specific 
strategies tailored to the local needs and identified in consultation with local stakeholders by the 
selected country Operators which will ensure the ownership of the Programmes by civil society on 
country level. It will also provide for a clearer structure, level of staffing and specific procedures 
and rules, and will expand possibilities for strategic partnerships with other donors.  
(2) Establish a Strategic Oversight Board of the Civil Society Programmes/Global Fund with 
representatives from the FMC, leading NGOs from the donor countries, and experts with 
knowledge of civil society from the beneficiary countries. This will contribute to a substantive 
outcome oriented process rather than an administrative focus and monitoring of the Programme. 
(3) Ensure regular strategic communication with the National Focal Points by improved strategic 
coordination with the NGO Operators at country level, or by including communication on the 
Global Civil Society Fund during the Annual meetings of the NFPs. This strategic partnership 
approach can provide for discussing the civil society issues (including co-financing) on a more 
strategic level by identifying areas of support of importance to optimize the application of the good 
governance and sustainable development principles. 
(4) Continue the good practice of entrusting the management of the NGO Programmes to 
organizations independent from the governments with commitment, experience and knowledge of 
civil society and trust within the NGO sectors.  
(5) Streamline the status of all NGO Programmes through their direct contracting by the FMO, not 
through the National Focal Points to ensure more effectiveness, strategic oversight and political 
risk management. 
(6) Allow for re-appointing of strong Operators of the NGO Programmes who have already been 
previously selected by open tenders based on close monitoring and performance evaluation. 
(7) Clarification of the roles and responsibilities, as well as of the level of flexibility and risk taking 
will be beneficial for all participants in the management set up – the FMO and the Operators of the 
NGO Programmes. 
Recommendations at the operational level 
(1) Include strategic communication initiatives stimulating greater public awareness of the role and 
achievements of civil society (incl. project promoters). This should help build trust and public 
support for NGOs acting as catalysts for change, and engage citizens in public debate on critical 
issues of society. 
(2) Better focus predefined projects to optimize investments at the level of systemic change. Some 
possibilities to consider include a focus on systemic capacity building; and a focus on common 
issues that are of importance to more countries, where comparative analyses and expanded 
opportunity for regional actions could be included. 
(3) Allow strategic selection of predefined project promoters that are clearly dominating the specific 
area instead of a competitive project application procedure, where the competition would in any 
case put them in the winning position.  
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(4) Complementary actions on the regional level should have a stronger focus and regional design. 
Consider a common fund for regional exchange and joint action based on a common strategy and 
planning among Operators.  
 Recommendations related to Procedures 
(1) Update existing procedures based on a shared vision among the Donors, the FMO and the 
Operators on possible flexibility and risk taking which can enable the NGO Programmes to 
accommodate innovation and be more effective in meeting the objective of the Programmes. 
(2) Upgrade the existing Guideline for NGO Programmes into a single document with rules and 
procedures for the management of Funds for NGOs as an Annex to the Regulation. 
(3) Increase the management costs for smaller programmes. 
(4) Provide strategic programming costs of the Operators additional to the management costs to grow 
the capacity of the sector and ensure strategic communication of NGOs and the Programme to the 
public.  
(5) Allow further re-granting by Operators to intermediaries to provide micro and small grants to 
grassroots initiatives, informal groups and small organizations. Change eligibility criteria to 
include grassroots and informal groups for this category of fund. 
(6) Diversify the selection procedure according to the type of grants and better use of the experience of 
the Operators. This could be done in a way that ensures the selection processes are based on the 
obligatory principles of transparency, quality and impartiality, yet responsive to the specificities of 
the particular funding instrument and local context. 
(7) Delegate more decision-making power to the Selection Committee on the portfolio level. One 
option is that each Operator develops overarching selection criteria (portfolio criteria), e.g. 
geographic distribution, innovation, or other strategic considerations. Based on these, the selection 
committee can suggest modification of the ranking lists. 
(8) Encourage a two-stage project application process which is linked to targeted capacity building. 
Simplify the concept format, focusing on capacity of the applicant. Ensure that the full proposal 
will be reviewed by the same assessors. Provide the applicants selected at the concept phase with 
the possibility to use technical assistance/guidance/advice from a pool of experts supported by the 
Operator in the preparation of the full proposal. 
(9) Change the “economic benefits” provision (Regulation, Article 5.4.2.). Interpreting sources from 
fundraising and revenue generating activities as profit and forcing organizations to use it within the 
project is in conflict with the purpose of strengthening civil society, an important part of which is 
sustainability of NGOs. Allow and provide incentives that raised income and support may be used 
to support the NGOs mission and long-term work. Exclude the NGO Programmes from the rules on 
state aid. 
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Introduction  
 
1. The Task  
The EEA Financial Mechanism (2009-2014) have committed  € 160,4 million to support seventeen 
NGO Programmes in sixteen countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Spain. The overall objective of the EEA Grants NGO Programmes is strengthened civil society 
development and enhanced contribution to social justice, democracy and sustainable development in 
each of the beneficiary countries. As of 30 of June 2014, 957 projects in total of € 53,793,561  have 
been supported mainly in the fields of democracy, citizen participation, human rights, social justice and 
empowerment, sustainable development and provision of basic welfare services.  
 
The mid-term evaluation of the NGO Programmes funded by the EEA Financial Mechanism (2009-
2014) is an independent formative evaluation. Its objective was two-fold: 1) to assess the progress and 
needs for improvement of the current Programmes, and 2) to inform policies for the next financial 
period.  
The main purpose of this evaluation was to provide an expert independent mid-term assessment of the 
contribution of the EEA Grants 2009-2014 to the NGO sectors in the beneficiary states operating NGO 
Programmes. The evaluation was of dual nature: (1) of a formative evaluation to identify progress and 
needs for improvement of the current Programmes and (2) of a forward oriented strategic review to 
inform policies for the next financial period. 
More specifically the evaluation's objectives entailed:  
(1) Explore the strategic relevance (extent to which the key political concern of supporting the NGO 
sectors in the different countries has been met; relevance of chosen priorities and approaches, of 
specified outcomes and chosen strategies to achieve them). 
(2) Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of management set up (at the level of the FMO and at the 
national levels in the beneficiary countries; key strengths and weaknesses of different set ups) 
(3) Review grant system and processes: promotion and outreach, clarity and transparency of selection, 
efficiency and comprehensiveness of procedures 
(4) Assess the effectiveness of the Programmes (expected achievements related to the Programme 
objectives, specified outcomes and outputs; extent of addressing the bilateral relations ; effectiveness in 
addressing the horizontal concerns; of use of capacity building tools; key factors contributing to 
success; main bottlenecks and challenges in implementation of the Programmes) 
(5) Forecast impact and sustainability prospects and the added value of the Programmes’ contribution 
to the development of the NGO sectors in the different countries: 
(6) Provide recommendations for improvement of the current Programmes and for the next financial 
mechanism based on emerging lessons: 
The evaluation covered all countries except Croatia, where the NGO Programme was approved only in 
April 2014. Based on the TOR the evaluation needed to go more in-depth into selected Programmes in 
8-10 countries to assess progress so far, while also providing an overview of the NGO Programmes in 
all countries.  
2. Approach and Methodology 
The leading evaluation question as in the Terms of Reference was the extent to which the key political 
concern of supporting the NGO sectors in the different countries has been met. While it is too early to 
assess the impact of the Programmes on developing civil societies able to contribute to social justice, 
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democracy and sustainable development, we explored: a) how the Programmes have defined success in 
this direction, b) how they have organized operations and activities towards this success, c) the 
likeliness of achieving the stated outcomes and d) the gaps and needs to be further addressed, including 
in the next financial period. 
A challenge was that most of the projects supported by the NGO Programmes are at an early or mid-
term level of implementation and cannot provide enough evidence on accomplished results, outcomes 
and sustainability. To meet this challenge we utilized theory of change and outcome mapping, 
combining assessment of effects so far with forecast analyses on potential for making a difference. We 
looked at the extent to which the NGO Programmes have identified the right civic organizations and 
activities that will increase the capacity of the sector to trigger social change within the priorities of 
EEA and Norway Grants. 
Our approach was based on close cooperation with the FMO and the Operators of the NGO 
Programmes in the beneficiary countries, to stimulate reflection on learning from the Programme 
implementation. Especially useful was the meeting of all Operators of the NGO Programmes, 
organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw, in June 2014. Discussions on efficiency, 
effectiveness, success factors and bottlenecks of the procedures and processes there were invaluable for 
informing the evaluation process. The conclusions and recommendations of this meeting are in 
Attachment 3 of this report.  
To meet the complexity of the evaluation in terms of tasks, geography, Programme dimensions and 
diversity of stages of implementation we employed a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative 
and quantitative data collection and analysis. The instruments involved: (1) documentary review of key 
EEA Grants NGO Programme documents and documentation of the Programme Operators, (2) Online 
survey/questionnaire with all organizations supported by the NGO Programmes, (3) semi-structured 
interviews with different stakeholders including the FMO, MFA, FO and PO, the NFPs in selected for 
in-depth assessment countries, other donors and civil society stakeholders, (4) three types of focus 
groups - with grantees, with external experts participating in the project selection process of the 
Programmes, and with other stakeholders, (5) site visits and interviews with project promoters.  
In terms of studied NGOs, as the evaluation is of formative nature, the methodology involved in-depth 
study of the experience of the NGOs that received funding from the Programmes. The opinions of a 
limited number of other NGOs (rejected or never applied), as well as of civil society experts and other 
stakeholders was considered too   
3. Implementation 
The evaluation covered 15 out of the 16 beneficiary countries and was implemented in the period May-
September 2014 by a team of CREDA Consulting consisting of 11 experts based in eight of the 
beneficiary countries. Implementation involved:  
(1) Online survey 
The online questionnaire translated in local languages was sent to 1088 organizations that have been 
contracted to implement the 957 projects in 13 of the 15 beneficiary countries. Following the agreed 
methodology with the FMO, the survey was sent only to project promoters that were already contracted 
in the different countries. The number of organizations that have received the questionnaire is higher 
than the number of supported projects - 957, as probably partner organizations have been included in 
the distribution list. In addition some NGOs have received more than one grant by the Programmes. 
Out of the 1088 NGOs that received the survey 354 NGOs have responded leading to a 33% overall 
response rate. The answers are relatively proportionally distributed across all countries, which ensures 
the representativeness of the sample. 
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Replies to on-line survey of Project Promoters 
Completed 
questionnaires 45 35 18 22 42 29 70 48 7 7 9 - 18 4 
Response rate 40% 23% 30% 55% 26% 51% 33% 50% 35% 18% 13% - 27 100% 
Due to a technical mistake in the system the survey was sent to fewer organizations in Latvia, for which 
we apologize. To compensate that, we increased the number of focus groups and interviews with NGOs 
in the country. 
The cumulative results from the survey are in attachment 4 of this report. 
(2) In depth assessment in selected countries with application of all methods 
The evaluation involved in-depth work in 8 focus countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. There we employed a National expert, supported 
by junior experts (in the five countries with biggest number of supported projects). Assessment 
involved field work and applying all data collection methods mentioned above. The Team leader and 
Quality control manager of CREDA also joined the assessment process in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland 
and Latvia. 
(3) Observation of the Operators’ meeting in Warsaw June, 2014 
Four members of the evaluation team participated as observers at the meeting.  
(4) Additional site visits to two countries 
In addition to the above 8 countries the assessment involved brief site visits of the senior CREDA team 
to two more countries – Cyprus and Slovenia. There, the evaluation involved the survey sent to all 
grantees, in-depth interviews with the Operator of the Programme, meetings with the NFPs and one 
focus group with grantees.  
(5) Phone interviews with the rest of the countries 
In the rest of the countries – Greece, Spain, Czech Republic and Malta we applied the survey to 
grantees, the review of key Programme documents, and interviews with the Operators of the 
Programmes in person or by phone.  
In total 630 respondents participated in the evaluation. Out of them 607 were different 
stakeholders from 15 countries participated in the evaluation (through in-depth interviews or 
participation in focus groups). Their distribution per type of stakeholder is illustrated in the Table 
below. 
 BG H LV LT PL P RO SK CY SI EE GR E MT 
Interviews & focus groups 
Norwegian Embassies 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 - - - - - - 
National Focal Points 4 - 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 - - - - 
Operators staff 9 6 4 12 8 3 24 14 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Project Promoters 59 27 41 33 60 30 47 36 8 9 - - - - 
Assessors/Selection comm. 4 15 5 7 11 7 11 3 - - - - - - 
Other NGOs and CS experts 7 - 7 12 12 1 7 1 - - - - - - 
Other donors 1 3 1 2 2 - 2 - - - - - - - 
Operators of other EEA/N Programmes 
and related public officials 3 - 3 2 4 - 4 - - - - - - - 
We want to thank all of the participants for sharing their views and the time spent, especially the FMO 
and the Operators. Without their help, this evaluation would not have been possible to organize.  
4. Limitations 
The main limitations of the evaluation relate to its timing, due to vacation time in the summer it was 
more challenging to organize data gathering and meetings. It was also a stressful time for some of the 
Operators, as they were in the middle of project selection processes.  
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Another limitation, which is more country specific, was the situation in Hungary. This mid-term 
evaluation took place during the government-led investigations and accusations toward the NGO Fund 
Operator and the suspension of other EEA and Norway grants. This affected the evaluation in various 
aspects. First, much less organizations responded to the online survey, as it coincided with the 
investigation of government. Second, it was an extremely stressful time for the Operator to reflect 
strategically, when they had Government Control Office KEHI at their offices. And third, it is the only 
country where we did not succeed to get the views of the National Focal Point as at the time of the 
evaluation, it did not exist. Attempts to interview some of the observers at the Selection Committees, 
also failed as most of them are already not working in the relevant ministry. The few who still do did 
not respond to our request.  
By the time the report was being finalized, the Hungarian tax authority suspended the tax numbers of 
the Fund Operator following police raids in the offices and personal homes of two of the consortium 
partners. In the current circumstances, the concern of the partner organizations of the Consortium that 
they will be forced by the government have unfortunately come true. Serving as Fund Operator has 
been in strong alignment with the values of the organizations administering the funds, allowing them to 
maintain their grant-making function within civil society. However, the role has proven to place the 
organizations in the consortium, all of which have other grant-making and operational programs under 
severe threat in terms of their legal ability to operate. They currently risk to be closed permanently 
while the staff and partner organizations are in fear of being attacked. The individuals themselves are 
under extreme pressure and uncertainty about their own personal security. 
5. About the report 
We named this report “Out of the Box: Providing Oxygen for Civil Society” based on two phrases 
coming often in interviews and focus groups with stakeholders. The title actually captures some of the 
main messages of the report. In the current funding environment the EEA Financial Mechanism policy 
to support the effective functioning of civil society is an “out of the box” approach as compared to 
other public funding. It rescues and provides “oxygen for civil society” at a difficult time when civic 
organizations fight for survival. At the same time in order to reach the demanding purpose of the NGO 
Programme it needs to get “out of the box” of tight compliance with procedures and risk prevention and 
adopt more flexible, risk-taking and diversified approaches that better accommodate innovation and in 
turn create new thinking and acting of civil society.  
The report consists of two main parts: the Main report and Country specific reports.  
The first 5 chapters of the Main Evaluation Report present summaries of the findings across the 
counties organized around: 
• Strategic relevance and coherence; 
• Efficiency and effectiveness of management set up and procedures; 
• Grant systems and processes; 
• Effectiveness of support to projects; 
• Effectiveness of specific components common for all countries. 
Wherever possible, generalizations of issues common for all countries are offered. Comparative data 
for the different programmes is presented and concrete examples are highlighted. Where appropriate, 
some of our immediate conclusions are included. Detailed country-by-country analysis is offered in 
part two of the report – Country Reports.  
Our conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6. Of The Main Report – Making a Difference? 
Conclusions and Emerging Lessons. 
Our Recommendations are offered in Chapter 7. Looking Forward: Recommendations. 
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Chapter 1: Strategic Relevance and Coherence  
 
I. Why Civil Society Programmes? 
 
1. Key contextual trends 
At present the EEA and Norway Grants are the major source of funding providing consistent 
support in the 16 beneficiary countries in Europe aimed at fostering the development of strong 
civil societies able to contribute to social justice, democracy and sustainable development. This 
support came at a critical time for the beneficiary countries. They all share a European identity 
and as older or newer European members they have committed to basic principles of rule of law, 
respect of fundamental rights and individual freedoms, which are the building blocks of any 
functioning democracies. The question is to what extent these core European values are actually 
put in practice. The diverse gaps in individual countries are determined by the specific 
combination of contextual characteristics including diverse history, democratic traditions and 
level of development of civil societies. 
There are several contextual aspects that determine the need for support to vibrant civil 
societies: 
• Making democracy truly functional. Democracy is not only a ritual of regular casting of 
votes. Democracy is also about structures that serve as checks and balances of the political 
institutions. It is about active citizens who have the energy, the willingness, the tools and 
the opportunities to influence the decision-making process done on their behalf. The first 
aspect (having the energy and the willingness) requires supportive actions at the 
individual level, “nurturing citizens”. The second aspect (the tools and the opportunities) 
requires interventions at systemic level that would make possible for the civic engagement 
and energy to influence the decision-making process. 
• Overcoming the mistrust toward government and strengthening the functioning of 
democratic institutions. All European societies are facing disillusionment of part of the 
population with and questioning of the benefits of democracy and of a united Europe. 
Such “negative constituencies” vote in representatives that vocally oppose the basic 
principles of democratic societies (inclusiveness, solidarity, respect and protection of 
human rights), - and peddle nationalism, and populism. The new phenomena of massive 
civic protests in the past two years (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Portugal, Spain) 
rising against the impotence of elected governments to handle societal issues and 
economic crises highlights the magnitude of the problems and the existence of civic 
energy that needs to be captured and channeled for the societal benefit.  
• Preventing the attitudes pendulum from going into the xenophobic extreme. The 
results of recent European Parliament elections - right wing nationalist parties gained 25% 
of the seats - as well as the political shifts in some of the countries indicate some 
fundamental shifts in public attitudes. European societies today are exhibiting growing 
negative trends of rising xenophobia, intolerance, populism and social tensions. 
Vulnerable groups are increasingly seen as scapegoats “responsible” for the nation states’ 
failures. There is an urgent need of reinvention of inclusive societies by more effective 
approaches to human rights. Strong civil society, including at the local level, capable of 
providing “bonding social capital” is instrumental in that regard.  
• Inclusive responses to the challenges of the economic crisis. The high unemployment in 
most EU member states (particularly among the young) pushes citizens into a “survivalist 
mode” and into low participation. Frustrated by the economic situation votes have 
contributed to the shift towards the right end of the political spectrum. This also decreases 
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the aptitude to social solidarity. The latter also needs to be redefined and reinvented – 
complementing the centrally-managed redistribution with local and community level 
supporting systems.  
Strong and independent civil societies (active citizens, groups and organizations) are even more 
needed in Europe today to respond to negative trends and challenges. However, the effectiveness 
of playing this role will depend on the strategic capacities of organized civil society and its 
legitimacy, trustworthiness and recognition by decision makers and the broader society. 
2. Civil Societies in beneficiary countries: key assets, gaps and challenges 
The history and development of civil society in the beneficiary countries is very diverse. In some 
countries it emerged “organically” and on its own and has a long history. In other countries its 
development was also extensively supported by donors as assistance for the democratization of 
the post communist societies in the past 20 years. In general, the current civil society map in the 
different countries is dotted by numerous and diverse NGOs, but only a small share of them are 
considered active. Among the geographic and historic diversity of the different beneficiary 
countries, the existing civic infrastructure (networks, coalitions, platforms, resource centers) 
varies significantly, as well, and depends on the history and culture of the individual NGO sectors  
We should emphasize however, that while the individual reports provide specific detail on all the 
aspects of civil society development in each of the countries, there is a consensus, discernable in 
the interviews and focus groups discussions, that the main assets of organized civil society are 
the commitment, motivation and dedication of its human capital - the teams, volunteers and 
supporters involved. There are numerous good practices in approaching issues of importance for 
the people and the society as a whole; there are multiple new approaches and models in the stage 
of development; there is substantial evidence of advocacy that led to improvement of legal 
frameworks and policies. NGOs in the beneficiary countries have been on the forefront of voicing 
out the interests of vulnerable groups and have proven that they can be very helpful (and in many 
instances indispensable) in providing timely and meaningful services to a variety of groups in 
society. 
The most serious gap identified in all countries was the limited funding and the resulting struggle 
for survival of numerous NGOs. The uncertainty makes it difficult to keep their staff. Space and 
resources for strategic thinking, capacity development, joint action and consistent communication 
with the public at large are very limited. Cooperative ways of working are often blocked by 
constant competition for project funding. There is uneven development of the sectors with a 
growing gap between its different segments: small local organizations vs. big established well 
funded ones, new organizations and groups vs. old ones; social provision vs. advocacy and 
watchdogs. Another serious issue is the missing resources to build new civic leaders and to ensure 
continuity among older and newer generations of leadership.  
On a broader strategic level there are four interrelated challenges for civil societies that can be 
outlined across borders, identified by the interviewed stakeholders. 
(1) The constituency challenge 
Limited or missing constituency support is a critical challenge to NGOs in the majority of the 
countries. The NGOs with very few exceptions are not rooted in broad membership and have the 
nature of small active groups of committed individuals that got together around an issue or a 
cause, and/or due to opportunities for support, especially in the post-communist countries. Even if 
they put forward meaningful initiatives, it is critical to assess to what extent they are vocal and 
heard, i.e. visible to the public, and thus, growing trust and more supporters for the causes they 
work for. If NGOs are isolated and not embedded in a broader public support it is much easier to 
politically manipulate the public in negative imaging of civic organizations. 
In a number of beneficiary countries, a tendency reported by multiple respondents was that the public 
at large knows very little about the role of NGOs and the trust is comparatively low. As outlined in 
interviews, it seems the NGOs especially in new EU member countries missed the opportunity to work 
 3 
for increased public visibility in the relatively stable period after joining the European Union and 
before the economic crises. There are wide spread negative perceptions that NGOs are “noise makers” 
and pursue personal aims. In some countries work in the sector is not deemed as attractive by young 
people. 
(2) The legitimacy challenge 
Governments’ recognition of the importance of the civil society role of NGOs to represent and 
advocate for civic interests is low in the majority of the countries. NGOs are accepted as 
contractors of services, implementers of policies; they are often invited in consultative bodies but 
their input and critical feedback on policies is not easily accepted. At the same time, increasing 
fragmentation due to the competition for limited funds has weakened the ability of the NGO 
sectors to advocate effectively for civic interests with central governments. In many countries it 
was reported that cooperation with local governments is more successful, but mostly in the area of 
service provision and community development. In some countries, (e.g. Poland, Spain, Slovenia) 
there is an established practice of co-financing provided by the governments; which is missing in 
other countries. In addition, government co-financing is vulnerable to austerity measures and has 
been reducing in a number of countries. 
Relations between NGOs and governments can also be much politicized. There is a perception, 
that preferential support and partnerships are established with NGOs favored by the relevant 
governments. Especially in post-communist countries with dramatic political shifts, the NGOs and 
critical voices to governments have been repeatedly painted as the “enemies and agents of foreign 
issues and interests”. 
The most recent case is in Hungary with the current attacks of the Government against the NGOs 
operating the EEA Grants NGO Programme and the NGOs supported by it. The operating 
environment for Hungarian NGOs has become more restricted in terms of diversity of funding 
sources, and the support for approaches grounded in values of pluralism and democracy.  In 
essence, this has put strong limitations on organizations focusing on watch-dog, human rights and 
democracy work.  
As watchdog and rights-based organizations often receive funding from external sources, the 
government alludes that the organizations are “promoting foreign interests” with agendas and 
values “undermining the interests of Hungary”. In this context, the Government Control Office 
(KEHI) investigations of the Norway/EEA NGO Fund Operator and grantees in the summer of 
2014 served a clear sign of intimidation and messaging of the government’s stance toward these 
organizations. The move has created a climate of instability and insecurity for all civil society.  
In September 2014 the Hungarian tax authority suspended the tax numbers of the NGOs members 
of the consortium which is the Fund Operator of the EEA Grants NGO Programme following 
police raids in the offices and personal homes of two of the consortium partners. This threatens 
their existence and operations as legal entities. Leaders and members of the staff, as well as 
beneficiary organizations supported by the Programme are under extreme pressure and 
uncertainty. 
Such attack against civil society is unprecedented in European Union history and is in clash with 
European values and democracy. This raised strong solidarity action in support to basic principles 
of democracy that were violated in Hungary. An appeal signed by 975 NGOs from over 32 
countries called on the higher institutions of the European Union to take a stand against the recent 
anti-democratic actions in Hungary. The raids against the Fund Operator were referred to as ‘an 
unprecedented demonstration of force' within the borders of the European Union.2  
(3) The sustainability challenge 
Struggle for survival is a crosscutting trend that is characteristic for the NGOs in all beneficiary 
countries. This relates to the nature of existing funding and sources of income of NGOs.  
                                                 
2 http://www.esurveyspro.com/Survey.aspx?id=ed23ae97-2927-4f60-874f-1313f9a30958 
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The main sources of funding at the moment are the EU funds and Programmes, which are 
predominantly channeled through the central or local governments. Funding is available mostly 
for service provision and is much more limited for support of civic infrastructure, advocacy and 
human rights protection, with few exceptions. Some EC programmes provide support to human 
rights and advocacy (e.g. EC programmes of Human rights and democracy, Europe for Citizens), 
but they are accessible to a very small number of well-established NGOs in the different European 
countries.  
While in some of the countries governments have allocated support to civil society from their own 
budgets, there is a tendency of reducing government support to NGOs due to austerity measures 
and the increasing budget cuts in the social sphere, By rule, governments especially in post-
communist countries are not eager to fund advocacy initiatives and controversial areas related to 
critical feedback on the dysfunctional application of democratic principles and values. 
Very few bilateral or private donors are still active in the region. The most significant of them is 
the Swiss contribution which provides CHF 85 million for projects that strengthen the 
participation of civil society in social and economic development in 10 of the beneficiary 
countries3. 
The private donors that have provided support to growing civil society in post-communist 
countries have withdrawn or reduced their support to those that became EU members. Open 
Society Foundation (OSF) continues support through its regional programmes. Few of the 
National OSFs continue grant-making with their own funds. The newly established Open Society 
Foundation Europe (OSIFE) is providing support to organizations working on human rights and 
combating discrimination and xenophobia in Europe. C.S Mott Foundation continues providing 
long-term general support to a few leading organizations in some of the beneficiary countries 
mostly in the area of philanthropy. In very few countries like Bulgaria, Poland and Romania civil 
society is supported by the legacy organizations of the American Enterprise Funds. Most 
extensive is the support provided by the America for Bulgaria Foundation; and the most 
interesting is the approach of social innovation applied by the Romanian American Foundation.  
Local philanthropy and individual giving in support to civil society is underdeveloped.  
There are some positive trends - 2% tax, donating platforms, corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. Newly established private and corporate foundations usually support their own 
initiatives, not NGOs. There are a few private philanthropies, which provide more consistent 
support. They focus mostly on support for educational and cultural initiatives; and very few 
venture in the human rights or other democracy issues. The individual donations and corporate 
giving is still mostly of a charitable nature (support to social or health issues of individuals or 
groups) and rarely to civic initiatives on controversial issues like respect for human rights, Roma 
inclusion, or various aspects of democracy etc. Some new mechanisms, such as the SMS-
donations and the user supported content of public interest sites have been on the rise. Most of the 
money collected, however, is for supporting humanitarian assistance or small initiatives. 
Income generation and social enterprises have some successes but, once again, they are confined 
to the fields of culture, education or inclusion of people with different impairments.  
Membership fees and raised individual donations are insufficient income for the NGOs with small 
memberships and limited support from broader public constituencies. This, together with very 
little experience in systematic income generating activities makes NGOs in the region dependent 
on project funding which has a serious implication on the culture, capacity and sustainability of 
the NGO sectors in two interrelated aspects:  
• Dependency on project funding distributed mostly through governmental agencies may 
jeopardize the independence of NGOs to voice out the interests of the groups they represent. 
This is especially true in the majority of post-communist countries, since democratic values 
                                                 
3 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia 
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and traditions are younger than in most other EU member states. It is critical to keep the 
independence of the sector and identify the balance and connection between its different roles 
in regards to governments –as watchdogs and advocates and as partners for development. 
• The NGO sectors are gradually transformed into a service provision instrument for social 
services outsourced and contracted by central or local governments. This reduces the NGO 
sector’s civic mobilization, watchdog and critical feedback capacity – all of which contribute 
to good systems of checks and balances as part of healthy democracies.  
(4) The innovation challenge 
The ability to change while working for social change requires innovation in thinking and acting 
to respond to new realities. While this is an important element of the strategic capacity of the 
NGO sectors, it is part of its main challenges. Based on interviews with stakeholders and focus 
groups this challenge relates to the following aspects: 
• Support for innovation and experimenting of new civic approaches is missing. Most of the 
available public funding programmes, which are currently shaping the NGO sectors, have 
rigid procedures and do not provide flexibility and space for that. Innovation often implies 
higher risk, which is usually discouraged and potentially also linked to financial risks of the 
grantee. 
• Innovation is often blocked by the NGO struggle for survival. The instability limits the 
space for developing new organizational thinking and acting. The NGOs become risk averse 
and prefer using the familiar practices and the messages. Doing things in a new way and 
identifying new niches requires organizational resource, including the human resource base 
to innovate.  
• There are a number of innovative tools and tested approaches as a result of funding in the 
past. However, critical learning on what works or not is missing. Sharing and learning that 
can boost innovation but is also often impeded by high competition for the same funding, 
and lack of external actors to convene organizations and stimulate generative thinking  
While the national NGO sectors are facing their challenges with innovation, the nature of civic 
action is rapidly changing worldwide. There is a new energy of individuals and groups beyond 
traditional NGOs - informal groups, bloggers and informal platforms in social media. NGOs are 
no longer the only indispensable agents in starting and supporting social movements. At the same 
time, competent use of social media channels (Twitter, Facebook, Digg, Reddit to name just a 
few) and information tools such as mobile apps opens up vast possibilities for NGOs to deliver 
their message and build their constituencies. Crowd funding has radically changed the domains of 
fundraising, allowing them to tap into new resources both locally and globally. 
A critical challenge for both donors and NGOs is how to grasp the new dynamics, how to tap into 
this new energy for social change of various pop up civic initiatives, new interactive spaces and 
communities. 
 
II. The Response: EEA Grants NGO Programmes’ Strategies 
1. The New Focus and Overall Strategic Framework of the EEA Grants Support to Civil 
Society 2009-2014  
As compared to the NGO Funds in the previous financial period, the new NGO Programmes of 
the EEA Grants (2009-2014) pursue their mission but add some considerable changes in terms of 
policy, geographic coverage, focus, anticipated changes and design and structure.  
Based on the interviews with the FMO’s Civil Society Sector team several main shifts are of 
importance to the new NGO Programmes: 
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• In terms of policy, there is a continued strong interest of the donors to support 
strengthening of civil society as a critical factor for sustained democracy and good 
governance. The support to civil society became mandatory under the 2009-14 period, 
where at least 10% of all EEA Grants for each country had to be allocated for the NGO 
Programmes. Geographically, the number of beneficiary countries with NGO Programmes 
increased from 12 to 17 including Spain, Malta, Greece and most recently Croatia.  
• There was a new targeted focus on outcomes or the desired changes the Programmes will 
contribute to. A set of ten outcomes have been identified as leading the NGO 
Programmes4.  
• Thirdly, from being widely spread across all thematic priorities of the EEA Grants in the 
past, the current NGO Programmes have a priority focus on the area of democracy, 
equality and human rights, additionally fostered by a set of specific donors’ horizontal 
concerns and the increasing attention to capacity building of civic organizations. 
• And last but not least, there was much more clear definition of the competences of the 
Operators managing the Programmes. As compared to the last Financial Mechanism there 
is much higher tendency of direct contracting of the Programmes by the FMO rather than 
through the NFPs. 
In addition, the design of the new NGO Programmes was marked by the overall shift of the EEA 
Grants from project-based to a programme-based financing model following a Results Based 
Management approach.  
As a result, the overall strategic framework of the NGO Programmes which is leading the design 
of the country strategies is quite complex and multidimensional. We tried to outline it in the Table 
“Overall Strategy at a Glance” on next page. 
The strategy is led by an overarching goal and 10 outcomes guiding the work in priority areas. Of 
highest priority is the area of Democracy, equality and rights, where 1/3 of the overall funding 
will be allocated. A second priority area is - Social services to vulnerable groups with a focus is 
on service provision of specified vulnerable groups where services are missing or not adequately 
provided by state institutions. Environment and sustainable development is an additional eligible 
area with a focus on civic aspects of environmental work - civic activism, strengthening of civic 
infrastructure, advocacy and awareness raising.  
Functional priorities across Programme areas include capacity building of NGOs and the NGO 
sector; horizontal concerns adding additional emphasis on issues of equality, human rights and 
democracy; bilateral relations, as well as the requirement that 10% of the overall funding should 
be allocated for children and youth. As all EEA and Norway Grants Programmes, the NGO 
Programmes need to integrate the three cross cutting principles of good governance, sustainable 
development and gender equality.  
Programmes need to integrate the three cross cutting principles of good governance, sustainable 
development and gender equality. A key moment of the overall strategy of the NGO Programmes 
is that its country implementation is entrusted to Operators selected by an open call which have to 
be strong NGOs with extensive grant-making experience, knowledge, trust and links with the 
NGO sectors and independent from Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 http://eeagrants.org/What-we-do/Programme-areas/Civil-society/NGO-Programmes/Overview 
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Table 1: Overall strategy at a glance 
 
Objective 
Strengthened civil society development and enhanced contribution to social justice, democracy and 
sustainable development 
 
 
Anticipated Outcomes 
 (1) Active citizenship fostered 
(2) Increased involvement of NGOs in policy and decision-making processes  
(3) Cross-sectoral partnerships developed with governmental organizations at local, regional or national 
level  
(4) Democratic values, including human rights, promoted 
(5) Advocacy and watchdog role developed 
(6) Developed networks and coalitions of NGOs working in partnership 
(7) Strengthened capacity of NGOs and an enabling environment for the sector promoted 
(8) Increased contribution to sustainable development achieved 
(9) Provision of welfare and basic services to defined target groups increased 
(10) Empowerment of vulnerable groups 
 
 
 
Programme Areas Common Policy Aspects 
Priority areas 
 
(1) Democracy, equality and rights  
 (at least 1/3 of the overall funding) 
• Democracy, 
• Human rights, anti-discrimination, multicultural 
dialogue 
• Good governance 
• Gender and equality 
• Fight against poverty and social exclusion 
 
Additional eligible areas 
 
(2) Provision of welfare and basic services 
Focus on specific vulnerable groups and on services that 
are missing or are not adequately provided by 
governmental institutions. 
 
(3) Environment and climate change 
• Sustainable societies and development 
• Civic participation and local involvement 
• Coalition and networking 
 
 
Donors horizontal concerns: 
• Hate speech, extremism and hate crime,  
• Racism and xenophobia, homophobia, 
• Anti-Semitism, 
• Tolerance and multicultural understanding, 
• Roma inclusion,  
• Sexual harassment, violence against women 
and trafficking 
 
EEA Grants cross-cutting principles 
• Good governance; 
• Sustainable development 
• Gender equality 
 
10 % of total eligible funding to be allocated for 
youth and children 
 
Specific focus on capacity building of the NGO 
sectors: 
(capacity development and support, peer 
exchanges, training and mentoring) 
 
Bilateral relations 
Support to networking and partnership between 
NGOs in the beneficiary and donors countries 
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2. NGO Programmes Strategy Frameworks in the Beneficiary Countries  
Following the proportionality principle of 10% fund allocation of all the eligible EEA Grants for 
each of the beneficiary countries resulted in a quite diverse size of the Programmes in the different 
countries.  
Table 2 NGO Programmes: Allocation of funding 
 Country Operator  Programme Name Programme 
size (€ million ) 
W/ co-
financing  
Size of co-
financing 
(€ million) 
1. Poland Consortium: 
Lead partner Stefan Batory 
Foundation; partner Polish Youth 
Foundation 
Citizens for Democracy 37.0  
2.   Romania Consortium: Lead partner Civil 
Society Development foundation;  
partners: 
NGO Fund for Romania 36.3  
3. Hungary Consortium: Lead partner 
Hungarian Environmental 
Partnership Foundation  
Partners: Demnet, Carpathian 
Foundation, Autonomia Foundation 
The NGO Fund in 
Hungary 
 
13.5 
 
4. Bulgaria Consortium:  
Lead partner Open Society Institute 
Sofia; partner Workshop for Civic 
Initiatives 
The NGO Programme 11.8  
5. Latvia Society Integration Foundation  10.9 0.5 
6. Czech 
Republic 
Civil Society Development 
Foundation (NROS) 
The Czech NGO 
Programme 
9.8  
7. Portugal Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Active Citzenship 
Programme 
8.7  
8 Greece  Bodossaki Foundation We All Are Citizens 7.3  
9. Lithuania Consortium: 
 Lead partner Human Rights 
Monitoring Institute; partner OSFL 
Projektai 
The NGO Programme 5.5  
10. Spain NGO Platform of Social Action Active Citizenship 
Programme 
4.7 0,1 
11 
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Slovakia Consortium:  
Lead partner Ekopolis Foundation ; 
Partners: Children of Slovakia and 
Socia Foundation  
Active citizenship and 
inclusion Programme 
3.7 
 
 
Open Society Foundation – 
Bratislava  
Democracy and Human 
Rights Programme 
3.7 
 
 
13 Estonia Open Estonia Foundation The NGO Programme 2.3  
14 Slovenia Consortium:  
Lead partner Regional 
Environmental Center; Partner 
CNVOS 
NGO Programme 1.9  
15 Cyprus Consortium:  
Lead partnerPrice Waterhouse 
Coopers; Partner First Elements 
Euroconsult Ltd 
Funds for NGOs for 
Cyprus 
1.5 
 
0.1 
16 Croatia  National Foundation for Civil 
Society Development 
The NGO Programme 1.3  
17 Malta Solidarity Overseas (SOS) Malta The NGO Programme 0.5  
   Total  160.4 0.7 
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As it can be seen from Table 2 the largest allocations are in Poland and Romania (€ 36,3-37 
million); in six countries (Greece, Portugal Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary) they 
are average high (in the range of € 8.7 to € 13. 5 million); four Programmes in Lithuania, Spain 
and the two Programmes in Slovakia are in the range of € 5.5 – € 3.7 million) and the remaining 
five Programmes (Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Croatia and Malta) are very small ranging from € 
0.5 to € 2.3 million. 
Some of the Programmes are neutrally named “NGO Programmes” and “NGO funds”, while 
seven of the Programmes have names that carry their leading objective, substance and the focus of 
the work - active citizens, democracy, inclusion and human rights. This is a good practice to 
message out the “mission” of the Programme in its broader meaning to society, rather than 
focusing on the instrument for change - the NGOs.  
The overall strategic framework is guiding the country strategies of all the NGO Programmes but 
providing space for the selected Operators to identify best approaches to respond to priority needs 
of local civil societies. This resulted in diverse strategic translations of the framework as specific 
focus, approaches and programmatic components. The specifics of the strategies depended on the 
vision for change of the selected Operators, rooted in consultative processes and research of civil 
society, as well as on the size of fund allocation in the different countries.  
Each NGO Programme country strategy is unique in its way of approaching the objective and the 
predefined overall framework. It involves a complex set of strategic measures, approaches, 
programmatic components aimed at achieving a different number outcomes selected from the 10 
outcomes leading the general framework.  
The outline of each country strategy is provided in more detail in the country reports. Overall, 
several key elements can be outlined.  
In terms of areas of support: 
• All Programmes have a priority focus in the broad area of “Democracy, equality and human 
rights”. The different aspects within this area (participatory democracy, human rights, good 
governance, anti-discrimination, multicultural dialogue, gender and equality, fight against 
poverty and social exclusion) are present as core priorities, and in a number of countries as 
specific thematic components. 
• The area of “Provision of welfare and basic services” is present in the majority of the 
countries, but with different accents. In some it focuses mostly on the service provision, in 
others it is also linked with the empowerment of vulnerable groups. 
• The additional area of “Environment and sustainable development” is present in the majority 
of the countries, but has different weight and meaning. In a number of countries (e.g. 
Hungary, Romania, Slovenia) it is very focused on approaches to expand capacity of 
environmental movement and organizations to contribute to sustainable development. This is 
also linked with the fact that some of the strongest grant-making organizations in the area of 
environment and civil society are part of the consortiums managing the Programmes. 
In terms of functional or specific elements across programmatic areas: 
Donors horizontal concerns which were introduced after approval of the Programmes relate to 
specific attention on overcoming negative trends in environment related to hate speech, extremism 
and hate crime, racism and xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism, sexual harassment, violence 
against women and trafficking, need of tolerance and multicultural understanding and of Roma 
inclusion. As most of them are linked to already defined priorities within the Democracy and 
Human rights they are present as integral components in this area. They were also added as 
consideration across all the other Programme areas.  
Capacity development of NGOs and the NGO sectors had a growing weight in the strategies of 
the Programmes. It was present in the initial Terms of reference for design of the strategies and 
was further strengthened by additional tools and compulsory and optional indicators to measure 
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progress in applied capacity development. As a result, all Programmes provide the option of 10-
15% of eligible amount of the grants to be used for capacity building by project promoters. In 
addition, some Programmes (e.g. Bulgaria) have specific components targeted at expanding 
capacity of NGOs in identified areas. In other countries, (e.g. Slovakia SK10, Romania, Lithuania) specific pre-defined projects are targeting capacity building on sector level or in important specific areas e.g. fundraising.  
In terms of outcomes:  
Each Operator has chosen a different set of outcomes from the menu of 10 outcomes from the 
overall strategic framework. Committed support per outcome is illustrated in the Figure below. 
 
 
While the country strategies are organized around Programme priority/thematic areas, the 
outcomes are leading in their reporting systems on implementation, effectiveness budget 
allocation.  
As it can be seen from Figure 1, two outcomes have leading weight as budget commitment - 
“democratic values, including human rights promoted” and “active citizenship fostered”. They 
are followed by “increased provision of basic and welfare services” combined with a relatively 
high level of commitment on “empowerment of vulnerable groups”. Some countries differ from 
the general picture. Thus in Bulgaria priority in terms of budget allocations is given to “Increased 
involvement of NGOs in policy and decision-making processes” and “Empowerment of 
vulnerable groups”. 
In regard to NGO capacity related outcomes, higher is the allocation on strengthened capacity of 
NGOs and improved environment for NGO work, followed by advocacy and watchdog role 
promoted, and less commitment of funds to developed networks and coalitions of NGOs. Lower is 
the allocation on the capacity of NGOs to influence policies- increased involvement of the NGOs 
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in policy and decision making at different levels, and the lowest - on partnerships with 
government at different levels.  
The least popular outcome of cross sectoral partnership with government at different levels is 
present only in Romania, Slovenia and Spain, with a higher allocation in Romania. At the same 
time, in some countries like Portugal cross sector partnership with government at different levels 
is present as an output under other outcomes. The second least popular outcome related to the 
capacity of NGOs to influence policy and decision making is present in six countries - Bulgaria, 
Romania, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia.  
The other eight outcomes are combined differently in the country strategies as weight in budget 
allocation. None of the outcomes has allocated more than 50% of the overall re-granting budget in 
any of the countries. In the table below we offer the comparative weight of the outcomes per 
country and per % of the budget allocation. The colors are different for the ranges 0-10%, 11-
20%, 21-30%, 31-40% and 41-50%. 
Table 3. Comparative weight of outcomes per country (% of budget allocation) 
 Democratic 
values, 
including 
human 
rights, 
promoted 
Active 
citizensh
ip 
fostered 
Welfare 
and basic 
services 
to defined 
target 
groups 
increased 
Strengthened 
capacity of 
NGOs and 
an enabling 
environment 
for the sector 
promoted 
Empower
ment of 
vulnerable 
groups 
Advocacy 
and 
watchdog 
role 
developed 
Increased 
contribution 
to 
sustainable 
development 
achieved 
Increased 
involvement 
of NGOs in 
policy and 
decision-
making 
processes  
Developed 
networks 
and 
coalitions 
of NGOs 
working in 
partnership 
Cross-
sectoral 
partnerships 
developed, 
with 
government 
at different 
levels 
BG 15% 10% 10% 9% 17% 5% 11% 18% 6%  
HR 14%   36% 12% 37%     
CY 40%  35% 25%       
CZ 36% 24% 13% 0% 7%  20%    
ET 38%   24%  38%     
GR 31%  45% 12%  13%     
H 21% 10% 10% 5% 10% 18% 10%  16%  
LV 10% 39% 49% 1%       
LT 14% 8% 15% 22% 6% 13%  17% 5%  
MT 40%      10%  50%  
PL 17% 17%  31% 17% 17%     
PT 26%   26% 34%   13%   
RO 13% 14% 24% 4% 12% 6% 13% 6% 6% 4% 
SK 10% 35% 9% 6% 17% 9% 6% 8%   
SL  17%   17% 26%   27% 13% 
ES  34%      25% 25% 15% 
While the overall and country outcome picture provides some outline of the strategic focus of 
attention per outcome, it needs to be used carefully for three reasons. First, the outcomes are 
defined too generally and the concrete “spelling” of their meaning may differ in the different 
strategies. Second, there is also significant overlap between the different outcomes, and some of 
the outcomes by default have more than one meaning. And third, as outlined in interviews with 
the Operators of the NGO Programmes, budgeting per outcome is challenging and often may 
provide a “fake” picture as different interventions and supported projects may result in more than 
one outcome. 
In terms of grant-making approaches and instruments:  
The picture of country strategies is also very diverse in terms of type of instruments, how they are 
combined and applied in the different strategies:  
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• Some of the grants relate to thematic support (with integrated capacity development 
element) targeted at individual organizations and/or partnerships and networks. A number 
of Operators also planned diversified size of grants (small, medium, large) which is a 
good approach to address the diversity of NGOs in terms of needs and capacity.  
• Other instruments relate to systemic change at sector level, which is approached in a 
different way. Some strategies have specific systemic grants (Poland), or targeted grant-
making components (e.g. some of the above-mentioned capacity building components in 
Hungary, Romania and Lithuania).  
• Predefined projects are another instrument for work on systemic change. In a number of 
countries the predefined projects envisage mapping of the NGO sectors or specific areas, 
others plan different strategic initiatives related to important aspects of the development of 
the sectors.  
• Last but not least are the envisaged strategies in the framework of Complementary action 
which is a budget line supporting complementary activities to the core grant-making 
activities of the Operators. Regionally, this includes exchange and learning among 
Operators and with similar entities in donor countries. It also relates to the involvement of 
the NGO Programmes in the regional campaign “No Hate Speech” led by the Council of 
Europe as a strategic partner of the EEA and Norway grants. The in-country aspect of the 
Complementary action includes activities that are linked with the strategic work of the 
Operators with the entire sector and/or specific themes related to the priorities of the 
Programme, including on horizontal concerns.  
3. Relevance of the strategies  
3.1. Relevance to context and needs of civil society 
Based on the feedback from all respondent groups that participated in this evaluation, the NGO 
Programmes supported by the EEA Grants are of very high relevance to the contextual challenges 
and needs of the civil society in the beneficiary countries: 
• They provide targeted support to strengthen the role of civil society to counteract to the 
growing negative trends in society and to build broader public support to the core values and 
practices related to democracy and human rights.  
• This support is very timely and coming at critical times for the NGO sectors in the beneficiary 
countries which are facing the challenge of staying alive with limited and reducing funding 
from other sources. Especially important is that the NGO Programmes focus on areas that 
relate to the civic meaning of NGOs - advocacy, watchdog, public awareness, promotion of 
core values of democracy related to human and civil rights and freedoms. Funding for this is 
very limited or missing. 
• The NGO Programmes provide support for developing the capacity of NGOs to carry out 
effectively their mission - to act as catalyst for active citizens’ engagement and to serve as 
check and balance for policy development and implementation. Support to organizational 
development is practically missing in most of the countries. As referred in interviews the 
Programmes are “rescuing the NGO sectors out of the dead zone of mere survival”, they are 
"the oxygen for real civil society work".  
• Support as envisaged in the strategies is relatively longer term. The Programmes have five 
year commitment, and some of the strategies provide options for 2-3 years support to projects 
and organizations.  
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3.2. Relevance of strategic design  
The following aspects of the relevance of strategic design can be outlined: 
• In terms of focus: 
We consider that the main asset of the NGO Programmes is that they are focused on the 
functional aspects of organized civil society. Rather than investing in thematic sectors and sub-
sectors they are aiming at strengthening the role of civil society to stimulate change processes and 
outcomes of importance to viable democracies and sustainable development. The majority of 
respondents also see as main strength of the design that it is not closed in one or two specific 
thematic areas and provides opportunity for support to a variety of organizations and societal 
issues. This way the Programmes support plurality of approaches and independent voices to 
overcome social injustices, gaps in state welfare services, blockages that prevent fulfillment of 
fundamental human rights, and protect the environment as an asset for future generations.  
At the same time a concern raised by the FMO team is that strategies in some countries may be 
spreading too thin among the multiple priorities. Looking at the country strategies, some seem 
more “all inclusive”, others are more focused. However, in our view focus does not always mean 
fewer priorities and fewer components. Based on the evaluation in the countries, there are some 
good examples of strategies with multiple components that are strategically coherent and 
complementary to each other, expanding the impact towards the overall objective (e.g. Poland, 
Romania, and Hungary). The strategic link among them is the growth of the functional capacity of 
the sector and they invest in the plurality of civil society.  
The question of focus is especially important for smaller Programmes which have much less 
funding to meet the high demand for support from the NGOs in the relevant countries. Some 
Programmes chose a more narrow focus. One example is Malta which has the smallest NGO 
Programme despite the usually high demand. The Operator had no choice but to identify a 
strategic niche to invest in support for development of civic networks in priority areas, which are 
missing in the country. Another example is Lithuania, where the Programme has a clear focus on 
Human Rights as an overarching priority and supports leading organizations in this area. At the 
same time even though the Programme is providing support to other areas too, it is perceived by 
some NGOs in the country as too narrow to respond to the broader objective of strengthening civil 
society which requires reach out to broader segments of civil society and to local level initiatives.  
What the right level of focus is remains a very difficult question due to the high demand for 
support from all segments of civil society in the beneficiary countries. This is a challenge for both 
big and small Programmes but especially stressful for the smaller ones that have high level of 
oversubscription. There can hardly be a uniform answer on what is the best option - narrower or 
broader focus.  
The best is to continue the diversified approach of leaving open space for the Operators to define 
and justify the focus of their strategies in the process of negotiation at the start of the Programmes. 
This will depend on the size of overall funding, the identified niches for interventions and the 
capacity of the Operator to invest the resources in an optimal way to ensure maximum 
effectiveness towards the objective and desired change.  
Based on the interviews with stakeholders the additional area of environment and sustainable 
development is viewed as important, especially in its focus on growing capacity of the 
environmental NGOs to mobilize citizens locally, to reach out to broader audiences and to 
collaborate and carry out effective advocacy. We consider that it has also great potential to 
respond to the priority attention of the Programmes to youth engagement, as in many countries 
young people get motivated by the environmental causes.  
We find the focus of support on basic and welfare services as not very relevant to the objective of 
the Programme to strengthen civil society. It is not always clear what the aim is of this part of the 
NGO Programmes support. Is it support to provision of services, or it is support for capacity of 
service provision NGOs to be more than just silent implementer of state services? NGOs have a 
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lot to offer especially in the area of social innovation. However, sustaining new approaches and 
models will depend on the ability of NGOs to advocate for their mainstreaming. It is important to 
support the development of capacities of the NGOs that deliver services to voice out the needs of 
those served, rather than being just an efficient contractor to the State. 
• In terms of overall strategic framework:  
Based on the views of both the Operators and partly of the FMO, as well as on our assessment, the 
overall strategic framework is overcomplicated, with too many priorities as areas, predefined 
outcomes, horizontal concerns, cross cutting issues and functional elements across Programmes. 
This confuses the hierarchy of priorities and their coherence. There is a significant overlap among 
different elements (e.g. democracy area and horizontal concerns), among outcomes and between 
outcomes and activities. As already outlined budgeting under outcomes due to lack of clarity or 
overlap of their meaning is artificial. All this makes reporting at country levels very challenging 
and what is more, it confuses the systems for learning which are critical for civil society 
programmes.  
A second important aspect relates to innovation. We were asked by the FMO to look for the level 
of innovation of the Programmes in two aspects: as approaches to support civil society, and as 
results -  stimulating new types of processes and outcomes - civic initiatives, new groups and new 
civic energy, new models for resolving issues of society. However, in our view such innovation 
needs openness and flexibility, and often more creative and proactive approaches. It is 
questionable whether this can be achieved only by traditional calls for proposals with sometimes 
very rigid procedures, which makes the Programmes responsive to what comes from the field.  
The question is whether “the field” is ready with innovative responses. For example, NGOs in 
some focus groups were actually not happy with the requirement for innovation. “With scarce 
resources to keep organizations alive, we need funding for basic work”. If the NGO Programmes 
want to support innovation this will require diversified approaches, more proactive work to 
nurture creative thinking and new ideas “out of the box” of survivalist culture that is dominating 
the NGOs in the region. This in turn requires much more flexible procedures and risk taking, 
which the Programmes and the FMO are missing at this stage. 
Two more challenges relate to the time for implementation and size of support: 
• Programmes are very ambitious and the time needed to achieve and sustain social change 
in the priority areas will be much longer than the five year timeframe of the current 
Financial Mechanism.  
• The demand and the development needs of the NGO sector to become a viable catalyst for 
social change is much higher than the size of support provided by the EEA Grants in the 
different countries. Despite the comparatively large scale of funding that the NGO 
Programmes bring in many of the countries, they are still limited in meeting all these 
needs effectively, mainly due to the fact that funding critical areas of work of civil society 
is very limited or missing. 
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Chapter 2. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Management set up and 
Procedures 
 
I. The Operators of the NGO Programmes 
 
1. The Process of Selection and Appointing of the Operators of the NGO Programme  
The Funds for Non-Governmental Organizations is the only Programme area of the EEA Grants 
where there is a requirement for the Operators to be independent of Governments – usually 
Foundations, selected through open calls. This was the practice in both previous and current 
Financial Mechanisms. The POs of all other Programmes are in most of the cases Ministries or 
state agencies, nominated by Government. The Regulation allows that the requirement is waived 
in exceptional cases. In the current Financial Mechanism this was done in Latvia and (recently) in 
Croatia. 
The negotiation of the NGO Programmes and selection of its Operators follows a strict procedure 
described in the Regulation5. This involves agreement on the text in the MoU on the NGO Fund 
and relevant specific concerns, stakeholder consultations, and selection of the Operators. The 
Operators are selected and contracted either directly by the FMO or by the NFP.  
The direct procedure included call for expression of interest, short-listing best candidates, 
developing and sending TORs to short-listed organizations, appraisal of the bids and decision on 
the Programme. In the non-direct procedure the NFPs were organizing the open calls. The practice 
of direct contracting emerged in the previous Financial Mechanism when three NGO funds 
(Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) were contracted by the FMO due to the need to speed up the 
process. Based on the evaluation of the NGO funds in the previous Financial Mechanism this 
model was considered as more efficient and effective. 
Open calls for selection of the Operators (launched by either FMO or NFP) were applied in all 
countries except in Latvia and Spain where the Society Integration Foundation (a public fund) and 
the Platform of Social NGOs respectively were directly appointed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding agreed between between the Government and Donors as the Operator of the NGO 
Programmes.  
Stakeholder consultations were implemented in each country and the results were reflected in the 
respective TOR for selection of the Operators. This is another distinctiveness of the NGO 
Progamme Area as compared to other EEA grants progammes, where stakeholder consultations 
are said to be scarce or missing. In most of the countries the consultative process for the NGO 
Programmes involved stakeholder meetings organized by the FMO. Only in Poland was this 
process much more structured. The NFP and the FMO outsourced the process to the Public 
Benefit Works Council - a consultative and advisory body to the Minister competent for social 
security6. The process took three months and involved broad social consultations using online 
platforms, questionnaires and sector level meetings.  
NGO Programme Operators were selected based on a clear set of requirements and criteria7 
covering three main areas: 
                                                 
5 Regulation Art. 4.2.4 (Programmes where the FP appoints a PO in consultation with the FMC) and Art. 5.13 
(Programmes in which the FMO is designated as Programme Operator). Guideline for NGO Programmes, 3.4. 
NGO Programme Operator characteristics.  
6 http://www.pozytek.gov.pl/Public, Benefit,Works,Council,538.html 
7 EEA Financial Mechanism 2009-2014. Programme Area “Funds for Non-Governmental Organisations”. 
Guideline for NGO Programmes. 
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• Knowledge and understanding of the NGO sector (ability to respond to needs, strong ties 
with the sector, trusting relationships, and strategic capacity to support the growth of the 
NGO sector); 
• Independence from government at all levels (free from direct or indirect political 
considerations); 
• Experience and capacity to lead and manage grant-making Programmes (experience in 
managing grants and strong record in providing capacity building support); 
The process of selection of Operators is viewed by stakeholders as innovative for the EEA Grants 
and strategically relevant to the objective of the support to the civil society. The strength of the 
NGO Programmes is that they allowed for a consistent effort to identify the best in-country actors 
able to lead and manage the Programmes, moreover consortia of 2 and more organizations 
complementing each other’s competences and experience were welcomed. This demonstrates that 
the essence of these Programmes is not just a technical disbursement mechanism, but an 
investment in the development of civil society. Selecting Operators who are linked with the NGO 
sector and have strategic and management capacity to invest in its development is a key success 
factor towards the objective of donors support to civil society.  
On the downside, the effectiveness of this process was reduced by significant delays in the 
different stages of its implementation. The selection of Operators of the NGO Programmes could 
start only after signing the MoU with each country which was delayed in most of the cases.  
The second round of delays related to the process of selecting the Operator and reaching 
agreement with the NFPs. This varied among the countries. In a few of them (e.g. Bulgaria and 
Portugal) the selection process was pretty fast. In others it took from 8 months to more than a year 
and a half. Delays were due to reasons of different nature: the long process of final proposal 
approval by the FMO and signing of PIA (reported in a number of countries), appeal of rejected 
applicants disagreeing with the rejection (e.g. Czech Republic), unplanned withdrawal of 
applicants (Greece) and different positions of the Donors and the NFP on the selection of the 
Operator (Poland). It should be noted that despite the delays the NGO Programmes were among 
the first that started operation and launched calls for proposals.  
In 8 out of 12 countries the Operators selected through the tender were the same organizations that 
operated the NGO Funds in the previous Financial Mechanism. This was the case in Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania (with one additional partner in 
the consortium). The open tender despite of other candidates did not generate better offers for the 
management of the Programmes (as quality of proposals and set of capacities). It may also relate 
to the fact that in each country very few entities can combine needed extensive grant-making 
experience with strategic knowledge and ties with the NGO sectors, while being independent from 
governments.  
The delays of the start of the NGO Programmes turned into the most serious bottleneck of its 
implementation. Their five year commitment was practically reduced to 2–3 years for actual 
project implementation. This put a lot of stress on all aspects of the NGO Programmes – short 
time frame to implement the strategy designed for 5 years, preparation and launch of the calls, 
selection and recruitment of external experts, management and monitoring of grants, reporting, 
etc. Thus in the Czech Republic due to very late start of the Programme the initially planned 3 
calls had to be reduced to 2 organized in quick succession with little possibility to integrate any 
learning from the first one. The considerable delay in the selection of the Operator and the start of 
the Programme seriously affected implementation in Greece, too – it will be much shorter than 
originally planned. 
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The negative implications of the delays upon the effectiveness and impact of the Programmes 
came as a recurrent message at meetings of all Operators8 and throughout this evaluation. As it 
was best phrased by one of the Operators “Preparing the start of a Programme for more than a 
year and a half to implement it for only two years is not effective, especially if it is to invest in 
civil society development”.  
2. The Results of the Selection 
The current Financial Mechanism has 17 Operators of NGO Programmes in 16 countries (in 
Slovakia the Programmes and respectively their Operators are two). As compared to the previous 
Financial Mechanism, four countries were added – Malta, Spain, Greece and most recently 
Croatia.  
Currently, 12 out of the 16 Programmes covered by the evaluation have the FMO as Programme 
Operator which in turn contracted directly Fund Operators. Four NGO Programmes are contracted 
through the NFP: in Latvia, Spain, Czech Republic and Cyprus. The organizations managing them 
are named “Programme Operators”.  
The mosaic of selected Operators of the NGO Programmes in the 15 countries (Croatia is not 
covered by this evaluation) is diverse as concerns management set up, capacities, approaches and 
record of previous experience. Some key aspects include: 
• All Operators are non-profit organizations/Foundations with the exception of the Operator 
in Cyprus which is a partnership of two companies and the Operator in Latvia who is a 
public foundation established with a Law by the Government; 
• Eight of the Operators are partnerships of two organizations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Lithuania and Poland) or larger consortia of 3-4 partners in Romania, Slovakia 
(SK10) and Hungary. At least one of the consortium members has strong grant-making 
experience; 
• In seven countries the NGO Programmes are managed by a single organization - a leading 
grant-making foundation in Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovakia (SK03), or a 
leading operational NGO in Malta and an NGO platform in Spain; 
• Eight of the Operators have the experience of managing the NGO funds from the previous 
Financial Mechanism.   
Based on the evaluation, a number of the Operators with experience form the 2004-2009 Financial 
Mechanism put a lot of effort to discuss the lessons from the management of the NGO Funds and 
integrate them into the strategies of the current ones (e.g. this was part of the process of design of 
the new Programmes in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). This in our view helped the strategic 
continuity of the EEA Grants investment in civil society in the relevant countries. In addition, 
Operators already had knowledge and capacity in complying with EEA Grants procedures, which 
helped the efficiency of the start-up and the implementation of the Programmes.  
The rest of the Operators were newcomers – as new Operators or as new countries with NGO 
Programmes. They came with different level of expertise and capacities in managing public funds. 
They had the challenge to quickly learn the specific rules and procedures as required by the EEA 
and Norway Financial Mechanism. This in cases brought a lot of stress on their management 
system. It also required much more assistance and communication with the FMO in clarifying 
procedural matters. The main problem again was that time for learning and assistance at the start 
of the Programmes was very short due to the overall delay of their start. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Memo from Operators Meeting in March 2014, direct observations and Memo from the Operators Meeting in 
Warsaw, June 2014 
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3. Profile of the Management Set Up on Country Level: Strengths and Challenges. 
Based on an in-depth assessment of the Programmes in eight of the countries, the Operators come 
with different experiences and level of capacities. The management set up in each country is in a 
way unique in this respect.  
While this is highlighted in more details in the country reports, the following strengths of country 
management set ups can be outlined:  
(1) The legitimacy and visibility of the Operators as leading actors for assisting social change 
and development is an added value and a key factor for the success of the Programmes.  
The majority of the Operators have over 15 years of experience in providing support to different 
aspects of development of civil society in their countries. They are well positioned and respected 
as leading grant-makers and actors in their fields of expertise. For a great number of them the 
objectives and priorities of this Programme (promoting democracy, civic and human rights, 
protecting the environment, social inclusion and justice, as well as assisting the growth of civic 
groups and organizations) are at the heart of their mission.  
Most Operators are independent from Governments and their experience in these fields is widely 
recognized and valued by the NGO communities. As phrased in several Focus Groups, the 
Operators’ main asset is that they are not the Government –they belong to the non-profit sector 
and care about it.  
There are two exceptions of different nature. The Society Integration Foundation (SIF) in Latvia 
is seen as a public “semi-independent” foundation, established with a Law in 2001 by the 
Government which directly participates in its Board9. While there was agreed recognition among 
the NGOs that SIF is very professional in managing grants support, due to its direct links with the 
Government it is seen more as a technical grants provider and not as a developer setting the 
agenda of civil society. 
The second exception is the Operator in Cyprus which is a partnership of two companies (Price 
WaterHouse Cooper with First Elements Euroconsult Ltd). Interestingly, the focus group with 
project promoters did not outline problems with the fact that the Operator does not belong to the 
non-profit community. Our observations also confirm that the Operator is knowledgeable about 
the sector, and moreover, it successfully managed the NGO Fund in the previous period, and it 
has the advantage of having a professional outside and unbiased perspective on the sector. Its 
deficits in developing the capacity of the Cypriot NGOs were compensated by extending a grant 
to the NGO Support Centre, aimed at mapping the non-profit sector and capacity building. 
(2) All Operators have high professionalism and expertise needed for managing the Funds.  
All Operators offer extensive and diverse experience related to some or all of the priority areas 
and the managerial aspects of the Programme. We met with excellent and professional teams with 
shared commitment to make the Programmes a success. The size of allocated human resources 
differs depending on (a) the size of the Programme, (b) the number of partners in consortia, (c) the 
management fees, (d) the strategies for the Programmes implementation and (e) the established 
successful management practices of the Operators. The two largest Programmes (€ 36-37 million) 
involve 35 staff (Romania) and 19 (Poland). The average sized Programmes (€ 10-13.5 million) 
have staff of 24 (Bulgaria) and 17 (Latvia). The smaller Programmes of € 3-4.7 million have staff 
of 6 (SK03) and 8 (SK10), and Lithuania – 10 people. The smallest Programmes have staff of 2-4 
people. The numbers mentioned refer to full and part time staff, the ratio being very diverse, 
depending on the Programme.  
In most countries the Operators provide voluntary contribution of other staff from their 
organizations in order to expand on areas of expertise as needed, both in small and larger 
                                                 
9 Board includes of 6 Ministers, 6 NGOs, 5 Heads of Planning Regions. 
 19 
Programmes. For smaller ones this was the way to compensate for the limited resources provided 
for management of the Programme and capacity building of NGOs. For example, the Human 
Rights Monitoring Institute (Lithuania) supported the NGO Programme through the work of its 
human rights operational department, which was not part of the budget for management of the 
Programme. The CNVOS in Slovenia mobilizing its staff especially for capacity building and 
sector level work – the majority of this was a volunteer contribution of the organization. Examples 
for this came also from Hungary, Poland and Romania where the Operators mobilized knowledge 
and experience from their broader teams in needed areas. 
Apart from leveraging the efforts for effective Programme management by volunteer contribution 
of staff, two Operators of larger Programmes invested own financial resources in support at 
project level. In Poland, the Stefan Batory Foundation provided for covering the 10% financial 
contribution required from small organizations, which made the Programme more accessible to 
them. The Operator in Portugal, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (the largest self-funded 
foundation in the country and among the 10 largest in Europe) decided to provide €0.5 million 
from its own resources to support six large projects which were below the scoring line.  
Recognition for the professionalism, but also a potential for strategic leverage, is the fact that in 
several countries the selected Operators of the NGO Programmes (or one of the partners in the 
consortia) are also managing the Swiss support to NGOs. Examples for this are in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Based on the interviews with Operators, 
they were putting efforts for synergy of the two financing schemes in the areas of similar 
objectives. 
The organizations selected as Operators are very diverse as size and organizational and financial 
capacities. Some like the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal are among the 10 largest 
foundations in Europe with annual turnover of €100 million and total staff of 500 people. A 
number of Operators had annual turnover of € 4-4,4 million and staff of 33-53 people in for 2011 
(the year before they applied for the role of Operators). Some examples include CSDF in 
Romania, Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland, and the Society Integration Foundation in Latvia. 
Another group of Operators have much less resources with annual budgets between € 400,000 and 
€ 2 million.  
For a great number of both bigger and smaller Operators the NGO Programmes represent a 
considerable raise in the financial resources, which by itself is a management challenge. The fact 
that all Operators have succeeded in organizing good financial management of much larger 
budgets is additional evidence for their professionalism and capacity to handle such a complex 
Programme. As outlined by the FMO there were some initial challenges of organizing the 
financial systems for the grants schemes, especially of smaller Programmes with much lower 
management costs. At the time of this evaluation it seemed that these initial challenges had been 
overcome with the assistance of the FMO. 
(3) The established partnerships in managing the Programmes are a good model of optimizing 
the resources, expertise and qualities of the different organizations involved.  
The Partnerships operating the Programmes are very diverse – in number, size and culture of 
participating organizations, history of previous cooperation, level of shared vision for change, and 
openness to innovation and transformative approaches.  
Some of the partnerships (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) consist of experienced 
grant-makers with two decades of support in different thematic areas, including democracy, 
human rights and Roma inclusion:  
• The Operator in Hungary is a partnership of the four leading grant-making organizations 
in different areas of civil society in the country. It has good history of cooperation, 
including the NGO Fund in the previous Financial Mechanism. As noted in the interviews 
with the Operator: “we decided to join our efforts instead of competing with each other, as 
we have the same aim - a stronger civil society in our country”. Shared values and vision 
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for social change, as well as common passion for identifying innovative approaches were 
the drivers for designing and successfully implementing the programme. 
• The Operator in Romania is a strong partnership of the three leading grant-making 
organizations in the country in the priorities of the Programme. Over the years they have 
tested and mainstreamed a number of innovative approaches and practices that have 
assisted with grants support and policy work the growth of civil society in the country.  
They brought together strategic leadership and skills in civil society development, 
environment and Roma inclusion. The partnership is also based on years of joint work and 
cooperation, including the management of the NGO Fund under the previous EEA Grants 
Financial Mechanism (2004-2009)10  
• The Partnership in Poland is led by Stefan Batory Foundation again known for over 20 
years of strategic leadership and assistance to growth of civil society in the areas of 
democracy, civic and human rights. It matched its efforts with another strategic player - 
the Polish Youth with over 20 years of experience of support to youth initiatives and 
organizations. The partnership is vision and value driven and bringing a number of good 
tested tools in innovative grant-making. 
• The partnership in Bulgaria is led by OSI with over 20 years of history in providing 
support to civil society in the country and increasing policy work in the areas of 
democracy, civic rights, Roma inclusion. It was joined by the Workshop for Civic 
Initiatives (WCIF) with extensive grant-making experience in the area of community 
development. Apart from managing the whole Capacity building Thematic Area, WCIF 
ensured outreach of the Programme to the very local and community level, where is the 
traditional focus of work of the organization. 
• The partnership of SK10 is led by Ekopolis with high credibility of years of grant-making 
the area of sustainable development and environment. It has two more partners both 
extensive grant-making experience  -  Children of Slovakia (in the area of children and 
youth) and Socia Foundation ( in the area of social inclusion of vulnerable groups) 
Other partnerships combined grant-making and operational organizations - working on NGO 
sector or thematic levels: 
• In Lithuania the lead organization is the Human Rights Monitoring Institute - an advocacy 
and watchdog organization with high visibility and good record of work in the area of 
human rights. It invited as partner the OSI spin OSFL Projektai to bring in their expertise 
in providing and managing grants 
• In Slovenia the lead organization is Regional Environmental Center that was the operator 
of the NGO Fund in the previous EEA Grants Financial mechanism. It joined its efforts in 
strategic partnership with CNVOS - an umbrella organization working for capacity 
building, advocacy and development at sector level.  
Based on the interviews with Operators the main advantages of partnership the opportunity to 
combine work, share the responsibilities, complement approach, expertise and skills, reach out to 
many and diverse NGOs and match existing resources to meet the multiple tasks of the 
demanding objectives of the Programmes. A particular value of the consortia compositions is that 
they brought together organizations with different levels of work with NGOs (national, local and 
community based), as well as diverse thematic expertise  
As conveyed by all Operators, the main factors for successful partnerships are shared values and 
vision for social change, common passion for civil society development and search for innovative 
approaches, as well as levels of previous cooperation. On the more challenging side is the human 
                                                 
10 Only two of the partners in the Consortium that is Operator of the NGO Programme in Romania - CSDF and 
REPF were the Operators of the NGO Fund of the previous Financial Mechanism 
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resource management. As shared in interviews “Sometimes it is easier to solve an issue as one 
organization than as a partnership. It takes more time, but it pays back”. Based on the evaluation 
in the 10 visited countries, all Operators that function as a partnership of two organizations or a 
consortium of more than two have very good working relations, shared responsibility, clear line of 
communications and follow the distribution of tasks and workload as agreed in the design of the 
Programmes.  
Several issues related to the capacity of the management set up on a country level can also 
be outlined: 
• OSF Slovakia as Operator of SK03. The foundation has many years of history of grant-
making in the area of human rights and system changing processes. However, it has faced 
two interrelated and complementing each other challenges. The first to OSF 
organizational capacities - leadership change and turnover of staff related to the NGO 
Programme. There were a number of issues outlined by the FMO on the effectiveness of 
the design of the calls for proposals, as well as communication.   Others relate to the FMO 
- due to limited number of staff at the NGO team monitoring and oversight of SK03 was 
not always consistent. With new leadership on board OSF has the chance of moving 
forward quickly. 
• Requirements of the FMO that came in the course of the implementation of the 
Programmes (the horizontal concerns, the application of centrally developed capacity 
building tools, the DoRIS information data base and the external audits of projects) put 
some stress on their management. For some countries these came late in the process when 
calls were already announced and the Operators had to go back to grantees with additional 
requirements. In most of the cases the new requirements were not coming with additional 
funding and the Operators had to meet them in the framework of available management 
resources. 
• Very good cooperation, a fair division of resources and excellent communication was 
reported in the all of the Programmes managed by partnerships of several organizations. 
Management resources were allocated among partners based on the initial strategy that 
they developed together. However, the additional requirements added to the workload 
which was not planned, and participating organizations had to compensate this by a lot of 
volunteer contribution of time and people.  
• Most of the management challenges faced by the Operators and reported throughout the 
evaluation relate to application of some of the procedures related to management 
resources, selection process and contractual relations with promoters. Their clarification 
was done on the run and took a lot of time of both Operators and the FMO. They will be 
described in more detail in the next sections of the report as they relate not only to the 
operational but also to the strategic performance of the Programmes. 
• As shared by the FMO, some Operators had difficulties related to the technical 
management of the Programmes, e.g. financial flows, reporting, etc. Our interviews with 
the Operators indicated that where such issues existed they were overcome in 
consultations with the FMO. 
4. Challenges of management provisions and resources  
Management provisions largely determine the effectiveness of the NGO Programmes. Below are 
several issue areas that were identified in the course of the evaluation:  
4.1. General rules and their fit with the nature of the NGO Programmes 
The NGO Programmes are regulated by a number of documents – the Regulation, the Rules on 
appointment of a Fund Operator, the Guideline for NGO Programmes, the Programme 
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Implementation Agreements (PIA) and the Programme Agreements (PA)11 with each Operator, as 
well as a number of guidelines and manuals of the EEA grants. As outlined by the Operators in 
the Warsaw meeting (June 2014), issues of different interpretations of provisions were raised 
during Programme implementation and consumed a lot of energy and resources of both the FMO 
and the Operators. 
As outlined by the management of the FMO, the Regulation was designed for different types of 
Programmes in the framework of EEA and Norway grants – Programmes of much larger scale 
(the normal threshold of grants assistance is normally € 1 million and managed by public 
institutions). All these Programmes are contracted through the NFP and managed by appointed 
public institutions that are implementing public policy in the relevant area.  
The NGO Programmes are different. They are focusing on the development of civil society by 
seeding value-based initiatives and enabling NGOs and civic groups to act as catalysts that 
mobilize citizens and voice out their interests to improve policies in priority areas. This requires a 
lot of flexibility, innovative ideas, creative actions and organizational development. Sizes of the 
grants are much smaller, with a great number of them between € 5,000 - 50,000, and the project 
promoters are NGOs, not public institutions. 
Due to these differences the NGOs are present in the Regulation as an exclusion to the general 
rules for the other EEA Grants Programmes. Most of the Programmes covered by this evaluation 
therefore fall under Art 5.13 (contracting directly with the FMO). Although as a result the 
Regulation does not apply to these Programmes, many of its provisions are translated in the PIAs. 
The PIAs also repeat many of the clauses of the Guideline for NGO Programmes. The Guideline 
on its behalf is applicable to NFP contracted Programmes and “not directly applicable” (art. 3.2.) 
to the FMO contracted ones. It also instructs that in the cases of direct contracting the Operators’ 
Terms of reference and PIAs “shall be broadly based on the provisions of both the Regulation and 
the present Guideline”. 
Special and clear rules, especially for the directly contracted NGO Programmes, were obviously 
needed but were not developed, maybe also due to the fact that still 4 out of 17 Programmes were 
contracted through the NFP and in order to operate they needed clarification in the overall 
Regulation. The PIAs and PAs signed with each Operator are currently the guiding documents 
that translate the Regulation and the Guideline for the concrete Programme on a country level, but 
their length and complexity imposes additional administrative burden on FMO and Fund 
Operators, particularly for amendments.  
4.2. Management fee and resources for implementation 
The management fee of the NGO Programmes is following the provisions of the Regulation (Art. 
7.10) and is calculated as a percentage of the total eligible expenditures of the Programmes 
depending on their size12. Several issues related to management fees were raised during the 
evaluation:  
• Insufficient resources for management.  
The majority of the NGO Programmes (11 out 17) are below € 10 million. The management fee 
for Programmes below this threshold is 10% (up to 15% if funds for Capacity building and 
Complementary actions are included, see below). This resulted in very limited funds to cover 
management costs especially for the smaller programs that are below € 6 million (e.g. Cyprus, 
Estonia, Malta, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Though smaller as overall funding, the 
management of these Programmes entailed a significant workload to respond to administrative 
requirements, as well as to meet the demand from the sector as to the level of project applications.  
                                                 
11 PIA is signed with each Fund Operator directly contracted by the FMO. PA is signed with the NFP that 
contracts Programme Operators to manage the NGO Funds. 
12 10% of the first 10 Mln, 7% of the next 40 Mln, 5% of the next 50 Mln and 4% of the remaining amount 
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• Costs for external audits of the projects to be provided by the Operators, as stipulated 
by the PIA.  
In a number of countries the PIA requirement for financial audit of a part of the funded projects 
was understood by the Operators as costs for the relevant actions of their own accounting staff. 
The clarification that the audit should be external to the Operator came at a later stage. This 
affected both smaller and larger Programmes. Just several examples. In the case of Estonia, where 
the programme and respectively the management cost is small, this is currently causing issues 
with finding relevant funding to provide for the external audit which is an expensive exercise. 
Lack of this funding is among the reasons, why the Operator will not be able to keep all of its 
Programme staff until the end of the current Programme. Another example is the Bulgarian 
Operator – OSI has a long history and experience in auditing financed projects by its internal 
auditor. The requirement for an external audit came as a surprise after the Programme proposal 
was submitted, and there was no budget allocated for it. The same was the case with Poland.  
• Insufficient resources for capacity development, strategic communication and work 
at the sector level.  
The management costs are spent on overheads and administration of the fund. This guarantees the 
operation of the NGO programs as regranting mechanisms (administration, financial oversight, 
announcing and organizing of calls, events related to this, monitoring, processing of reports, etc.), 
but it does not provide for capacity building and sector level work by the Operators. In order to 
overcome this gap the donors included additional costs for capacity building (up to 3% of the 
overall fund). Complementary action was also included, with both regional and country level 
dimensions. According to the Regulation, all these costs together with the management cost 
should not be more than 15% (Article 7.10, 7.11). 
As these additions for capacity building and complementary action are also designed like a flat 
percentage of the overall eligible costs, they are also facing issues with proportionality. For small 
Programmes they are really insignificant. In addition, for all Programmes the current level of 
resources for capacity building confines it to technical assistance for project application and 
raising the administrative capacity of supported NGOs. Allocated resources are not sufficient to 
meet the objective of the Programme, which requires a more proactive approach in growing 
functional capacities of the sector - related advocacy, collaborative initiatives and innovation.  
• Bank guarantee or retaining % of the management fee for risk mitigation 
A guarantee to cover financial risks or irregularities at the project or Programme level is required 
for the direct contracts with FMO. The requirement is not present for the Programmes contracted 
by the NFPs (including the other Programmes of the EEA and Norway Grants), as it is the NFPs 
that are accountable in the event of financial risk. The 13 directly contracted Operators could 
choose from two options: (1) providing bank guarantee for certain percentage of the allocation 
(plus the FMO retaining up to 10% of the management cost portion of every advance and interim 
payment) or (2) the FMO retaining 30% (instead of 10%) of the management cost. The details of 
how it will be handled are specified in the relevant PIA with each Operator. 
Four of the directly contracted Operators have chosen the option for a bank guarantee –Bulgaria, 
Slovakia (SK10), Estonia and Hungary. Seven Operators have the provision that 30% of the 
advance and interim payment of their management are retained by the FMO, and in two countries 
this share is lower – 10% in Slovenia and 15% in Lithuania.  
Based on the interviews with all Operators, these risk mitigation measures present another 
resource management challenge. They are especially difficult for Operators of small Programmes, 
which have insufficient management costs, and if 30% are retained this puts a lot a stress on the 
organizations managing the fund. All of the Operators are NGOs/Foundations and (with few 
exceptions among the bigger ones) have difficulties in allocating their own resources in order to 
support costs of the management fee to be paid after the end of the Programme.  
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Obtaining bank guarantees for five years, especially for an NGO, is a challenge by itself, and the 
bank charges can be very high. Some of the Operators (e.g. Ekopolis in Slovakia) are willing to 
freeze their own funds for the guarantee and not use a bank guarantee. But the bigger question is 
the merit of the guarantee at all. As phrased in one of the interviews “Covering the risk for the 
donor brings high risk for the Operator, creates cash flow problems and does not help but 
deteriorates the Fund Operator’s capacity”.  
• Management and control systems 
In addition, all Operators had to develop Management and Control Systems (MCS) and provide 
independent auditor’s opinions on them. The involvement of auditors (contracted by the Operators 
from among renowned international companies) proved to be counterproductive for two reasons. 
First, there was no guidance on behalf of the FMO in terms of expectations, especially in respect 
of the “assessment of the proportionality of the management and control systems’ requirements in 
relation to the effectiveness of achieving the objectives of the Programmes”. Secondly, where the 
Operators worked with the auditors for refining their traditional MCSs (e.g. Bulgaria) the final 
product was a rigid system of multiple checklists quite similar to the procedures applied by public 
institutions managing EU funds and surpassing the FMO requirements. 
5. Interaction with the National Focal Points and linkage with other EEA and Norway 
Grants Programmes  
5.1. The Role of the National Focal Points (NFP) 
The Role of the NFP in the management set up of the NGO Programmes is different, depending 
on how they were contracted. In the cases of the four NGO Programmes that were not contracted 
by the FMO, the NFPs have much more of direct oversight role – together with the FMO they 
approve the calls for proposals before they are published, participate as observers at Selection 
Committee meetings, receive and approve the annual Programme reports from the FO and receive 
the final Programme report. 
The NGO Programmes contracted through the NFPs have identified some advantages in this set 
up. In some countries the Government provides co-financing and there is more interest on behalf 
of the NFP as it is co-responsible for the successful implementation of the programme. For 
example in Latvia the Government co-financed the Programme with 5%. In addition, in 
agreement with donors it decided that the EEA Grants for social development are channeled 
through SIF as the Operator, and not through the Ministry of Welfare. This resulted in doubling 
the amount of the NGO fund and shared responsibility for the Programme. Another advantage is 
that the financial risks are covered by the Government, not by the Operator, and the National 
Auditing institution’s advice and services are available.  
At the same time, in none of the countries where the NFPs contracted the Operators did the 
Governments provide additional funding for relieving the pressure for 10% co-financing expected 
from project promoters, as was the expectation of the FMO.  
None of the Operators contracted via the NFP reports serious problems in the relations. In the 
cases of Cyprus and Latvia the effective cooperation is rooted in mutual trust of an already good 
record of working together during the previous Financial Mechanism or on other funding 
Programmes. In Latvia the Operator is directly linked with Government which naturally brings for 
more trust in their capacity.  
As outlined by the Operators13, the question about the effectiveness of the relations with the NFP 
is not always structural – it also depends to a great extent on the quality, capacities and 
understanding of the importance of civil society of the people working there. If their staff has 
genuine interest and commitment in the Programme then there are excellent relations. A great 
example in this direction is the NFP in Cyprus.  
                                                 
13 Meeting of Operators, Warsaw, June 2014, as well as in individual interviews 
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The main disadvantages of the management set up of contracting the NGO Programmes through 
the Government as outlined by the Operators are that it puts a double administrative burden of 
reporting to two authorities – the FMO and the NFP. Reporting is not streamlined and 
requirements might differ. In some cases this can contribute to delays in the process, as the 
procedures of reporting and approval in the state system might be longer and more complicated 
(e.g. the Czech Republic). A serious issue during the previous Financial Mechanism in Slovakia 
was the several months delay in the payments from the NFP to the Operator due to minor 
accounting issues. 
As shared by the FMO and various stakeholders in the beneficiary countries, an important factor 
is also the overall political climate and attitudes toward NGOs.  
While in most of the beneficiary countries civil societies are functioning in normal environments 
with more or less challenges, the recent events in Hungary of politicized attacks targeted at the 
Operator and the NGOs supported by the NGO Programme are clear evidence that it is critical to 
provide safeguards for the independence of the NGO Programmes. While such attacks are not 
happening in other countries, the NGO Programmes can always be vulnerable to political changes 
after elections and the shifts of commitments of governments.  This is a critical aspect of the 
political risk management of the NGO Programmes. 
In the case of the 13 NGO funds contracted directly through the FMO the role of the NFP is more 
of an observer. NFPs are obligatory invited at the Selection Committee meetings and the Annual 
Review Meetings, they receive reports and information on the progress of the Programmes, but 
they do not provide direct supervision – the line of responsibility and reporting is to the FMO. 
We met with the NFP in 10 countries covered by field work in the course of this evaluation. The 
task was to get their perspective on the performance of the NGO Funds, as well as to see the level 
of coordination and cooperation with other EEA Grants Programmes that have grants schemes 
open to NGOs. Our observations and findings are quite different. The attitudes of the NFP in the 
countries that have Operators directly contracted by the FMO varied between genuine interest and 
some level of collaboration to polite indifference or complete detachment.  
Text box 1. Examples for the relationships between NFPs and the NGO Operators 
The NFP in Romania considers the collaboration with the operator of the NGO Programme as good. The NFP 
as also consulted with the FO on a case by case basis in order to avoid overlaps between funding among 
different programmes of the EEA and Norway Grants, where NGOs are eligible participants in small grants 
schemes. In some cases, this is done more at the initiative of the Operator of the NGO Programme and other 
EEA and Norway Grants Programme Operators. In principle, the collaboration with the NGO Programme on a 
more strategic level is minimal and its Operator is not invited at the NFP meetings with the other 12 POs. 
In Bulgaria, based on our request for the interview, the NFP organized a four hours group discussion with its 
entire staff working on the Programme. There was very good knowledge on the progress of the NGO 
Programme, and regular communication with the Operator mostly to make sure that duplication of funding is 
avoided. Part of the reason for higher interest in the Programme was that some of the NFP’s staff had NGO 
background themselves. 
In Slovakia and Slovenia the interviews were surprisingly brief (10-30 minutes) and quite cursory. The core 
message was - “as it was not contracted through us, we have no role at all, no responsibility or views on the 
programme”. Unfortunately, similar attitudes came from the interviews with NFPs in other countries too. It 
should be noted that some of the NFPs have their own capacity problems to handle a multitude of programmes 
and having someone managing the NGO Programme is a welcomed relief. 
The NFP in Poland appreciates the efforts of the Operator to inform them on progress. The NFP outlined that 
the Operator was appointed by the donors and contracted directly through the FMO. This was noted as a relief 
of workload and responsibilities for the NFP, but on the other hand the NFP would not be able to intervene if 
there were issues with the Programme and/or its grantees. However, these concerns were not shared by the 
Project Promoters during the interviews.  
In Portugal the relationship between the Operator and the NFP is good, but not really close – the NFP seems to 
feel bypassed and not engaged beyond the minimum formalities and advocated against the allocation of 
remaining funds from other programmes going to the NGO Programme.  
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The only country we could not interview the NFP was Hungary, as at the time of the evaluation it 
had not been reinstated, following previous changes. The contacts with NFP appointed 
representatives in the Selection Committee did not lead to interviews either. Based on 
documentation review and interviews with Programme stakeholders, there was minimal 
interaction with the NFP outside the regular attendance of its representatives in the Selection 
Committee meetings. 
In terms of interaction with the NGO Programmes there are some important questions that need 
consideration.  
• In principle, the role of the NFP is not only related to control and supervision of Programmes. 
It is also the role of coordinator for all of the EEA and Norway Grants funding in the country. 
Though not directly involved in the management of the NGO Programmes, it has to provide 
for horizontal linkages between them and the other Programmes in order to optimize their 
resources for increased overall impact of the donors support that is provided. 
• The question is do the NFPs need to have the NGO Programmes under their management and 
direct supervision in order to be interested and involved beyond “passive observers”? If 
support to civil society is part of consistent Governments policies, then the Operators of the 
NGO Programmes, no matter how they are contracted, should be natural strategic partners to 
consult with on optimizing other EEA and Norway Grants investments. The partnership can 
range from regular exchange of information and advice to entrusting Operators with the 
management of grant schemes for NGOs within other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes. 
5.2. Linkage with other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes 
The NGO Programmes are a very little share of up to 10% of the overall funding provided by the 
EEA and Norway Grants to the beneficiary countries. They are the only ones investing directly in 
civil society to expand its capacities and civic infrastructure to address effectively key issues in 
priority areas and horizontal concerns.  
The other EEA and Norway Grants programmes which are much larger as financial contribution 
are in priority thematic areas as defined in the MoU for each of the country. While they are very 
diverse, what brings them together are the cross cutting principles of good governance and 
sustainable development common for all EEA and Norway Grants. Based on the definitions of 
these two principles they have a visible link with civil society. Both good governance and 
sustainable development also depend on the ability of institutions to be inclusive to citizens input 
and to cooperate and work effectively with civil society. 
The statistics system of the EEA and Norway Grants follows the link of programme outcomes 
with policy markers related to key political priorities and concerns of the donors. The policy 
markers are assigned by the FMO as part of the programmes appraisal and can be fundamental (of 
fundamental importance for the design and impact of the programme) or significant (an important 
issue, but not principle for the justification of the outcomes and impact of the programme) 
Table 4: Policy Marker Civil Society per country 
 Civil Society 
Country Significant issue Fundamental issue 
Bulgaria 7  
Cyprus 4 1 
Czech Republic 13  
Estonia 10  
Greece  1 
Hungary 3  
Lithuania 5  
Poland 3 1 
Portugal 1  
Romania 4 2 
Slovakia 4  
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Slovenia 3 1 
Spain 4  
Total 61 6 
 
Based on information from DoRIS, 61 EEA and Norway Grants Programmes (not including the 
NGO Programmes) have been marked by “significant” policy marker for civil society in 13 
countries. Only 6 of other EEA Grants Programmes have “fundamental” policy marker for civil 
society in five countries. Their distribution per country is illustrated in the Table above.  
Most frequent is the marking of civil society as of significant or fundamental importance in the 
programme areas of Children and Youth at Risk, Public Health Initiatives, Mainstreaming Gender 
Equality and Domestic and Gender-based violence. Civil society is also sporadically present as 
policy marker in Local and Regional Initiatives to reduce national inequalities and to promote 
social inclusion; Cultural heritage and Schengen Cooperation and combating cross-border and 
organized crime, including trafficking.  
In the majority of the cases there are small grants schemes in the above programme areas that are 
eligible for NGOs - mostly as partners to local institutions and less as main applicants. At the time 
of the evaluation there were only a few calls of the small grants schemes that were finalized and it 
was difficult to see how many NGOs benefited from this and in what way this may be also 
contributing to the objective of the civil society programmes. Due to the limited timing and 
resources for this evaluation we could not find data available how the NGO sector is benefiting 
from these other programmes.  
Based on the interviews and focus groups with NGOs in the beneficiary countries, those that had 
experience with other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes consider the requirements of their 
calls as burdensome and extremely bureaucratic. The support provided to civil society under the 
other programmes is very fragmented and does not provide for capacity building of applying 
organizations.  
There is no focus on civil society in other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes and no data is 
available on how the sector benefits from these Programmes. As witnessed in Lithuania by the 
Operator and Central Project Management Agency managing other programmes, no coordination 
is present nor there have been information sharing attempts.  
The level of cooperation and coordination among the NGO Programmes and the other EEA and 
Norway Grants Programmes is low or missing in the majority of the countries. This can be due to 
various reasons. Some relate to the above mentioned “detachment” of some of the NFPs from the 
NGO Programmes when they are not contracted through them. Others relate to lack of time and 
pro-activeness of the Operators of the NGO Programmes to search for contacts and cooperation 
(also due to the tremendous workload at the start of the Programmes).  
In Lithuania, for example, the Operator of the NGO Programme sought cooperation with “the 
“Children and Youth at Risk” Programme, but the Ministry of Social Security and Labour was not 
responsive. Cases of more successful cooperation include: 
• Romania, where there is strategic cooperation between the Operators of the NGO 
Programme and of the Children and Youth at Risk and Local and Regional Initiatives. 
They are not only looking for potential overlap of initiatives, but also for ways to optimise 
the investments of the programmes and mutually reinforce their impact. 
• In Slovenia the members of the consortium managing the NGO Fund are invited and 
participate in the selection committees of two other EEA and Norway Grants 
Programmes. While this is a very good practice, on the more challenging side is the fact 
that this participation is more nominal and formal than real, as materials for the meetings 
are usually distributed at the very last moment and there is little space for actual 
participation. 
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• In the Czech Republic there is a very interesting practice of entrusting the EEA and  
Norway Grants  Programmes on gender Equality to a non-profit entity - the Open Society 
Foundation. This can be a model to further explore of effective management of some of 
the other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes. 
At present the strategic coherence between the NGO Programmes and the rest of the EEA and 
Norway Grants programmes is limited. It can hardly be anticipated that sustainable democracy 
and good governance can be achieved only with the limited investment in the capacity of civil 
society. Much more attention is needed in developing capacities of institutions to be open to civil 
society, to embrace democratic values and to work in   equal partnerships with NGOs.  
This also relates to putting in practice the cross cutting principles of the EEA and Norway Grants 
of good governance and sustainable development which are valid for all Programmes. Some 
aspects of their substantial meaning are directly linked with civil society – consulting and 
involving citizens, inclusive policies and civic participation. From this perspective, civil society 
and NGOs are a natural part of these cross cutting principles and need to be part of the 
programming in the relevant other areas, in addition to the specialized NGO Programme.  
Collaboration with the NGO Programmes is needed not only to avoid duplication, but on a 
strategic level - identifying the best ways to support a different culture of good governance and 
sustainable development based on accountability to citizens and partnerships with the 
organizations that represent them. Using the specific expertise of the Operators of the NGO 
Programmes can be of help in designing and managing some of the small grants schemes that can 
stimulate participation of NGOs and their partnership with institutions in different thematic areas.  
 
II. The FMO as a Programme Operator  
1. The challenges of the task 
The FMO is providing oversight to the EEA and Norway Grants through the NFPs which are to 
guarantee their successful implementation at the country level. The NGO Funds Programme area 
is the only one where the FMO also has the function of the Programme Operator in 13 of the 
countries, where it has directly contracted the NGO Fund Operators. This is a completely new role 
for the FMO as compared to all other parts of the EEA and Norway Grants portfolio which is 
much more demanding due to the different nature of the civil society support area:  
• The directly contracted NGO Programmes have Operators that are selected based on 
open tenders, organized by the FMO. This required much more involvement in the 
Operators’ selection and appraisal process, agreeing on the Programmes strategies, 
drafting, negotiating and signing the PIAs with each Operator; 
• The NGO Programmes have much more intensive grant-making schemes which allocate 
very small scale funding to numerous projects. At the time of this evaluation the projects 
funded by the NGO Programmes constitute 2/3 of all projects funded by the EEA and 
Norway Grants. All Operators (except Cyprus) and all project promoters are non-profit 
organizations and the Programmes themselves are investing in the way NGOs function 
and promote civil society – they are oriented at expanding capacities and stimulating 
processes that will bring forth a strengthened civil society able to act in different thematic 
areas.  
• The Programmes are innovative in character. Innovation usually needs space and 
flexibility to test approaches and take risks. This did not always fit into the existing legal 
framework and overall procedures. It required much more strategic and operational 
oversight in order to provide for effective guidance, monitoring and risk management. 
Some Operators came with less capacity and needed more attention and assistance than 
others in the course of implementation.  
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• The Programmes are among the only ones that practically deliver on most of the 
horizontal concerns of the EEA and Norway Grants. This involved transmitting to the 
Operators the new requirements related to the strategy of the Programme, as well as more 
involvement in regional level action like the “No Hate Speech” campaign, organized by 
the Council of Europe as a strategic partner of the EEA and Norway Grants.  
Apart from these challenges, the role of the FMO as Programme Operator has significant 
advantages. It allows for immediate contact with the Operators, direct observations on the 
Programmes implementation and identification of successes, risks and issues, ability to take 
corrective action when needed. Managing the Programmes through direct contracts with the 
Operators provides much space for learning from the field. 
2. The human resource challenges 
The new role of the FMO also brought a serious human resource challenge. The civil society team 
staff had to increase. Starting with one part-time person, currently the staff of the civil society 
sector consists of 3 senior sector officers, one of them being the sector coordinator. The 
coordination and oversight of the 13 directly contracted Programmes is distributed among them, 
and the remaining 4 contracted by the NFPs are within the responsibilities of  officers  from other 
FMO teams.  
The civil society sector team is responsible for practically all aspects of the Programmes’ 
implementation. It is backed up by other departments of the FMO (legal, financial, 
communication, results and evaluation), as well as other country officers. Respectively, the 
different departments provided individual online or on site consultations to the Operators in their 
area of expertise. There were a number of trainings organized for all Operators on different areas 
of concern – DoRIS, irregularities, management and control systems. Specific areas related to the 
management of the NGO Programmes and the use of the Capacity Building tools and matrix were 
discussed at the two regional meetings of all Operators organized by the FMO. 
The issue with the effectiveness of the FMO civil society team comes from the concentration of 
four responsibilities that are quite different in nature and workload: 
• Providing strategic guidance to Operators (e.g. feedback on Programme proposal, 
planning of the calls for proposals, addressing horizontal concerns and capacity building); 
• Providing operational support and oversight to Operators (e.g. approving guidelines for 
applicants, participation in Selection committees); 
• Risk management of the Programmes (including both internal and external risks); 
• Technical management of the Programmes (e.g. processing of Operators’ reports and 
DoRIS data, day-to-day communication with the Operators on administrative issues, etc.). 
While the Civil society team considers the first three, and especially the risk management, as most 
important for the proper management and the achievement of the objectives of the Programmes, it 
is the technical component that consumes 70% of the sector officers’ time and resources. There is 
practically no possibility for extra work, e.g. providing targeted capacity building support for 
Operators when such becomes needed.  
The over-focusing of the existing human resources of the FMO on technical and administrative 
aspects of the Programmes’ management has its effect upon the quality of the strategic oversight 
of the Programmes. During the interviews the civil society sector team members demonstrated 
knowledge and interest in the non-profit sectors in the beneficiary countries, as well as genuine 
motivation to contribute to the strengthening of civil society and NGOs. At the same time, due to 
lack of time, the substantial knowledge of the civil society sector team is not used effectively.  
Monitoring of Programmes is mostly related to compliance with procedures and managerial 
performance of Operators. Visits to the countries relate mostly to the Selection committees 
meetings and the annual review of the Operator. There are almost no other meetings and contacts 
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with stakeholders from civil society or donors in the beneficiary countries. This narrows the actual 
knowledge of the FMO officers on the realities of civil society in the beneficiary countries. The 
team does not have the overall pictures of the EEA and Norway Grants operation in other areas 
and, therefore, is not in a position to suggest additional ways for more effective involvement of 
(and support to) NGOs in other Programmes.  
A simple way out of this situation is employing a small number of junior officers to provide back 
up for the technical aspects of the Programmes management. This will not require a considerable 
increase in the FMO budget and is quite justifiable from the point of view of proportionality – the 
NGO projects constitute 2/3 of all EEA and Norway Grants funded projects. 
3. Who has the responsibility? 
From a managerial point of view, an important question is who has the responsibility for the 
Programme - the FMO as PO or the Fund Operators in each of the countries. If the Programmes 
are entrusted to the FMO and it is their Operator, then naturally this comes with a responsibility 
for their diligent and transparent management. Maybe this is among the reasons that measures for 
risk mitigation and avoiding irregularities, especially in the project selection process, became the 
highest priority in the approach of the FMO to the NGO Programmes.  
At the same time, the FMO invested a lot of effort in selecting the right actors to operate it at the 
country levels. The Operators of the NGO Programmes came with strategies, capacities, 
experience and commitment. They also invested their credibility at the country level. In practice, 
they have the responsibility for the Programme’s success or failure and they were its public face 
locally. As shared in interviews with Operators, they are ultimately accountable to the NGO sector 
as they are part of it. With the high demand and expectations from the Programmes, the 
responsibility to make them a success is huge. 
As outlined by the FMO, some countries needed more involvement and closer oversight than 
others, and it did not always relate to the size of the Programme but to the capacity of the 
Operator to follow the procedures. This brought more hands-on involvement of the FMO in some 
countries as compared to others. A special area of attention was the projects selection processes to 
ensure their transparency and equal treatment of applicants. The main challenge was in three 
directions:  
1. How to find the right balance of how much hands on interference is not too much and 
does not lead to micromanagement of the process;  
2. How much consistent hands-on FMO involvement is feasible with the limited human 
resources of the FMO, and;  
3. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Selection Committees, especially in regards 
to when and why they can change the scoring of projects. 
There were three cases reported that can provide interesting learning in all three aspects: 
(1) The first is the case in Lithuania.  
In the first call for proposals the Operator missed to differentiate the number of projects to be 
funded by outcomes in the guidelines. It tried to overcome this later by re-distributing the projects 
into 8 sub-lists by expected outcomes. This moved up in the ranking list 7 projects, which had 
lower scores as assessed from the external experts. This caused a misunderstanding with the 
FMO, also involving the Norwegian Embassy as mediator to resolve the problem. It took nearly 
three months to resolve the issue which delayed the signing of supported projects in the country.  
This case provides learning in two directions. First, the Operator in Lithuania is the only one 
where the leading partner is an excellent human rights operational NGO, but with no grant-
making experience. This required much more attention and assistance from the FMO to grow the 
capacity of the Operator to handle the complex requirements of the EEA Grants. However, at the 
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time of the first call due to limited human resources the FMO could not provide timely feedback 
on the text for Open call which was sent for consultation.   
Since the above issues were resolved, interaction between FMO and Operator has improved. The 
Operator has been provided with both advisory and financial suport. 30 000 EUR have been 
allocated to support core activities of the Operator and an external consultant has been paid by the 
FMO to develop the pre-defined projects and train the Operator in the results based management 
approach. The Operator will also be a beneficiary of pre-defined capacity building Project to start 
late autumn of 2014. 
(2) A second case was Slovakia (SK03). 
Due to insufficient clarity of the second call documents, some of the applicants whose 
applications were turned down at the stage of eligibility check complained to the FMO. The FMO 
interfered and the Operator reconsidered the rejected proposals and invited the rejected applicants 
to the second step of the two stage application process. The results of the call were announced 
only partially and part of the programme budget was set aside to ensure the financial support to 
the selected applicants that were additionally invited. This caused a total delay of the selection 
process of about three months.  
Together with issues of organizational and communication capacity of the Operator (OSF had 
changes of leadership and staff turnover, as well as flaws in communication with the FMO), the 
FMO also had challenges to provide effective oversight to the SK03 Programme. Due to serious 
shortage of human resources at the FMO NGO team in the summer of 2013 the FMO could not attend 
the SC meeting of the first call for proposals. The SK03 Programme had to be monitored by more than 
one member of other teams of the FMO to overcome the above mentioned human resource shortage in 
the NGO team. This case provides another evidence for the need of increasing the human 
resources capacity at the FMO if it has to provide close oversight of the Programmes, especially 
to those it considers problematic in terms of capacity to handle well the processes.  
(3) A third, most recent case was in the Czech Republic.  
The Operator did not invite the FMO at the Selection Committee (SC) meeting. A dispute 
emerged around three environmental advocacy projects during the SC meeting. The decision of 
the Selection Committee (SC) was to lower their scores as it assessed the quality of their strategy 
lower than the outside experts. It identified as main shortage of the projects that they were one 
sided and missing broader public debates and discussions. This decision was interpreted by the 
Embassy and respectively by the FMO as a lack of desire of the SC to support controversial 
projects. Based on the intervention of the FMO, the decision of the SC was changed and the 
contested three projects were approved. However, the whole argument resulted in one month 
delay of the approval of all projects in the Czech Republic - which is a lot in mind of the overall 
delay of the start of the Programme (due to administrative issues on the Czech side).  
This case provides learning for both the Operator and the FMO. If the FMO has been invited and 
if it participated in the SC meeting many “misunderstandings” would be avoided and cleared on 
the spot, as the FMO could have provided guidance to ensure that the rules of transparency and 
equal treatment are observed. Another learning aspect relates broader to the role of the Selection 
committee that needs clarification especially in its part how to tackle differences in the assessment 
of the quality of submitted proposals by the SC and the external evaluators. In which cases the SC 
may have the right to change the ranking of submitted projects? 
All of the above three cases can serve for reflection on critical questions of importance for 
expanding the effectiveness of the FMO as Programme Operator and the capacities of the 
Operators, as well as about the effective interaction among them. They provide evidence for the 
need of increasing the human resources at the FMO with substantial knowledge on civil society 
allocated to the Programme, especially in cases when Operators may need more assistance and 
intensive communication if some capacity gaps have been identified. They also outline the need 
for clarification of the roles and responsibilities in the selection process, and respectively the 
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broader questions of trust and ownership of the Programmes in order to optimize the Programmes 
impact. 
4. Feedback on the performance of the FMO as a PO of the NGO Programmes 
The feedback from the donors is that the FMO is a very good advisor, with good knowledge of the 
countries, successful in interaction with them and developing a relationship of trust. The feedback 
from the Operators also confirmed this. They consider that the Donors and the FMO have genuine 
commitment to the Programmes. They try to assist them in the best way in order to make it 
successful. The staff of the FMO teams have the difficult task to provide guidance in complex and 
difficult bureaucratic requirements. Feedback on assistance especially on financial matters was 
very positive. Assistance from the legal department was helpful, but sometimes due to legal 
terminology it took time to understand. People in the team of the Programme are open and 
interested in the Programmes and trying to assist in resolving issues in the course of 
implementation.  
Together with the overall positive feedback there are some challenges: 
• The FMO requirements and procedures are seen as more bureaucratic in this Financial 
Mechanism than in the previous one. The Programme seems dominated by procedures 
and content issues get lost on the way. 
• Most of the Operators see an increasing tendency of the FMO trying to control everything 
in order to safeguard against risks and decreasing levels of trust in the Operators. This 
was raised by some Embassies too. As outlined in the interview with the Ambassador of 
Norway in Lithuania “It is critical to clearly anchor all Programmes nationally and to give 
space for Operators of national Programmes to act strategically in order to meet their 
responsibility”. 
• Staff turnover, as well as delegating monitoring of the NGO Programmes to FMO staff 
who does not have substantial knowledge of the civil society sector is seen among the 
reasons for challenges in providing quality oversight of the Programmes in all countries. 
There is a difference in interpretation of the same questions by different people – some 
think more in terms of procedures, others of content. Technically there were delays of 
answers which in turn could cause problems in implementation. New people need time to 
get acquainted with the Programme. In some cases people involved have little knowledge 
of the beneficiary countries and local contexts. The FMO institutional memory is lost, as 
the people are changing. In some cases like Slovenia, the Operator had to provide a 
package of core information to the new FMO officer (not provided by the previous 
person). 
As shared by most of the Operators, as the Programmes are new and so much needed in the 
region, their proper management is a tremendous and challenging effort. Difficulties are 
inevitable.  
5. Advantages of direct contracting of the NGO Programmes 
Despite the challenges, the majority of the Operators consider that direct contracting with the 
FMO has much more advantages than contracts through the NFPs. Based on this evaluation we 
find the management set up of direct contracting of the Operators by the FMO as more effective 
in several directions: 
• It provides for much better overall strategic coherence and a value driven nature of the 
Programme across countries. 
• It provides for much better direct interaction and helps the efficient and effective 
implementation. Direct contact with the FMO helps clarify issues faster than if they were 
through the NFPs.  
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• It provides safeguards from future delays. For example in Bulgaria due to the instability of 
Government, the majority of the EEA Grants Programmes are much more delayed.  
• It also provides for independence of the NGO Funds and the assistance for strengthening 
of civil society, and is a safeguard from potential political interference.  
The question of direct contracting by the FMO may also raise certain concerns.  
The first one relates to local ownership. Usually the practice of the EEA Grants is to ensure local 
ownership by having contractual agreement with the Governments in the beneficiary countries. If 
the NGO Programmes are entrusted to the FMO, this can be interpreted as “taking away the local 
ownership”. Actually, in our view the NGO Programmes have clear cut local ownership. They are 
contracted to in-country based non-profits that are strategically positioned and recognized in local 
civil society. From this perspective the Programmes ensure local ownership of the Programmes - 
but of civil society, not of Government. In our view this is an advantage, not disadvantage of the 
direct contracting of the NGO Programmes by the FMO. 
The second argument is that if the Programmes are directly contracted by the FMO this will take 
away the advantage of the co-financing of the Governments in the beneficiary countries. Looking 
at the level of co-financing of current Programmes this is true - there is no co-financing of any of 
the NGO Programmes that is directly contracted by the FMO. However, the rest of the countries 
with NGO Programmes contracted through the NFP have very minimal or no financial 
contribution too. This was more or less the case with the NGO Funds of the previous Financial 
Mechanism. 
The third concern is more serious - it relates to the level of commitment of Governments to work 
with civil society and to support it. As already outlined in previous sections if civil society is a 
part of consistent Government policies and concern then the way of contracting is not of primary 
importance. Governments do not need to have the NGO Programmes under their management and 
direct supervision in order to be interested and involved. By having the NGO Programmes 
independently contracted by the FMO the EEA and Norway Grants can model a new type of 
strategic partnership relation between the Government and the Operators, rather than having 
them in subordinate line of control and supervision. This strategic partnership and coordination 
can help increase the commitment of Government to work collaboratively with civil society as 
well as will help optimizing other EEA and Norway Grants investments towards more good 
governance and sustainable development practices. 
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Chapter 3. Grant systems and processes 
 
I. Application process 
1. Promotion  
All Operators used a variety of information channels to reach out to diverse actors of civil society 
(big, and small NGOs and community groups from different parts of the country). 
Information about the Programme was published in leading newspapers and/or social media – the 
website of the Operator, national NGO portals and 
platforms where they exist, websites of NGO thematic 
networks, social networks, mailing lists etc. All 
Operators organized informational events and meetings 
in the capital which generated a lot of interest and 
attendance.  
The majority of the Operators also organized meetings 
outside the capital in order to reach out to locally based 
NGOs. In most of the countries regardless of their 
geographical size meetings with local NGOs were 
organized on a regional basis in different districts.  
2. Calls for application process: design, organization and assistance to applicants 
The number and subjects of the calls differed among countries following the specifics of country 
strategies. Each call was carefully designed following the country strategy priorities and desired 
outcomes. Based on interviews with the Operators in the different countries, the complexity of the 
overall framework of the strategies was a challenge for the design of the guidelines and criteria. 
With so many features of priorities, outcomes, crosscutting issues and horizontal concerns it was 
difficult to find the best way to present it in a concise way which will be clear to applicants. 
Difficulties in grasping the interrelations between the different priorities, outcomes and concerns 
were shared in Focus Groups and interviews with evaluators and stakeholders. The biggest 
confusion was caused by the multitude of definitions: specific concerns, horizontal concerns, 
cross-cutting issues, etc. In some cases, as shared by both Operators and stakeholders applying 
horizontal concerns and crosscutting issues in all areas resulted in mechanical, superficial and 
declarative sections in proposals. In other cases it seems they were not understood by both 
applicants and evaluators. For example, a Latvian Project promoter insisted in public 
presentations that “traditional family values” are gender equality values, and was not very 
supportive of LGBT rights. Their project was written in a professional way that did not allow for 
“catching” the misinterpretation during selection process. The project was later cancelled. 
As indicated by many interviews with different respondents, the very language of the Programmes 
could have been less formal and more “user-friendly”. 
In a number of countries the Operators simplified and improved the guidelines for consecutive 
calls based on the feedback from external experts involved in the selection, as well as from 
applicants. Very good practices for getting the feedback from the NGOs on the application 
process and adequacy of calls were surveys with NGOs organized by the Operators in Hungary 
and in Poland.  
In most of the countries the application process was diversified according to the size of projects 
that can be supported – micro, small, medium and large. Most of the Operators, especially in the 
larger NGO Programmes, introduced a two stage process – applying with a letter of intent or 
concept, and then if selected - applying with a full proposal. This approach was used mostly for 
medium and large projects. 
Text box 2. Examples of wide 
promotion campaigns 
 
In Latvia, the Operator used the 
infrastructure of Regional NGO centers. 
The campaign in Hungary included 
more than 23 information sessions 
around the country, with at least one in 
each County. To make the information 
accessible to those who could not attend, 
the Operator recorded the meeting and 
made it available online.  
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Based on Focus Groups and interviews with grantees in the 8 focus countries plus Cyprus and 
Slovenia, in most of the cases the two stage process (first concept and then full proposal) was 
assessed as more efficient and effective. It saved time for the NGOs, as a full proposal takes a lot 
of time and resources. However, in some countries like Bulgaria this was not the case. The two-
stage process proved to be so slow (the contracts with the successful applicants were signed 8-10 
months after the submission of the concept) that the Operator decided to abandon it in the second 
call. The grantees also find the two-stage process inefficient. Apart from being time consuming, it 
sometimes generated frustrations in terms of conflicting recommendations on behalf of the 
evaluators of the two stages (different for each stage).  
Some views shared by respondents in Romania outline other risks of the two-step procedure. It is 
found more useful for experienced applicants, who are skilled to summarise correctly a project 
idea in a letter of intent. Less experienced ones miss details in the letter of intent, which when 
elaborated later in the full proposal practically modify the approved concept. This risk can be 
mitigated by clear indications in the Guidelines on elements that cannot be changed between the 
two stages, and by close assistance by the Operator to the promoters whose letters of intent were 
appoved. 
A number of Operators made a much simpler format for small projects in order to ease the 
accessibility of the NGO fund to small organizations. For example in Slovenia the one stage 
application for small projects was in practice similar to developing a brief concept with a budget.  
The major asset of the NGO Programmes was that they did not rely only on the general 
information meetings, but provided meaningful and interactive communication and assistance to 
applicants. Receiving consultations from the Operators in the process of application and 
implementation was also assessed highly by the participants in the online survey that was done by 
this evaluation. Over 40% consider that this is what makes the NGO Programmes unique as 
compared to other funding programmes (EU or other EEA and Norway Grants). The interviews 
and the focus groups also showed marked satisfaction with the on-line submission of applications. 
In Bulgaria this was a nice contrast to almost all other grant-giving programmes. 
The application process is largely defined by the survey respondents (94%) as user friendly in 
terms of the adequacy of deadlines, clarity of selection procedures and criteria and accessibility of 
information during the application process. 
 
II. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Project Selection 
1. The Overall Guiding Procedures 
The selection process of projects is guided by similar procedures that are outlined in detail in the 
Regulation (Chapter 6), the Guideline for NGO Programmes and in the PIAs. Procedures are 
guided by the principles of equal treatment of applicants, transparency and accountability of the 
selection process. Basically the selection procedures envisage four stages: 
(1) Review of the compliance of applications with the administrative and eligibility criteria 
done by the Operator.  
(2) Independent external experts (directly invited or selected by open call) score projects 
based on published criteria. Each application is scored individually by two experts and 
projects are ranked based on the average of their scores. In case of a 30% difference 
between scored projects, a third expert is invited and project ranking is the average of the 
two closest scores.  
(3) Selection Committee (SC) is established by each Operator, consisting of at least three 
members, with at least one external to the Operator. The SC reviews the scoring list 
resulting from the independent experts’ individual assessments and recommends to the 
Operator the list of projects for funding. The SC “may modify the ranking of projects in 
justified cases”, with detailed justification in the minutes of the SC meeting. 
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(4) The Operator verifies the compliance of the selection process with the procedures and the 
objectives of the Programme. “Based on the decision of the SC it makes a final decision 
on which projects will be supported. All applicants (both successful and unsuccessful) will 
be informed of the outcome. Unsuccessful applicants will get feedback on why their 
projects were not funded and there will be provisions for appeal of the decision”.14  
2. Organization of the Selection Process in the Different Countries 
The overall procedures outlined above were the backbone of the selection process in each of the 
countries. However, the efficiency of its application reflected the country specificities - strategy 
approach and size of the Programmme, level of demand/applications, experience of the Operator, 
and capacity of the selected external experts. Due to the importance of the selection process for 
the overall effectiveness of the Programmes we explored it in more detail especially in the 8 
countries for in-depth assessment.  
2.1. External experts 
The process of selection of external experts differed in the 8 countries. The Operators in Poland, 
Bulgaria and Latvia applied an open tender. The Operators in Hungary, Slovakia and Portugal 
used direct invitation for external experts based on their expertise and previous work with the 
Operators. A combination of direct invitation and open tender was used in the case of Romania 
and Lithuania. In most of the countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania external 
experts were selected per component/priority area with some of them working on more than one 
component. 
There is a big difference in the number of external experts involved in the selection process in 
each of the countries, and respectively the workload as number of applications per evaluator. 
Some examples: 
• It was highest in Poland where 104 experts were recruited in order to respond to the very 
high number of applications (1931 outlines for thematic projects and 289 for systemic 
ones); 
• Romania, which is the second largest Programme after Poland had 1496 applications, and 
involved in total only 25 experts. Workload varied between components and stage of calls 
(concept or full proposal) and it was in the range of 25-110 applications per expert; 
• In Portugal, there were 35 evaluators and 1299 evaluations over 2013 and 2014. The 
average was about 19 evaluations per evaluator. 
• In Hungary, which is a smaller programme than Poland and Romania, but with a very high 
demand (1029 micro project applications and 310 macro project applications) the 
workload of external experts differed depending on availability, but reached at times up to 
100 projects per external expert; 
• Latvia handled 759 applications with 24 experts with an average of 32 applications per 
expert; 
• Bulgaria processed 548 applications with 42 external experts in the 2013 call for 
proposals, and 624 applications with 50 assessors in the first 2014 call. There were great 
differences between the numbers of applications reviewed by one expert varying between 
3-90 projects; 
• In Lithuania there were only 6 experts reviewing 353 applications in the first call and 245 
in the second one, with a very high workload – about 90 applications per expert. 
The practice of using a third expert in cases of over 30% difference between the scoring of the 
two individual expert assessments was different among countries and among components within 
the countries NGO Programmes. In Lithuania a third expert was invited in 28%-32% of the 
applications in the two calls. In Poland, it reached to 40% in the first thematic call and 37% in the 
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second one and was a bit lower in the call for systemic projects (32%). In Bulgaria, this was 
reported as a frequent practice, while in Romania there were only 5 cases when a third expert had 
to be invited.  
2.2. Selection Committees and Decision making bodies of Operators 
The Selection Committees were established in compliance with the provisions in the Regulation 
and the PIAs. In five of the focus countries the Programmes had one SC (Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and both Programmes in Slovakia). In Latvia the SCs were two, and in Hungary 
the SCs were organized around each component.  
In most countries the SCs consisted of five members, with at least two of them external to the 
Operator. In Romania the SC was bigger – 7 members, with three of them external to the 
members of the consortium managing the Programme. In Hungary the seven SCs were smaller – 
three members each with at least one external. 
In principle, the external members of SCs were experts with an NGO background and/or good 
knowledge of the sector. In Latvia, in addition to the two independent NGO representatives there 
was a representative of the Ministry of Culture, as the Operator is a public foundation. In some 
countries (e.g. Slovenia, Bulgaria) the SCs members also had a broader look on civil society from 
different inter sectoral perspectives. In Romania, the SC involved a representative of another EEA 
and Norway Programme Operator and 2 independent experts with substantial knowledge of civil 
society. 
The meetings of the SCs were attended by representatives of the Norwegian Embassies, the FMO, 
as well as the NFP in their capacities as observers of the process as provided by the 
Regulation/PIA. Meetings were very well documented by full transcription, as well as brief memo 
of the discussions and decisions taken.  
Though the Regulation allows for the Selection Committees to make modifications of the ranking 
of projects as scored by individual experts, this was not a very frequent practice. 
 
The final decision level on support to projects were the Operators - especially established 
commissions for the Programme with the participation of representatives of their Boards, or the 
Board of the Operator as a decision making body.  
3. Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Selection Procedures  
The time needed for processing applications is an indicator for the efficiency of the selection 
process. Based on the evaluation in the 8 focus countries, Poland and Romania are leading in 
efficiency. Processing applications in the two stage process (concept and full proposal) took 
approximately five months. It is interesting that the approach used by the two Operators was 
Text box 3. Examples for Selection Committee changes in the ranking of projects 
In Bulgaria the SC changed the ranking and suggested projects in 12 cases during the first call and 11 
during the second one. The arguments were adequate, mostly failure to meet the requirements of the SC in 
the concept phase, failure to present all required documents, dependence of the applicant on political 
parties, etc. 
In Hungary, an internal rule was introduced. In case the SC suggests a project below the line, all projects 
that have the same scoring also need to be reviewed to ensure equal treatment of applicants.  
In Lithuania there was just one case of a rejected project and suggestion of a new one below the line.  
In Romania there was only one case of a rejected project by the SC. This was due to the fact that the 
project promoter was recommended for financing on more than one component, independent of each other, 
and the total number of projects to be financed was over the capacity of the respective applicant. Therefore, 
the amount that became available was granted to the next positions from the reserve list. 
In Poland and Slovakia there were no cases of modification of the ranking list of projects as scored by the 
external experts. 
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different. In Poland this was done based on a large external experts panel (104), while in 
Romania, it was done with a small panel of 25 external experts with capacity to review 
individually a large number of applications. The two stage process took longer in Latvia (8 
months) and the longest in Bulgaria (8-10 months). In Bulgaria this was the main reason the 
Operator decided not to use it as a tool in the second call. In regard to small projects, most 
efficient was Lithuanian Operator – the selection took only 2 months.  
We tried to identify the prerequisites/factors for ensuring the most efficient selection process. 
However, any generalization in this direction would be simplistic. Efficiency depends on a 
multiple set of factors including the local context, local civil society capacity, the quality and 
availability of the external experts for the period of evaluation, as well as their strategic coherence 
with the vision of the Programme.  
Based on this evaluation, the most efficient was the selection process in Programmes which used 
external experts that are familiar with similar efforts, as well as with the approach of the Operator 
from previous work for them as external evaluators. Another critical factor is the understanding of 
values of civil society and horizontal concerns which is as important as the technical skills for 
evaluation. In some smaller countries (e.g. Slovenia) it was very difficult to find experts with civil 
society expertise who do not have potential conflict of interest. The solution was to invite experts 
with broader thematic expertise.  
The remuneration of the experts is not a decisive factor. Actually, the payment of external experts 
for evaluation of the projects is extremely low – about € 20 euro per project. This is lower than 
payment for similar work of project assessment of Governmental Programmes and does not 
respond to the actual workload needed to assess seriously projects. However, none of the 
interviewed assessors reported that (s)he would have done the work differently if offered higher 
payment. The majority of them have the commitment to civil society and as shared in the 
interviews felt honored to be invited for this job.  
The effectiveness of the selection process is defined by the results of the selection - whether the 
approved projects are those that can make a difference towards desired changes of the 
Programmes. There are three critical factors in this respect:  
• The quality of design of the calls for proposals.  
The design of the guidelines for applications and the text for the Open call for proposals are very 
important - their quality is critical for what kind of projects they will generate as response. The 
quality of design of the calls depended on the capacity of the different Operators. As outlined in 
the sections before in general the feedback on the clarity of the calls and guidelines for application 
from Project Promoters was mostly positive. As outlined by the FMO many issues raised during 
the selection committee, some of which were outlined in previous sections, could have been 
avoided if the text of the Call would be more clearly written by the Operators. The rule is that the 
FMO reviews this text before publishing in order to make sure that it is in line with the PIA 
requirements of transparency and equal treatment. Regrettably, as shared by the FMO it did not 
have capacities to check every detail of the text. The combination of these two factors - the level 
of capacity of the Operator and the availability of the FMO to play effective backstopping in the 
selection process had been a challenge in some of the countries. 
•  The quality of proposals coming from the NGOs in the different countries in response 
to the calls.  
Based on interviews and focus groups with external experts, the Selection Committees, as well as 
the Operators in the focus countries, the quality of proposals differed depending on (a) the subject 
of the call, (b) the level of development of NGO sector in the areas and (c) the capacity of NGOs 
to come up with good ideas and develop them as well justified proposals.  
In Bulgaria the interviewed assessors and representatives of the Operator find the quality of the 
proposals adequate from the technical point of view, but low in terms of content – new ideas and 
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approaches were generally lacking and the applicants seemed to use the Programme as a means of 
continuing their traditional work.  
In Romania, according to the Operator and to the evaluators, the quality of the proposals was 
different in the different components. Under components 1 (Engage), 3 (Sustainable development) 
and 5 (NGO capacity development; networks and coalitions), most of the proposals were 
appreciated as good and very good, most of the approved ones often represented developments of 
experiences previously implemented. Under component 2.1, dedicated to rural interethnic 
communities, there was a clear difference between the non-Roma and Roma NGOs, with the latter 
projects being weaker in writing skills but better at content (problems identification and proposed 
approach). Under 2.2 (Social justice) and 4 (Welfare and basic services) the general quality was 
appreciated as moderate to good. 
In Poland the projects submitted in the areas of Civic participation, Public scrutiny, and in 
particular in Combating discrimination were innovative and high quality as NGOs prepared 
projects in narrow areas in which they have specialized knowledge and practical experience. 
• The design of the calls and respectively the clarity of applied selection criteria - how 
well they translated the vision and strategic framework of the Programme. 
Based on the review of the guidelines of the 8 NGO Programmes, the selection criteria in the 
different calls for proposals were well thought out and linked with the relevant strategies. Content 
related criteria had the highest important weight and brought the most points. These include 
relevance (to the objectives of the Fund, to the needs and context); potential for bringing real 
outcomes and results; and quality of suggested approaches/methodology. These were followed by 
the criteria for effectiveness (implementation plan) and value for money (budget and costs). 
Sustainability was on a lower scale of awarding points.  
Another important aspect is that in principle the NGO Programmes were assessing projects, 
not organizations. From this perspective the various capacities of NGOs that were applying were 
more a “background check” criteria of secondary importance. Some exceptions included Slovakia, 
where organizational capacity of applying NGOs was among the highly important criteria; 
Hungary, especially the macro projects, where the capacity building potential (of applicant, its 
partners and beneficiaries) was of high importance in scoring; Latvia - the Activity measure, 
which was in practice institutional support where the NGOs were applying with strategies for 
three years, and their organizational capacity - objectives and strategies were among criteria of 
high importance.  
• The strategic coherence among the different levels in the selection process - external 
panel of experts, Selection Committee and the Operator 
The level of understanding of the Programmes by the external panel of experts is a critical factor, 
as the major part of the selection process is in practice outsourced to these external experts. From 
this perspective it is important to what extent they have a shared understanding of change that the 
Programme wants to contribute to, the meaning of the selection criteria, etc.  
Text box 4. Examples for good approaches to  strategic coherence of the Selection Process 
Several practices of the NGO funds have contributed to ensuring effectiveness in this direction: 
All Operators made introduction meetings with the external experts prior to the start of the selection process to 
present the vision of the Operator, to discuss the content of core principles and criteria, as well as procedures. In 
practice this is one of the very few levels where the Operators could influence the quality of the selection 
process outsourced to external experts. Based on the interviews with assessors these meetings were considered 
very useful. However, it was also shared that more time needs to be allocated on this, especially when 
completely new experts were invited. 
In a number of countries the Operators developed manuals for the evaluators. A good example is the 
“evaluators guide” developed in Portugal before the first call in 2013 and later improved for the 2014 calls. 
In most of the countries the Operators were searching for feedback from the external experts after each call on 
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the quality of applications. Some examples are Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. This contributed to improving 
the design of the consequent calls and fine-tuning selection criteria. 
A very good practice was applied in Hungary. The Operator invited the external experts at the meetings of the 
Selection Committee. This helped better decisions based on a more interactive discussion on proposed projects 
at the component level. 
A good practice was applied in Romania. After the external experts were done with individual assessments and 
sent their scoring grids, the Operator made a summary table with the different scoring on all projects and sent it 
back to the experts. They were then provided with the contact of the other evaluators that worked on the same 
projects and were allowed to contact each other and discuss differences. This communication was done without 
the participation of the Operator, and was found to be very useful by external experts. It did not always lead to 
changing the individual scoring, but it definitely provided for clarification on the different perspectives and 
views of the experts. “It helped develop a more shared understanding on what we mean behind the arithmetic of 
scoring”. 
A third good practice was organizing working meetings of all external experts on components after the 
individual assessment was over. This was done in Poland and Romania. As shared by external experts and by 
Operators this helped, provide a more strategic overview of the results on the component “portfolio” level.  
Based on the findings of this evaluation, the selection process applied in the different countries 
was very effective, following integrity, transparency and equal treatment of applicants principles. 
Our findings can be grouped as follows: 
• High efficiency and effectiveness 
For a very short time of about a month most of the Operators succeeded developing well-designed 
calls for proposals, with clear criteria and instruments for assessment, as well as identifying and 
introducing panels of external experts able to implement the assessment. The selection process 
was comparatively short - an average of 2-4 months for small projects and 5 months for the two 
stage process, with the exceptions of Latvia and Bulgaria mentioned above. Other EEA and 
Norway Grants Programmes are facing much longer delays in implementation. 
• Value driven and user friendly 
An achievement of the NGO Funds was that the selection processes was done in a much more 
user friendly manner than other public funding Programmes. This was confirmed by the high 
scores on the comprehensiveness of the application process in the Online Survey. Based on the 
views of participants in the Focus Groups, the NGO Programmes were more effective as they are 
managed by non-profit entities which are more or less a part of the sector and know it well, have 
experience in grant-making for development of the sector, and are much more open and accessible 
to provide guidance and clarifications. “They care and are interested that we have equal chances 
to succeed, they are not focused on how to cut us off as is the case of other Programmes” 
• Selection was transparent and accountable  
All Operators had clear policies of conflict of interest. Criteria and results of selection were 
published. In the case of Poland, the Operator also published the score cards and justification 
which is a practice for all public programmes. Based on the online survey, Focus Groups, and 
interviews with different stakeholders, the selection process is assessed as highly professional and 
transparent.  
This was also the opinion of most of the NFPs we met with, no matter whether the NGO 
Programme was contracted by the FMO or through the NFPs. The only exception was Hungary, 
where the main justification for the Government’s attacks against the NGO Operator is the 
“integrity” of the selection process. We could not meet with the NFP as at the time of this 
evaluation since as such it was not in place. However, based on interviews with civil society 
representatives and other donors in Hungary, the nature of these attacks is seen as political and 
biased, rather than based on justified issues related to professionalism or transparency of selection 
of projects done by the Operator of the NGO Programme.  
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We reviewed the full memos of the meetings of the Selection Committees meetings of all 
components of the Programme in Hungary. It is interesting that though the representatives of 
Government did participate as observers in all these meetings we could not find any evidence for 
serious criticism on concrete project selection or the selection process as a whole. We tried to 
follow up and verify this finding through interviews with observers from government, but most of 
them were not working in the relevant ministry or did not respond to our request for an interview.  
Several challenges related to the selection process were outlined by different respondent 
groups. They can be grouped as follows: 
• Problem in identifying independent experts 
It was an issue shared especially in small countries like Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, etc. Very few of those who have the capacity to assess in a quality way civil society 
projects are not involved in the sector. Identifying experts who have the knowledge but don’t have 
a conflict of interest is very challenging. This was resolved by having a smaller number of 
experts, or having experts who have thematic expertise but not so much NGO functional expertise 
(e.g. Slovenia). 
• Ensuring an external panel of experts with shared understanding of values, objectives 
and strategies of the Programmes 
The overall delay of the Programmes reduced the time to identify experts and organize adequate 
instruction at the start. In countries like Hungary and Romania the Operators had extensive 
experience in work with panels of external experts and could invite them based on knowledge of 
their practical capacity to assess applications. However, in Poland, where the Operator did not 
have experience with public funding, and with the short time provided, it had to rely on an open 
tender. In order to start the Programme as quick as possible, there was no time to test the practical 
capacity of selected experts. As shared by the Operator, it is not realistic to expect that an 
introductory instruction can do the job. A number of experts were coming with a background of 
project evaluation of other EU Programmes and respectively there was a threat that they might 
look at initiatives with a more technical and rigid eye. Time for interaction with the Operator and 
among evaluators at the start needs to be sufficient to provide for mutual “education” and getting 
on common ground about the strategic meaning of the arithmetic of scoring.  
• Lack of enough clarity on the role of the Selection Committees  
This was outlined as an issue at the Warsaw meeting of Operators (June, 2014). While there is a 
description of the role of the Selection Committee in the PIAs, it is not clear what its role actually 
is. Is it just to rubber stamp the scoring of the external experts and “to technically draw the line in 
the ranking list” or it is more than that. The provision on the power of the SC to make 
modifications of the ranking list as coming from external experts in “justified cases” is unclear – 
what is considered a justified case? This lack of clarity has caused some problems in the process.  
The Selection Committees is the more strategic level in the selection process. As shared by both 
Operators and external experts this level is critical. The external experts’ limitation is that they 
have knowledge only on individual project levels – those projects that they have assessed. The 
Selection Committee, which combines the expertise of both representatives of the Operator and of 
external experts on sector level, provides for more strategic oversight of selection results on a 
portfolio level beyond the simple arithmetic of scoring. Clarity of the role and power of the SC 
can be also achieved by developing some strategic level criteria on a component and portfolio 
level which can help clarify what “justified cases” of modification can mean. 
• The Selection process was led by over prescribed procedures and with limited or unclear 
room for innovation and flexibility.  
This came as a serious message from the meeting of all Operators in Warsaw (June 2014), as well 
as from the field work in the different countries. It relates to the bigger question of what is the role 
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of the Operators – just administrators of the funds acting as a technical secretariat for the re-
granting for the FMO, or as strategic grant-makers to develop civil society in the country.  
Most of the Operators were selected due to their extensive experience in operating various grant-
making Programmes in their countries. They have extensive knowledge of how this can be done 
in a way that it stimulates development of civil society rather than just mere absorption of funds. 
However, room for applying this capacity and knowledge was limited. Some Operators were less 
risk taking and were just applying the procedures as set by the donors (e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Portugal). As outlined by the Operators (e.g. Portugal) innovation was sought by making the 
evaluators aware, beforehand, that the selection rules were rigid, and that the responsibility to 
select the most innovative and promising projects – under this system – would lie with them. 
Others were more proactive in suggesting new approaches that will make more sense in the 
context of local NGO sectors (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Romania). They had to work it 
through by constant negotiation with the FMO and in many cases the decisions of whether or not 
suggestions for innovation can be applied depended on (1) the “advocacy” capacity of the 
Operator and (2) the understanding of the relevant officers and to what extent they were 
“procedure led or content led”. Some aspects that were “allowed” in some countries were not 
considered in others.  
A second important aspect is that the applied procedures are bound to paper. Selection is based on 
what is written. NGOs that write well or found professional proposal writers had more of a chance 
to win. This does not always mean that this will be the best initiative that will bring real changes 
as desired by the Programme. It may limit by default smaller organizations and players that have 
civic action potential, but low “paper capacity”.  
 
III. Contracting and Reporting Processes 
Project administration and financial systems of the NGO Funds in all countries are regulated by 
the provisions as set in the PAs and PIAs with each Operator, which in turn translate the general 
provisions in the Regulation on the Implementation of the EEA Financial Mechanism. This Mid-
term evaluation does not include an assessment of the administrative and financial aspects of the 
Funds. These are closely monitored by the FMO, especially the financial department, and are also 
subject to independent audits of each Operator commissioned by the FMO. 
We looked at contracting, reporting and financial aspects from the angle of how these systems are 
supporting the implementation of the Programmes in their advancement towards the objective of 
development of civil society in the different countries. 
The Online Survey had two main questions related to administrative and financial aspects of the 
Funds. 
The first addressed the balance between time and resources needed to meet the administrative 
requirements (reporting, data gathering, questionnaires, etc.) and the content related work. The 
majority of participants in the survey (60.17%) find administrative requirements as reasonable and 
not affecting their work on the content of their initiative. 56 organizations (15.82%) find that these 
requirements are strengthening the capacity of their organization, and only 24.01% of the survey 
respondents consider that the administrative requirements are taking too much time and resources 
and are negatively affecting their content related work. 
However, the level of satisfaction or discontent with the administrative requirements of 
respondents in the survey differs among the countries. This is illustrated in the Chart below: 
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As it can be seen from the Chart most content with the administrative requirements and approach 
of the Operator are the project promoters in Malta, Estonia and Slovenia followed by Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania. The biggest share of opinions that consider that the administrative 
requirements are taking too much time and resources are among the participants in Spain (72,2%) 
followed by Slovakia (39,5%) and Latvia (38,9) and partially by Bulgaria and Cyprus ( both 
around 28%).  
We also asked participants to assess the project implementation procedures. The highest was the 
rating on the responsiveness of Operators to requests for changes of the implementation plan. On 
the lowest scale is the easiness to follow the financial reporting requirements. The views shared at 
the Focus Groups and interviews with grantees in 10 of the countries confirm the results of the 
Online Survey. A great number of respondents find the administrative requirements and 
implementation procedures relatively reasonable as compared to many other programmes, 
especially the Structural Funds.  
While the NGO Programmes are viewed as much more beneficiary friendly and efficient as 
compared to programmes managed by the Governments, there are still some areas that were of 
concern to supported NGOs:  
(1) Co-financing requirement.  
Project promoters are requested to provide co-financing in the amount of 10% of eligible 
expenditures of the project, half of which may be in-kind. In most of the countries co-financing 
can be allocated for a specific activity component of the project (Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Poland). In Bulgaria, Slovakia and Latvia co-financing is required as a contribution 
to all activities (10% of each activity/budget line).  
The co-financing requirement has a good rationale – to 
stimulate ownership of projects of the supported NGOs. 
At the same time, for the majority of the NGOs it is a very 
difficult requirement to meet. This came as a message 
from most of the countries as a shared concern of both the 
Operators and the grantees. The majority of the NGOs do 
not have own resources to invest as co-financing in the 
projects. A great number of organizations have scarce 
budgets and are fighting to survive. This was also 
confirmed by the data about the financial capacity NGOs 
supported by the Programmes. More than half of the 
NGOs participating in the survey are NGOs operating with less than € 100,000 in 2013, with 36% 
of them with annual budgets below € 50,000, and for 13% - below € 10,000.  
Usually the budgets of NGOs are based on project funding from different donors. To meet the 
requirement for 10% co-financing the NGOs massively claimed project money from other donors 
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as their own contribution/co-financing. This practice contributes neither to increased ownership 
(due to own investment in the project) nor to raising support for follow up initiatives. It also 
creates issues with the sustainability and financial flow of the organizations – they have to take 
money from one project to co-finance a new application, and in case of delays this can affect their 
financial situation. Additionally, very few donors (i.e. private ones) would allow their money to 
be used for a different project. 
In most of the cases in order to minimise the financial burden, NGOs use the opportunity provided 
that 50% of own contribution can be in-kind. This type of calculation is also quite artificial. As 
shared by grantees in the Focus Group in Slovenia, NGOs are not used to calculating volunteer 
labor at an hourly rate and had to be a bit “artistic” to make these calculations. In Slovakia, the 
“Voluntarism Act” provides that voluntary work needs to be accounted on the basis of the 
minimum wage. This means that when a highly-paid expert is committing work in kind, the 
contribution is accounted very low. This is among the reasons the in-kind opportunity for co-
financing is not often used.  
(2) Indirect costs (overheads) 
Indirect costs can be up to 20% of the overall direct ones. The exact share is defined in the 
relevant PIAs and the proposal of the Operator. In most of the countries the share of indirect cost 
is 10%. In Lithuania it is left more open (up to 20% but not more than € 14,500). In Bulgaria it is 
10-15% depending on the size of the project. In Romania it is 15%, but with a provision for 
increasing it if well justified by the applicant. However, no NGOs have applied this, as it takes too 
much time and resource. 
As outlined in the Focus Groups and interviews, an issue related to indirect cost is that in some 
cases the NGO Programme coordinators and staff involved in programmatic work are also 
considered as part of the indirect cost. This reduces dramatically the capacity of the NGOs to 
implement their initiative.  
It is an issue with other funding programmes too. Most donors want to fund activities, while 
NGOs need to sustain their staff and strengthen the organizational capacity. From this perspective 
this is an issue for both small and big NGOs. The big ones typically have well-structured 
management set-ups and the remunerations of the management staff are secured from different 
projects (except for the rare cases of institutional grants). The 10% allocation for all indirect costs 
leads to a ridiculously low contribution to the salaries. With the small NGOs the situation is 
worse, as they usually implement small-scale projects, and the insignificant Programme 
contribution to management expenses makes it impossible for them to develop (or upgrade) their 
management staff and systems. As noted by stakeholders, the biggest expense in a good project is 
people, not buying stationery. 
(3) Budget cuts of approved projects 
The grantees in some of the 8 focus countries expressed dissatisfaction with the practice of the 
Operators to cut the proposed budgets before contracting. The budget optimization approaches 
were different. In Poland, Slovenia, and Latvia there were no budget cuts. In Hungary the level of 
budget cuts was limited and they were discussed with applicants to ensure they will not affect the 
work on the project. In Romania this practice was present on an average level and usually 
grantees were informed on suggestions for budget cuts coming from the evaluators. The applicant 
had the choice to accept the grant with requested modification or to give it up. 
In Lithuania budget cuts occurred frequently when applicants were asked to justify budgeted 
sums. A second type of budget cuts relates to the introduced new category of Reserve Projects 
during the second call. NGOs first on the reserve list are offered remaining funds in the funding 
area, if agree to cut the budget correspondingly without significantly changing the essence of the 
project.  
In Bulgaria, 50% of the supported projects had no budget cuts. For the other half the budget cuts 
were mostly up to 10%. Based on the interviews, budget cuts are practically non-negotiable. 
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Most widespread was the practice of cutting budgets (with more than 50%) in Slovakia SK03. 
This provoked strong resentment among the grantees. They were requested to adjust their budget 
according to the approved amounts but to keep the activities as applied, otherwise the applications 
approval would enter a different procedure. As a result the envisaged activities are to be delivered 
at a much lower cost, which seriously jeopardized the success of some of the projects. The 
Operator explains the budget cuts with “inflated hourly rates of experts and coordinators and 
ineligible expenditures”. This was the reason why OSF developed a special manual “Advisable 
limits for remuneration”.  
(4) Reporting and Payments  
There is no uniform approach of the Operators in establishing the systems for reporting the 
progress of the funded projects and extending the installments to the project promoters. In all 
countries the Project Promoters receive an advance payment at the start of the project, interim 
payment(s) linked with the approval of interim reports and a final payment of 10% (20% in 
Lithuania) after approval of their final report.  
Based on the review of the practices in the 8 focus countries of the evaluation, the amount of the 
advance payments differ greatly according to the size of the project and the policy of the 
Operators. It varies between 60 and 90 % for micro projects, 30 – 60 % for small projects, 30 – 60 
% for medium projects and 20 – 60 % for big projects. Hungary demonstrates the most grantees-
friendly practice of advance payment – 90% for micro projects and 60 % for all other projects. 
The Bulgarian Operator is the most restrictive with 60 % for micro projects, 30 % for small and 
medium ones and 20% for big projects.  
In most of the countries project promoters can 
request interim payments only after they have spent 
minimum 70% of the previous installment and upon 
approval of the corresponding interim reports. All 
reports have narrative and financial section 
(narrative and financial report). In all countries with 
the exception of Romania the project promoters 
have to submit at least one interim report.  
While the systems of payments aim to provide for 
flexibility to accommodate the diversity of 
promoters and projects as size and duration, some 
issues were identified. They result from the missing 
relation between the payment installments and the 
actual timeline and respectively planned expenses of 
the different projects. Thus many Project Promoters 
had difficulties, especially in the cases of intense 
activities in the relevant period – grantees had to 
find a way of covering the expenses in advance, 
waiting for the next installment. Lack of 
individually tailored planning of installments 
according to planned expenses was most often reported as an issue in Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
In most of the focus countries the periodicity of reports to be submitted is approximately 4 months 
(Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia) or 6 months (Bulgaria, Lithuania). The attitudes of the grantees 
towards the reporting schemes differ greatly and tend to go to extremes. Thus grantees on 4 
months schedule find the periods between reports too short and stimulating output thinking rather 
than focusing on achieving outcomes and impact. They would prefer a more relaxed scheme of 
one midterm and one final report. By contrast, some of the grantees on fixed 6 months reporting 
periods share that they have problems with the cash flow deriving from too long periods between 
the interim payments.  
Text box 6: Examples of most flexible 
reporting schemes 
In Romania for projects up to 18 months 1 
interim and 1 final report are recommended (not 
requested), and for projects over 18 months – 2 
interim and 1 final reports. The interim reports 
can be submitted and the corresponding 
payment requested only after spending 70% of 
the previously received amount. The Romanian 
Project Promoters are allowed to submit only a 
final report if they can implement the project 
without interim payments. 
The number and periodicity of the reports in 
Poland are determined individually in the grant 
agreement after analyzing the situation of the 
NGO and the risk level of the project. The 
Operator works together with the grantees to 
develop individual plan for payments. The 
interim reports are submitted after spending 
70% of the funds for the previous reporting 
period. 
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The ways to accommodate all demands are (a) to apply the Polish and Romanian models or (b) 
where Operators insist on fixed schedule in order to plan adequately for their own cash flow, 
introduce 6 months reporting periods with the option of grantees choosing 3 month in order to 
provide regular and timely flow of funds.  
As already outlined, supported NGOs have high rating on the flexibility of Operators in regards to 
changes in the implementation plan. In some countries (e.g. Lithuania) budget adjustments are 
allowed between budget items. In most countries, such adjustments are possible but require 
certain more or less formal procedure of notification of the Operators. 
(5) Procurement 
According to PIAs the Project promoters have to apply the National and EU public procurement 
law. PIAs require that “in absence of stricter national laws, in cases of procurement related to an 
amount of € 5,000 or higher but below the relevant EU thresholds, the project promoter shall 
invite at least three suppliers/services providers to submit offers”. In most of the countries the 
latter is the most often applied procurement mechanism.  
Two types of control of the sub-contracting were applied by the Operators. With the ex-ante 
control, i.e. the grantees submit the procurement documentation for approval before the start of 
the procedure. The Operators may require changes in the documents, as well as in the procedure 
as a whole, e.g. requesting a single tender for a set of similar services/supplies instead of direct 
contracting of the separate services. Although the ex-ante control required additional time for 
communication with the Operators and their eventual approval, it guaranteed that the results of the 
procurement procedures would be approved too. With the ex-post control the procurement 
documents are to be verified together with the rest of the supporting documents for the 
expenditures under the project. 
(6) State Aid 
In some countries the issue of state aid is quite a serious concern. The Regulation states (5.4.2.) 
that the applicable rules on state aid, procedural and substantive, shall be complied with. This 
leaves the decision whether the grants to NGOs are subject to state aid rules or not to the relevant 
national authorities. In the case of Bulgaria, for example, the grants for NGOs are treated as state 
aid and the de minimis rule is applicable to the project promoters. The rule allows a maximum of 
€ 200,000 in grants for three consecutive years. The rationale of regulating state aid is that the 
state should not create, by extending financial support, unfair competition. While this is 
appropriate for business entities, it is not the case with NGOs. NGOs may engage in economic 
activities but the majority of the grants they receive do not support such activities and therefore do 
not result in competitive advantage.  
Treating NGOs as commercial companies by applying state aid rules may limit their ability 
(especially with the big ones) to receive grants under this or other programmes. Thus if an NGO 
has received € 150,000 support from the EU (subject to state aid rules) in 2011, until 2014 it can 
apply to the EEA and Norway Grants for a maximum of € 50,000 regardless of whether it is a lead 
applicant or a partner. The way out is for the EEA and Norway Grants to make a block exemption 
for NGOs from the state aid rules unless the grants are aimed at supporting profit-making 
economic activities. The Swiss cooperation programme which is similar in nature does not treat 
grants to NGOs as state aid. 
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Chapter 4. Effectiveness of Support to Projects 
 
I. Mapping Results 
The majority of the NGO Programmes have been launched in the course of 2013, with the 
exception of Estonia, Bulgaria and Hungary which started at the end of 2012. The first rounds of 
calls for proposals were concluded in late 2013 and the first half of 2014. As a result, at the time 
of this evaluation the majority of supported projects are either just starting or at an initial stage of 
implementation, with very few of them towards completion.15. From this perspective the 
Programmes are too young in order to measure in depth the effects of the supported projects.  
The Table below illustrates the results of the calls for proposals as approved and contracted 
projects.  
Table 5: Map of projects (as of 30.06.2014)16 
Country 
Programme Projects Share of the 
approved 
out of the 
applied 
Funding  Share of provided 
grants as % 
of the total 
Programme Launch Applied Approved Approved 
Total re-
granting 
budget17 
Bulgaria  22 Nov `12 559 124 22.2% 3,100,612 10,024,250 31% 
Cyprus  13 July `13 108 20 18.5% 1,126,795 1,230,612 92% 
Czech 
Republic  24 Sept `13 466 0 0.0% 
Selection 
in process 8,268,583 0% 
Estonia  19 June `12 92 43 20.1% 1,228,772 1,910,000 64% 
122 
Greece  27 Nov `13 87 0 0.0% Selection in process 6,185,700 0% 221 
Hungary  12 Feb `13 1339 135 10.1% 3,830,477 11,610,000 33% 
Latvia  14 Nov `12 588 145 24.7% 6,796,277 9,058,898 75% 
Lithuania  6 Feb `13 353 32 9.1% 2,443,577 4,506,664 54% 
Malta  9 Apr `13  11 4 36.4% 119,169 396,233 30% 
Poland  25 June `13  2220 162 7.3% 12,795,631 32,700,000 39% 
Portugal  22 March `13  364 54 14.8% 2,991,683 7,453,000 40% 
Romania  18 Apr `13 1495 127 8.5% 11,242,724 31,170,030 36% 
Slovakia  25 Feb `13 104 26 25.0% 1,929,550 3,061,850 63% 
25 Feb `13 186 35 18.8% 1,660,075 3,067,805 54% 
Slovenia  19 June `13 365 15 4.1% 1,253,566 1,593,750 54% 
Spain  13 June `13 236 35 14.8% 3,274,653 3,785,671 87% 
Total  8916 957 10.7% 53,793,561 136,023,046 39.5% 
 
For a year and half since their official start the NGO Programmes reviewed 8916 proposals in 13 
countries and contracted 957 projects in total value of € 53,793,561. In some of the countries all 
funds had already been assigned to the approved projects by July 31 2014 (e.g. Portugal). 
                                                 
15 Based on the Online survey, filled in by 354 project promoters (about 37% of supported projects), 43,79% of them have 
just started, 41,24% are at the initial stage of implementation and only 14,97% are close to completion or completed 
16 Source DoRIS. Data on projects in Slovenia were added, as it was still not inserted in the system. 
17 Based on DoRIS data. The total amount includes co-financing and excludes program management, funds for bilateral 
relations, complementary action, preparation for program proposal and reserve for exchange rate losses. 
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Based on provided data, the demand for support as number of proposals is on average nine times 
higher than the ability of the Programmes to respond to it. The ability of the Programmes to 
respond to the level of demand differs among countries. It is the highest in Malta (36%); the 
positive rate of supported projects is between 25-20 % from all proposals in Slovakia, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, and Estonia, 12-18% in Portugal and Spain, and much lower in Romania, Poland, 
Lithuania and Hungary (between 8-10%). It is the lowest in Slovenia, where only 4% of the 
proposals could be supported.  
In terms of size of provided support the picture is also very diverse and depends on the size and 
the strategy of the Programme.  
 
Figure D1 
 
 
The majority of supported projects (83% or 786 projects) have a budget below € 100,000. Only 
17% of the projects have large budgets above € 100,000, with only nine which are very large - 
above € 250,000; 8 of them are in Poland. The small projects (€ 5-20,000) constitute almost a 
quarter of all the grants, but get only 5% of the funding while the the micro seed initiatives (4% of 
the all the grants) get less than half percent of the funding.  
Figure D2 below shows the distribution of projects by the size of the grants as % of the number of 
projects in the different countries. It is interesting to observe that the picture of distribution of the 
grants by size is totally different. It does not always depend on the size of the Programme or 
similarity of conditions in the countries. It is defined mostly by the strategy of the relevant 
Operator and the choice of size of grants to meet the needs of the sector.  
 
In Bulgaria and Estonia the majority of the grants are below € 50,000 with no grants above € 
100,000. In Hungary more than 80% of the grants are very small up to € 20,000 and very few are 
macro projects between € 50,000 and € 140,000. In Poland most of the grants are between 50-
100,000, with several large systemic projects and about 20% smaller grants below € 20,000. In the 
other countries all types of funds are present except the very large ones. 
 
 Distribution of  funding by size of grant (EUR) and number of 
projects in the respective group
 € 134 051 ; 0%
 € 23 028 501 ; 44%
 € 3 703 346 ; 7%
 € 2 638 618 ; 5%
 € 8 392 062 ; 16%
    417 ; 28%
from 0 to 5 000 € (40 projects)
from 5 to 20 000 € (218 projects)
from 20 to 50 000 € (244 projects)
from 50 to 100 000 € (324 projects)
from 100 to 250 000 € (107
projects)
Above 250 000 € (9 projects)
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Who was funded? 
As the Programmes are aimed at strengthening the NGOs as catalysts of civil society we tried to 
explore what type of NGOs are the project promoters - old/ new, grassroots/national, small/big, 
area and level of operation etc. Unfortunately, the FMO database, which collects information on 
the type of project promoters could not provide comparable data in this direction18. Below are 
some aspects of the types of Project Promoters based on the Online Survey and data from the 
Operators: 
Level of operation 
The Programmes are reaching out to both centrally based and to local NGOs. Based on the Online 
Survey 55 % of the participating NGOs have their headquarters in the capital, and the other 45% 
are based out of the capital (the majority of them are in bigger cities and some towns, and only 8% 
of them in rural/village areas). In terms of the level of their work 66% of the NGOs work at the 
national level, 35,5% at community level, 35% district level, and 37% work at the 
international/European level. 
Based on data provided by the Operators in the 8 focus countries of the evaluation we studied the 
ratio between supported NGOs based in the capital and local organizations. The lowest is the 
support to local NGOs in Lithuania - only 2 out of 31. The rest of the 29 NGOs are well 
established capital based organizations. This is also due to the priority attention of support to 
human rights organizations which are mostly in the capital and are almost missing at the local 
level in many of the countries.   
In the other countries, the highest outreach to local level NGOs is in Poland with 65% of the 
supported projects of which 35% are in Warsaw. It is followed by Romania with 57%, of which 
43% based in Bucharest. In Hungary and in Bulgaria, 44% of supported NGOs are locally based 
of which 56% are based in the capital. In all of these countries, supported capital-based NGOs are 
often implementing activities with a local outreach too.  
Based on the above data we consider that the Programmes were successful in reaching out to both 
centrally and locally based organizations. In a number of countries, the ratio was in favor of 
support to locally based NGOs. In addition a number of projects of NGOs based in the capital 
were also targeted at actions locally. At the same time, this differed among the countries 
                                                 
18 DoRIS does not offer multiple choice in defining the types of organizations and thus does not allow comparisons across 
the countries.  
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depending on the strategy as well as the areas of support. In some areas the NGO sectors miss or 
have fewer actors that are locally based. This relates mostly to the fields of human rights and 
advocacy where the best organizations are based in the capital. In addition, there are regions and 
locations where NGOs are underdeveloped and have limited capacities to compete with capital-
based organisations.  
Despite the relative success in reaching out to the local level, the majority of the Operators 
consider that this is an area that needs further attention. Specific measures and criteria in the calls, 
as well as capacity building for local groups can be helpful to increase the accessibility of the 
Programmes to locally based NGOs. Some of the organizations of vulnerable groups need more 
investment in their capacity to be more competitive in open calls for proposals (especially NGOs 
of Roma).  
Field and type of activity 
The biggest number of NGOs participating in the survey has chosen as a priority field of their 
work Children and youth, Social services and Education (32-30% each). The second group (27-
15%) are focused on Community development, Human rights, Non-profit sector development, 
Promotion of volunteering and the Environment. On the lower scale are Gender issues/gender 
equality (11%), Roma inclusion (7%), and the lowest - Promotion of philanthropy (3%).  
Per type of activity most frequent are the provision of social, health, educational services (45% of 
the respondents), followed by community based initiatives and facilitating civic participation 
(37% each), and advocacy, lobbying and watchdog activities (33%). On the lower scale are media 
campaigns (10%) and fundraising campaigns and resource mobilization from individuals and 
corporations. 
There is a correlation between the location of the NGO and the type of priority activity suggested. 
For example, 65% of the NGOs that have chosen as a priority advocacy, lobbying and watchdog 
activities are based in the capital, and the rest in bigger regional districts or towns. The majority of 
human rights organizations are also based in the capital or large cities, and few in smaller 
localities.  
Another interesting correlation is between the chosen field of activity and type of action. For 
example, 60% of the organizations that have chosen human rights as a field of activity also work 
on advocacy, lobbying and watchdog actions. The rest do not have advocacy as a priority type of 
action.  
A third interesting observation is that advocacy, lobbying and watchdog is chosen not only by old 
and experienced organizations, but also by younger NGOs. 
Size of supported organizations 
The majority of the supported NGOs identify themselves as small or medium sized. Based on the 
size of their budgets and human resources in the context of the country, 51% of those NGOs 
participating in the survey self-identify themselves as small, 38% as medium sized, and only 11% 
as big organizations. The 2013 budget of about half of the respondents are over € 100,000 (only 
14% of them above € 500,000). The other half operated with less than € 100,000 in 2013 (36% of 
them had budgets below € 50,000, and 13% - below € 10,000). There is a significant positive 
correlation between the age of an organizations and their annual budget, which increases with 
more experienced NGOs. NGOs that work on the national and/or European/international level 
also have relatively higher annual budgets.  
 
II. So what? Mapping progress towards planned outcomes 
1. The Overall Outcome Map 
The NGO Programmes are designed around a set of ten outcomes or changes, the achievement of 
which will increase the capacity of civil societies’ to contribute to social justice, democracy and 
 51 
sustainable development in these countries. These outcomes are leading the reporting systems on 
effectiveness of implementation and budget allocation.  
It is quite early to map progress towards planned outcomes, as most projects are still just starting 
or at an initial stage of implementation. In terms of effectiveness what can be viewed is (1) the 
progress of allocation of funding as compared to the funds commitment to the priority outcomes 
and (2) to what extent the type of supported projects and organizations are likely to contribute to 
leading outcomes based on observations from Focus Groups and interviews. 
The Figure below shows the overall map of number of supported projects and level of awarded 
funding per different priority outcomes in all beneficiary countries.19  
 
The spending per outcome follows the priorities in fund allocations as set in the country 
strategies. The largest number of grants (20%) and the most significant budget allocation of € 
10,605,745 are under the broad outcome of “active citizenship fostered”. This is 49 % of the 
overall committed funds under this outcome. The next two outcomes with the most projects 
and budget allocation are “Democratic values, included human rights promoted” (17% of all 
projects) and Provision of welfare and basic services” (14% of all supported projects) with a 
similar level of budget allocation (€ 8.7-8.3 million each), and 42% - 37% of spending as 
compared to initially planned funds. 
“Strengthened capacity of NGOs and enabling environment for the sector” is the next 
outcome as size of budget allocation, but with less projects (9% of all projects). This is due to 
the fact that under this outcome some of the grants are much larger (e.g. systemic projects in 
Poland, or macro projects in Hungary). The same is the situation with the 81 projects under 
“Advocacy and watchdog role developed”. The next outcome “Empowerment of vulnerable 
groups” has approximately the same amount of fund allocation but for twice more projects 
(117), as size of grants under this outcome are much smaller. All of the above outcomes have 
                                                 
19 Based on data from DoRIS (30.06.2014). Does not include the 15 projects funded in Slovenia as they were not 
inserted at the system at the closing date for DoRIS data use. 
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spending of about 38%, and a bit lower in the case of the Empowerment - 30% of planned 
funding.  
“Increased involvement in policy and decision making” is the outcome with the most spending 
(44%) from the planned funds, followed by “Developed networks and coalitions of NGOs”. 
Under each of these two outcomes, 5% and 5.4% respectively of the projects were supported 
with total funding of € 2.9 and € 2.4 million.  
The spending rate is lowest under Increased contribution to sustainable development - less than 
19% of planned allocation. The lowest number of only 6 projects is under the least popular in the 
strategies outcome “Cross sectoral partnerships developed”.  
As already outlined in the previous section assessing the relevance of strategy design the outcome 
map provides only a partial glance of the strategic focus of distribution of funding. Due to overlap 
of outcomes, their diverse meaning in the different country strategies and the fact that projects 
may be contributing to multiple outcome, the picture is much more diverse. For example, while 
cross sector partnership is the least popular outcome as priority of committed and allocated 
funding, the review of the projects shows that there are a number of cases where partnership is 
present especially at the local level under other outcomes - for example in the area of social 
service provision, social inclusion and sustainable development.  
The picture of funded and how they complement each other can be outlined better at “portfolio”’ 
level - under the priority areas of support, rather than on outcome level. The calls were designed 
following priority areas while rendering account of distribution per outcomes. Spending and 
distribution of projects per priority area can also provide a different glance on the level of focus of 
the programmes - whether they are too narrow or spreading too thin.  
However, due to the fact that the reporting system (including budgeting) was designed around the 
predefined outcomes, we could not find comparative data on achievements per priority areas. The 
challenge of outcomes design for monitoring and learning is further elaborated in the next sections 
of the report.  
2. Distribution per horizontal concerns and crosscutting issues  
As defined in the Programme Implementation Agreements, all NGO Programmes ensure 
addressing the horizontal concerns “hate speech, extremism and hate crime, racism and 
xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism, tolerance and multi-cultural understanding, Roma, 
sexual harassment, violence against women and trafficking”. The picture below illustrates FMO 
collected data derived from grantees’ information – project promoters indicate “fundamental” or 
“significant” contribution to respective horizontal concerns or cross cutting issues.  
Figure D3 
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While the above data provides a picture on distribution of horizontal concerns and crosscutting 
issues among the projects the summarized data has only general informative value. This is due to 
several reasons. First, one project may contribute to several areas and there is no data on the 
distribution of the resources by horizontal concerns. Second, there is obvious duplication between 
the horizontal concerns and some of the areas of support which makes confusing the very idea of 
horizontal interventions. Third, monitoring of the presence of the horizontal concerns is done 
entirely in self-reporting manner (the project promoters assessing to which horizontal areas their 
projects contribute “fundamentally” or “significantly”). At least from the outside the terminology 
is unclear (what is the exact difference between “fundamental” and “significant”). 
With all the caveats outlined above, it is interesting to note that most project promoters prefer to 
report “significant” and not “fundamental” contribution to all horizontal areas. 
The attention to the horizontal concerns is distributed differently among the ten priority outcomes. 
All horizontal concerns are most present under the outcomes active citizenship, democratic 
values, included human rights promoted, empowerment of vulnerable groups and partially under 
the outcome basic welfare service provision.  
While the horizontal concerns are addressed in the broader areas above, they are much less 
present in the outcomes related to capacity growth of NGOs and the sector. The outcome 
strengthened capacity of the NGOs accommodates only 11% of the projects for Roma inclusion; 
and only 8% of the gender equality projects. Developed networks and coalitions of NGOs 
accommodate only 7% of the projects dealing with hate speech, but 14% of those dealing with 
combating extremism. Networking is also low for Roma inclusion related projects (0 fundamental, 
and 13 significant), but a bit higher for gender equality (3 fundamental and 8 significant). 
Theoretically, detailed analysis is possible linking the individual project funding and the 
horizontal areas ticked. Such analysis however would not mean much due to the vagueness of the 
definitions mentioned above and the multiple areas addressed in some projects. Monitoring of the 
horizontal concerns wold be more appropriate at the level of outcomes as well as within the core 
areas of support related to democracy, human rights, empowerment and inclusion. 
3. The outcomes and outputs challenges  
The above data provides a good picture on what was funded as level of fund allocation, number of 
projects and effectiveness of spending in regard to outcomes. In order to answer the question on 
effectiveness (“so what?”) the qualitative reading of this information reveals some issues and 
challenges related to the outcome framework and monitoring systems of the Programmes. 
Based on the interviews with the FMO and the Operators of the Programmes, as well as our 
analysis of provided data on the monitoring and evaluation systems there are several key 
challenges. The NGO Programmes have a very complex system designed to measure change. The 
10 predefined outcomes and the relevant outputs are measured by 470 indicators, out of which 
160 outcome indicators and 310 output indicators. The number of indicators is highest in Bulgaria 
and lowest in Cyprus and Spain. 
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Chart D4: Number of outcome and output indicators by NGO Programme20 
 
The system was designed by the FMO, where a set of standard outcome indicators were 
developed in order to provide for aggregated data. This was to provide for comparability of data 
across the diversity of Programmes and contexts. At the same time Operators were encouraged to 
develop their own custom indicators where needed in order to fit the specificities of the 
Programme. The Operators in Slovenia and Estonia used standard indicators. The rest of the 
Operators added their own custom outcome indicators (most significantly in Romania -17 custom 
outcome indicators out of the total of 19).  
The large number of indicators (160 for all NGO Programmes) is already recognized as a 
challenge by the Evaluation Department of the FMO. Currently, there are internal processes of 
identifying ways of simplifying the overall indicators framework, by consolidating them to fewer  
indicators to report on, and more closely aligned to the 10 expected outcomes.  
A major challenge comes from the ten outcomes themselves. They are too many and designed as 
quite broad statements. There is no shared definition of what their meaning is or what set of 
desired changes they may involve. The content of outcomes can be outlined “bottom up” from the 
set of standard and custom indicators under each outcome as defined by the FMO or the 
Operators, as well as by the outputs that will lead to them.  
This makes the picture even more diverse and confusing at least from the outside. Based on the 
review of the set of indicators and outputs in the different strategies, there is an obvious overlap of 
the meaning among the different outcomes. In some cases some of the ten outcomes are present as 
outputs under other outcomes21.  
Some outcomes have accommodated a different meaning. For example, as already mentioned the 
outcome “Increased contribution to sustainable development” has two standard outcome 
indicators as developed by the FMO: “number of NGOs contributing to sustainable development” 
and “number of NGOs that have strategic sustainability plans”22. The first relates to sustainability 
as societal and governance practice, the second relates to sustainability of NGOs. At the same 
time, sustainability of NGOs as sustainable plans and new sources of funding is a standard 
                                                 
20 Chart provided by the evaluation department of the FMO. * Based on data provided in Annual Programme 
Report. Excludes HR02 and GR04. 
21 For example the outcome “active citizenship fostered” overlaps with the one on “participation in decision 
making”. It is also present as outputs under other outcomes or some of their aspects: monitoring and watchdog 
NGOs strengthened (Slovenia), “access to work of people facing poverty or social inclusion of the poor” 
(Slovakia) which in practice can easily be part of the empowerment outcome. The outcome “Promoted 
democratic values/human rights” have natural overlap with the one on “empowerment of vulnerable groups”. 
The same overlap is present between “advocacy and watchdog role promoted and “participation in policy and 
decision making”.  
22 List of Standard Indicators. EEA and Norway Grants 2009-2014, p.15 
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indicator under the outcome “Strengthened capacity of NGOs and enabling environment for the 
sector”. 
These overlaps affect the whole system of reporting. As was shared by Operators, budget 
allocation and reporting under outcomes is not realistic and creates a lot of “fake” windows. In 
many cases one project may be contributing to more than one outcome, and selecting projects by a 
priority outcome does not give the whole picture of changes emerging as a result of the 
investments.  
A second challenge is the quality of the indicators. Many of the “outcome” indicators are in fact 
output indicators. In addition, the baseline is set at “zero” as if nothing has been done in the area 
of civil society development in the last two decades. The “source of verification” is mostly 
programme reporting and rarely “NGO monitoring” or “custom surveys”. In some cases the same 
indicator is reported both as “outcome” and “output”.  
The third challenge is that the Programmes are dominated by quantitative indicators. This does 
not provide for extracting qualitative information that is so much needed for learning from change 
processes that these Programmes are trying to contribute to. 
The FMO considers that outcomes can be assessed mainly by evaluations combining quantitative 
and qualitative methods. DoRIS is a data system that mainly keeps track on progress on 
quantitative aspects of the outcome indicators. Normally, this is to provide the quantitative picture 
as a basis for outside independent evaluation studies. However, due to the outlined above 
challenges - overlap of outcomes, unclear meaning of both outcomes and indicators, the 
usefulness of the quantitative outcome map produced by DoRIS is questionable. It may provide 
some general orientation, but it can be also misleading for the actual change on the ground.  
The outcome and output monitoring systems in place needs careful review. The problem is 
structural and is rooted in the very way the program outputs and outcomes are defined. It is not 
“in the hands” of the Operators and can be addressed by the FMO only. It is the FMO who sets 
the standards (as priority outcomes and standard indicators) and requests the structure of the 
outcomes and outputs – and the respective indicators – being used by the Operators. 
A further important aspect is that outputs do not translate into outcomes immediately and 
automatically when delivered. This is particularly the case of interventions in an area like civil 
society development. There is always a gap of 1-2 years for the outcomes to be observable and 
registered. And even this is an optimistic expectation as societal change, especially change in 
attitudes, is a long-term endeavour. 
The desire to monitor outcomes is an essential element of responsible grant-making. However it is 
difficult to answer it at a Programme level. And it is impossible to accomplish by using 
programme-level data (consolidated reporting from the individual Operators and the projects their 
grantees implement, as it currently the practice). The link between the projects (their outputs) and 
the programme (its outcomes) is logical but not numerical. However, summing up estimates of 
the outputs does not produce estimates of the outcomes. The funding devoted to achieving 
immediate results of the projects (the Programme’s outputs) is related but not directly translated 
into a Programme’s outcomes. 
In addition, when observed and registered, the outcomes cannot be attributed to one single 
programme or intervention. In the case of a big national-level programme it is possible to claim 
“contribution” but difficult to talk about “attribution”. For assessing the degree to which this or 
that intervention has contributed to achieving a certain outcome, a general overview of the entire 
context and the contributions of the other stakeholders need to be considered. 
Existing outcomes and outputs systems need careful review and clarification, if they are to serve 
as the backbone of the learning systems of the EEA Grants NGO Programmes.  
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4. Data Sources for the Programme Monitoring: The Challenges of the Documentation 
Reporting and Information System (DoRIS) 
Currently the core of data needed for the internal learning and monitoring of the NGO Programme 
comes from the FMO information system DoRIS. The main purpose of DoRIS is to be a single 
platform for everything related to the EEA and Norway Grants and the beneficiary countries - 
programme preparation, appraisal, decisions, changes and modifications, reporting. It provides 
better document management and serves as an archive for the FMO. It provides the Donors with 
key information such as who the target groups are, geographical information, whether 
programmes and projects are contributing to selected policy areas that they would like to track, 
indicators across 33 programme areas (Civil Society being one of them), project summaries that 
include information on what expected results are, etc. It is the backbone for analyses and cross 
check of multiple data across programme areas to better report to the Donors and the general 
public.  
However, within the complexity of DoRIS, based on the information available23 as well as on 
interviews with NGO Programme Operators, DoRIS presents a number of challenges in terms of 
providing good basis for learning from the efforts of strengthening civil society. Part of the 
problems seem to be technical, part may be structural. 
All Operators except those in Greece and Malta consider that DoRIS is not quite user friendly, not 
analytical and stimulating a “tick in the box” approach to learning. Some of the major problems 
shared by the Operators are: 
• DoRIS came later after the start of the Programme. There was no initial information on 
categories of data to be gathered in order to feed the system at the time of the first calls for 
proposals. Integrating DoRIS later in the process added a lot of workload to the Operators, 
as they had to go back to grantees to collect needed information.  
• DoRIS requires too much information to fit the needs of all 150 EEA Grants programmes. 
Only most important data is collected across programmes to make it manageable. At the 
same time some categories that are related to the nature of the NGO Programmes are 
missing. For example, the category “citizens” is missing as an option for target group 
though often this is the main target of campaigns or other civic initiatives. The category 
“association” as an option for type of organization is also missing though this is one of 
the most frequent forms of NGOs registration in the studied counties). Part of the problem 
is that DoRIS was designed for quite different Programmes as size and targets. 
• DoRIS does not provide for multiple choices. For example, under “type of project 
promoter” as an organization there are numerous options, but no possibility to select more 
than one. At the same time an organization can be NGO of Public benefit, but also local, 
grassroots and/or advocacy NGO. With the possibility of only one choice different 
Operators put one aspect of the type of NGOs. Thus, in Bulgaria, all the project promoters 
are NGOs of public benefit, with no information on other aspects like level of work, or 
priority type of action. In other countries, Operators have outlined other aspects. This 
limits the utility of the information on project promoters for comparative analyses.  
Based on our observation and our limited experience with data from DoRIS there are a number of 
discrepancies. Some relate to technical mistakes in the data entered about projects which may lead 
to distorted quantitative maps of results. Delays in data entry are leading to discrepancies between 
the information generated by the system and the information from the annual reports of the 
Operators. There are also discrepancies between the financial data in the system and the data in 
the PIA and the respective annexes (at least those made available to the evaluation team). 
At the end, DoRIS is a tool that needs to provide for information management, learning and 
reporting on the basis of results-based monitoring of the EEA and Norway Grants. It follows the 
                                                 
23 The evaluating team did not have access to the system but was using its outputs as provided by the FMO. 
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overall outcome/output design and the respective indicators. It records the type of activities and 
outcome areas of support, however, in the case of the NGO Programmes these areas have often 
unclear meaning and overlap, which affects the reliability of data gathered in terms of the learning 
process. 
The information used for the ongoing monitoring of the Programme comes from the project level 
reporting aggregated at the level of the Operators and reported to the donors. It is made available 
to the public via a project portal on the EEA and Norway Grants web-site and provides basic 
information about each project. The data is also entered into DoRIS by the Operators under a lot 
of time pressure, and at the FMO there is very limited capacity for quality control of data entries. 
This may be the reason for the observed discrepancies.  
The technical mistakes can be addressed relatively easily by improving the quality control 
procedures and introducing internal data consistency checks in the system (or applying them if 
they exist). The bigger problem is the content of the information from the project and program 
level reporting – it is not suitable for outcome-level reporting as it is used now.  
Improvement of the monitoring and evaluation system needs to be of priority attention for the 
overall Programme. Based on the experience of this midterm evaluation its current design is 
challenging to use as a background for assessing the progress of the Programmes. 
5. An Attempt to Cluster the Existing Outcomes  
The predefined ten outcomes of the NGO Programmes are in different nature, focus and meaning 
under the broad objective of civil society strengthening. Some of them relate to change in 
societies and development that the NGOs will contribute to. Others relate to increased capacity of 
the individual NGOs and the NGO sector so that they are able to contribute to these changes and 
to bring desired societal changes.  
We tried to cluster the ten outcomes in three groups based on their nature and focus in regard to 
the desired change by the Programmes. They are illustrated in the matrix below: 
Nature Focus  Outcomes 
Outcomes related to 
changes of society and 
development 
Focus on the value 
propositions and impact 
that NGOs are bringing to 
society and improvement of 
the situation 
1. Fostered active citizenship  
2. Promoted human rights and democracy,  
3. Increased contribution to sustainable 
development, 
4. Empowerment of vulnerable groups, 
5. Increased provision of welfare and basic 
services to clearly defined target groups. 
 
Outcomes related to civic 
infrastructure  
Focus on strategic capacity 
of the NGOs and the sector 
and its enabling 
environment 
 
6. Developed networks and coalitions of NGOs 
working in partnership 
7. Strengthened capacity of NGOs and an 
enabling environment for the sector promoted 
Outcomes related to the 
policy influence capacity 
of NGOs 
Focus on the strategic 
ability of NGOs to voice 
and advocate for the 
citizens interests with the 
government  
8. Advocacy and watchdog role developed 
9. Increased involvement of NGOs in policy and 
decision-making processes  
10. Cross-sectoral partnerships with governmental 
organizations at different levels 
We also tried to identify the linkage among the different groups of outcomes. Two of the 
outcomes groups are focusing on the capacity of the NGOs and the sector. 
The strategic capacity outcomes focus on how the NGOs and the NGO sector work. The aim is to 
develop strong civic actors - viable, value led organizations with sound management and 
accountable governance, as well as a new collaborative culture of joint action which makes the 
sector stronger.  
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The policy influence capacities relate to the core of the role of NGOs to represent civic interests 
vis-à-vis governments. It involves expanding the advocacy and watchdog functions of NGOs, 
increased and effective involvement in decision making, as well as entering in cross sectoral 
partnerships that will be of benefit to the interests of represented civic groups. 
The third group of outcomes involves five broad areas of desired change in society and 
development. Or in other words - these are key processes that will contribute to the improvement 
of the situation in the long term. They relate to change of attitudes and practice of individuals, 
vulnerable groups, government and broader society.  
As outlined by some of the Operators, “active citizenship fostered” is overarching for all - it 
relates to empowerment of vulnerable groups, to sustainable development, to promoted human 
rights and democracy, as well as to improved service provision.  
This group of “societal change” outcomes is also depending on the first two groups. Key 
processes of change in society (active citizenship, empowerment of vulnerable groups, 
democracy and human rights promoted) and in areas of development (sustainable development, 
service provision) are more likely to happen if there are strong civic actors that work 
together in coalitions and partnerships and have a strong capacity to influence government 
by advocacy, participation in policy and/or partnerships to improve policy development and 
implementation. Again, active citizenship is the backbone of the strategic capacity of NGOs and 
the sector - broadened civic constituencies makes it stronger and more legitimate.  
We organized the existing ten outcomes in these three clusters in order to better focus the 
evaluation on analyzing the progress towards the anticipated social changes. However, this does 
not resolve the issue of serious overlap of the meaning between some of the outcomes, as well as 
the fact that supported projects contribute to more than one outcome. Developing several 
consolidated outcome areas (clustering outcomes in terms of their meaning towards the objective) 
may be useful as a possible approach to improve the current Programmes learning and reporting 
system. But this needs to be done together with the Operators of the Programmes and in a way 
that does not put completely new requirements in the middle of the implementation of the 
Programme. 
6. Potential Effects of supported projects towards the outcomes  
6.1. Outcomes related to changes of society and development (the value propositions that NGOs 
are bringing to society) 
Almost 70% of the projects in total value of € 39, 632,519 are supported under five outcomes or 
key areas of societal change: promotion of human rights and democratic values, active 
citizenship, sustainable societies, empowerment of vulnerable groups, and providing much needed 
services to clearly defined segments of society. These are various initiatives focusing on issues of 
each of the areas, as well as on the functional aspects of the increased role of NGOs in these 
change processes. 
a) Active citizenship fostered. The largest number of projects (211) and fund allocation (€ 
10,605,745) is the support to initiatives that foster active citizenship. These are projects in 9 
countries - Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
Based on interviews and focus groups with the supported NGOs in the eight focus countries, 
projects are very diverse as the aspects of active citizenship, approaches to fostering them, level of 
work and experience of the project promoters. These are initiatives developed by large and 
experienced organizations working nationwide, as well as small scale local initiatives developed 
at the community level by local NGOs. 
Supported projects seem to contribute towards various aspects of the outcome of active 
citizenship fostered. Some projects focus on increased civic engagement in non-profit work 
(membership and volunteerism) which will contribute to an important and much needed 
expanding of the constituency base of NGOs in different areas. A number of projects aim at 
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expanding the skills, knowledge, critical thinking and growing new values of wider groups of 
citizens to be able to make informed decisions about their communities. This may contribute to 
expanding the segments in society that have an understanding and shared commitment to critical 
democratic and social justice values. An important aspect in some of the supported initiatives is 
the growing civic engagement in dialogue or putting pressure on relevant authorities thus taking 
part in decisions that affect the life of their communities.  
In terms of approaches, projects that are especially valuable are community facilitation, 
campaigns, and providing opportunities for direct involvement as volunteers on different causes. 
As a number of projects are also related to the civic engagement of youth, in the long term they 
may potentially nurture new generations of engagement and leadership in civil society.  
As outlined in the interviews with Operators, in many countries active citizenship is considered as 
the leading outcome, underlying the approaches and initiatives within the other cluster of 
outcomes related to societal change like sustainable development, democracy and human rights 
and empowerment of vulnerable groups. A number of projects funded under other outcomes are 
also nurturing civic engagement around democratic values, environmental issues, human rights as 
well as self-organizing of vulnerable groups.  
b) Democratic values, including human rights promoted is the second priority outcome as 
allocation of funding with 159 projects supported in total value of 8,737,395. Supported initiatives 
are very diverse as issues, target groups, level of work and approaches. They address critical areas 
of human and citizens rights that are otherwise much neglected by other public funding 
Programmes. 
Some are aimed at awareness raising on various aspects of democracy and human rights. 
Approaches are very diverse including local, regional or national antidiscrimination campaigns 
especially with a focus on hate speech, awareness raising on implementing European policies and 
signed conventions. Others are fighting practices of intolerance and discrimination by monitoring 
of performance of institutions, educating and providing free legal aid to persons whose rights have 
been or are at risk of being violated, work with children and families for early promotion of 
tolerance and multicultural respect, monitoring and support to institutions for improved 
governance practices in relation to vulnerable groups in the short-run. 
Box 7: Counteracting Hate Speech  
Lithuania: A huge panda-bear rides a tricycle in Vilnius streets, makes chocolate, hugs people and invites 
messages of joy not of hatred. “She is a little bit black, a little bit white and a little bit Asian. But why talk 
through colour, when you can talk through LOVE?” “I Love Panda” is a creative project of the National 
Institute for Social Integration, which became the visual of the Council of Europe’s No Hate Speech campaign. 
Romania: The project ”Media competencies for high-school pupils in fighting discrimination and hate speech 
in mass-media” of the Center for Independent Journalism is  training high-school pupils and  teachers on 
tolerance skills and supporting pupils in organising relevant advocacy campaigns.  
Lithuania The “Ethnic Kitchen” project of the US Alumni Association campaigns against xenophobia, racism 
and sexism, and promotes intercultural dialogue among migrants and local population of Lithuania.  It is a 
documentary feature telling the personal stories about five women who moved to Lithuania from different 
countries (one of them is Roma), followed by grass-roots dissemination events and campaign all over the 
country. 
Poland: A number of innovative projects in the area of Combating discrimination address hate speech. The 
Karat Coalition Association’s initiative is developing recommendations for anti-discrimination policies at the 
level of several voivodships. The project of Polska Association mobilises civic energy in the protest against hate 
speech in public space, especially against offensive inscriptions on walls. The Humanity in Action Poland 
Foundation is focusing on the prevention of hate speech in the Internet.  
Some of the projects are very innovative in involving young people, using effective public 
communication tools thus reaching to broader audiences and with potential for effect on change of 
attitudes and practices. What is very important is that some of the projects are activating the local 
and regional levels, not staying in the official discourse of human rights only at the central level. 
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This relates both to campaigns, local assistance to victims of violation of rights, as well as policy 
recommendations.  
In some countries the projects contributing to the outcome Democratic values and human rights 
are tightly linked with the outcome fostering active citizenship and involve a variety of civic 
participation activities especially for young people (public forums, citizen jury, internships in 
leading NGOs, involvement in concrete campaigns and events). This is supporting the effect of 
growing a new generation of responsible citizens that embrace democratic values and human 
rights principles.  
Last but not least, the overall approach of the Programme area is sensitizing all NGOs on the 
issues of human rights and democracy. This is done by having the horizontal concerns, as well as 
through the priorities set by the Operators. The effect will be integrating the culture of practicing 
democratic values and human rights as principles of the functioning of NGOs regardless of the 
area they work in.  
c) Provision of welfare and basic services to defined target groups increased is the third 
outcome as level of support (131 projects in total value of € 8,389,182). These are very diverse 
initiatives targeted at various groups of societies that face social exclusion. They all are related to 
reducing social exclusion in areas where the public support system fails to deliver quality and 
accessible services.  
Some of the projects have more the nature of service development; others are more linked with 
empowerment of those served. What is very valuable are some of the supported community based 
services, which also increase the solidarity of local people with those who are excluded. What is 
very valuable are some of the supported community based services, which also increase the 
solidarity of local people with those who are excluded. Some of the projects offer innovative 
forms of support. 
Box 8: Examples of Innovative approaches to social services 
• Introduction of housing mediators for low-income Roma families, as well as other innovative community 
based social services for Roma in Bulgaria; 
• Work with autistic children in Hungary and Bulgaria and promoting their assets and ability to contribute 
to society;  
• Innovative services based on public private partnerships and social enterprises, as well as developing 
innovative social service networks aimed at victims of traffic, Roma youth and children and/or for isolated 
rural communities from the North-East Region in Romania;  
• Linking social services with advocacy in Romania. Supported project of Caritas Romania is focused on 
advocacy for equal opportunities for providers of social services interested in public funds, consulting and 
organizing over 60 service provision NGOs all over the country. 
d) Empowerment of vulnerable groups (117 projects in total value of € 5,173,222) is present as 
a focus in seven countries. Supported projects involve various groups like Roma, women victims 
of domestic violence, people with various disabilities, immigrants, children at risk, drug users etc.. 
All of these groups are either out of public attention or are in the focus of public discrimination. 
Projects address a variety of issues related to discrimination and exclusion of vulnerable groups.  
Approaches involve developing skills, knowledge and experience on rights and responsibilities, 
increasing access to information and services, community self-organizing and self-help initiatives, 
facilitating their effective interaction with institutions and voicing out their interests what are. 
Very valuable are initiatives emerging at the local level, especially those that involve creating 
community based civic infrastructure.  
A question of effectiveness is to what extent the Programmes have identified and supported NGOs 
representing the interests of those that need to be empowered. For example, in the area of Roma 
inclusion, there are a number of projects initiated by Roma-led organizations - mostly in Romania, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. Still (based on interviews) they are a smaller share of all 215 projects that 
have marked Roma inclusion as a fundamental or significant issue.  
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Part of the problem is the low capacities of the NGOs of the vulnerable groups themselves to 
develop competitive projects responding to the criteria of the Programmes. A second issue is that 
some of the Roma empowerment projects are closed, and only work within the Roma community, 
but miss the outreach to the broader majority to change attitudes and perceptions. However, there 
are some good and innovative practices bridging Roma and non Roma in Romania and Hungary. 
Box 9: Good practices in approaching empowerment and inclusion 
• Community self-organizing: A Roma project in Bulgaria (Kjustendil) has established a representative 
community council to negotiate and communicate with local institutions and to mobilize the community 
for resolving local problems. 
• Supported project of Impreuna Agency in Romania is mobilizing interethnic communities and linkage 
among different groups.  
• One of the macro projects in Hungary has a very innovative approach in the field of human rights and 
democracy, focusing on citizen’s journalism, news services and grassroots campaigning. 
• The Project ”Women participate EQUALLY” of E-Romnja (Association for Promotion of Roma Women 
Rights) in Romania is encouraging and supporting collaboration between Roma and non-Roma youngsters 
from the countryside, in view of sound transition from school to high-school  
• Good examples of approaches for social inclusion of various groups come also from Poland under the 
component Counteracting Social exclusion. 
e) Increased contribution to sustainable development has supported 48 initiatives in total value 
of 1,547,793 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. In addition, projects under 
other outcomes related to advocacy and policy influence in some countries too (e.g. Slovenia). 
also involve environmental organizations. 
A number of projects relate to fostering the policy influence of NGOs, including collaborative 
actions aimed at change of existing policies and practices. There is also a strong focus on raising 
the public awareness on different environmental aspects (campaigns targeting society at large 
and/or at community levels).  
Some of the very valuable activities are aimed at young people, mostly in schools, and include a 
variety of interactive tools and some target change of the educational system (e.g. advocacy to 
include green entrepreneurship in the curriculum in Bulgaria). Some of the initiatives focus on 
creating social capital at the community level and stimulate community cohesion and 
development around the issues of the environment (e.g. a number of the community development 
projects in Hungary, and in Romania). Another group of good practices with potential effect on 
improvement of policies are regionally based partnerships between different stakeholders, to carry 
out independent assessments and provide data for informed decisions on sustainable development 
(e.g. Bulgaria, Romania). 
6.2. Strengthened Civic Infrastructure and capacities of the NGOs and the NGO sector. 
 The two outcomes in this cluster are of critical importance for the effectiveness of the NGOs as 
catalysts of civil society. The first one ‘Strengthened capacity of NGOs and an enabling 
environment” has 90 projects in total value of € 6,920,474 and the second “Developed networks 
and coalitions of NGOs working in partnership” has 52 projects in total value of 2 € 487,435.  
Both outcomes involve different types of projects aiming at expanding the capacity of individual 
NGOs, or at partnership/network and sector level. They follow the strategy and specific approach 
to capacity building of the different Operators. While the capacity building approaches will be 
discussed in the next section of the report, some of the potential effects of projects towards 
strengthening the capacity of individual NGOs and the NGO sector can be grouped as follows:  
a/ investment in the individual capacities of NGOs is critical for developing strong organized 
civil society.  
The option of having up to 15% of the project for capacity building is contributing to growth of 
skills or capacities, but in mind of the fact that most of the grants are small, it cannot have a 
visible and measurable effect on the organizational development of promoters. Most instrumental 
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are approaches providing more consistent organizational support to the overall work of supported 
NGOs that build strategic space and potential for sustainability.  
Box 10.  Expanding Advocacy infrastructure by institutional support to core organizations in Latvia 
The NGO Activity Support component of the NGO programme in Latvia provided institutional support to 
leading advocacy organizations in different areas. This gave the opportunity for long term strategic work to 42 
organisations promoting democracy out of which 16 are local and 26 work at the national level in areas of 
human rights; good governance, antidiscrimination, gender equality and the environment. Due to the 
requirement for expanding networking and partnerships by the end of 2013, the subprogram had helped 93 
organisations to engage in local cooperation networks and 197 organisations to join regional, national or 
international cooperation networks. Just three examples: 
• Support to Providius enabled this most prominent public policy institute in the country  to expand its 
public policy monitoring  and participation by providing opinions on draft laws and policy documents, 
policy analysis, participation in working groups of Ministries and Parliament committees, advocacy 
activities and developing interactive internet tools for public participation.  
• Support to MOZAIKA as one of the leading human rights NGOs in Latvia ensured expanding its advocacy 
actions for better legislation, advocating LGTB community interests, support to the community, monitoring 
of hate crimes, participation in international networks and the organization of Euro Pride in Latvia.  
• Support to the Latvian Movement for Independent Life has strengthened its  institutional and human 
resources and expand its membership to empower people with special needs, to  evaluate social policies 
especially in the process of deinstitutionalization and to advocate for policy changes that will ensure better 
quality of life  of people with disabilities.  
Another group of projects aim at increasing the capacity at the NGO sector level - in key 
thematic sub-sectors or overall.  
The NGO Programmes use diversified approaches to stimulate networking and collaborative 
action at sector level. Some involve specific calls for sector level proposals (macro or systemic), 
others are part of the capacity building and/or thematic calls for projects. Practically, the EEA 
Grants NGO Programmes are among the very few investing in expanding civic infrastructure in 
the beneficiary countries.  
 
Box 11. Examples of support to growing civic infrastructure at NGO sector level 
• Hungary: Overall the programme in Hungary consistently supports collaborative work among various 
types of NGOs and membership based organizations locally and nationally. The Human Rights and 
Democracy Macro Projects focus on support to networking and collaborative culture of civic organizations. 
Support enables membership-based organizations from different sectors (environment, minorities, equal 
opportunities, LGBT, sports and recreation) in to support each other through processes of working and 
advocating NGO policies in the current legal framework, medium-term strategy development and fund-
raising. Very valuable is the work of established organizations with smaller local NGOs and informal 
groups to mutually expand their capacities.  
• Poland: The systemic projects supported by the Programme are also stimulating networking, expanding 
knowledge and comprehensive knowledge of NGOs, strengthening the position of NGOs in the processes 
of public policy consultation both at the local and national levels, and expanding the visibility and prestige 
of watchdog activities. Thematic projects also contribute to creating new networks. A good example is the 
National Consultation Network of Leaders in Poland involving local communities into discussions of key 
public policies and legal solutions 
• Romania: The network and coalition strengthening component of the Programme in Romania has provided  
support to 26 coalitions and networks to expand their capacities and membership base. Just two examples:  
The Project ”Coalition for Gender Equality” of the Foundation Center for Partnership for Equality which is 
consolidating the efforts of NGOs to promote the democratic and human rights values in the field of gender 
equality on the public agenda. The project “Re-use of confiscated goods for social aims” is an initiative of 
the Centre for Legal Resources aiming at promoting a law which will benefit to the whole NGO sector.  
• The whole programme in Malta is focused on establishing new networks in areas of importance to the 
NGO sector and society 
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• Bulgaria: The Specific Capacity building component helped 19 organizations of different type and size to 
address their needs in terms of capacity. This includes some of the leading networks in the country ( e.g. 
National Children’s network uniting over 100 organizations and very visible with its effective advocacy 
work for children rights) 
 
A good factor for success of the network projects is that most of them are of multi-year duration 
since sustainable networks take time, energy and the commitment of members to develop and 
grow.  
6.3. Representing and voicing citizens interests (Policy influence-related outcomes).  
The three outcomes in this cluster relate to a critical aspect of the capacity of NGOs to represent 
civic interests vis-à-vis governments at different levels by advocacy and watchdog functions, 
involvement in policy process and cross sector partnerships.  
The largest is the investment under the outcome Advocacy and watchdog role developed (81 
projects in total value of € 5,088,634), followed by Increased involvement of NGOs in policy and 
decision making processes with governments at different levels (47 projects in total value of € 
2,982,208.  
Supported projects under these two outcomes are various initiatives in the priority areas of the 
Programmes with a focus on influencing policy development and implementation at different 
levels. They involve a variety of advocacy actions locally and nationally, watchdog and 
monitoring initiatives of public institutions performance, of human rights etc.; public campaigns,). 
Some of them are at the local level mobilizing participation of local residents in decisions that 
affect their lives (especially in Poland and Romania). Others are national level actions - a number 
of the human rights advocacy and campaigns in Lithuania, initiatives and campaigns in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania. The already mentioned institutional support projects 
supported in Latvia under the Activity Programme measure have also enabled multiple advocacy, 
watchdog and public participation activities, organized by the supported organizations. 
Box 12. Examples of increased advocacy and involvement of NGOs in the policy process at different 
levels  
Poland: A number of projects funded under different components stimulate civic engagement and participation 
of NGOs in the policy process at different levels. Some examples include:  
• The project of the Stanczyk Institute of Civic Thought Foundation enables it to exercise public scrutiny 
of all stages of the legislative process in Kraków;  
• The Sendzimir Foundation project involves commune residents in the region of Silesia into the process of 
design and execution of decisions of local authorities related to land development;  
• the Rural Development Foundation eengages the residents of a village exposed to flooding to take part in 
social consultations that will accompany the preparation of flood risk management plans.  
Romania: The Programme supported a number of diverse projects increasing advocacy and involvement of 
citizens and NGOs in the policy process:  
• “Our community, our decisions” (PACT Foundation), targeted at the capacity of citizens from 5 local 
communities in the Southern part of Romania to advocate for their needs rights and interests; 
• “Transparency and quality in the public administration via social media” (Assistance and Programmes 
for Sustainable Development – Agenda 21), in partnership with the National Agency of Public Servants, 
aiming at increasing the advocacy and watch-dog role of the civil society; 
• The Initiative „Reports of open society – Public data open in Romania” of the Foundation for Open 
Society is aiming at consolidating the partnership between organisations working with open data as good 
governance tool, facilitating the transition from ad-hoc collaboration to structured strategy 
• The project ”Active NGOs participation in the management of European Funds” of the Foundation 
Resource Centre for Public Participation – aiming at strengthening the capacity of the Coalition on 
Structural Funds to contribute to the management of the Structural funds in the country.  
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The potential effect of the advocacy and policy influence initiatives is in multiple directions. It 
increases the visibility and legitimacy of NGOs as representing civic interests with both the 
institutions and the public at large. It increases the skills for advocacy and participation in public 
policy processes. Results from advocacy efforts would eventually bring policy changes that will 
lead to improvement of the situation in the area of work and in the locality or nationally.  
Only 6 projects were funded under the outcome Cross sectoral partnerships (total value of € 
607,907 in only three countries Romania, Slovenia and Spain. A good example are the two 
projects in Romania that address the local level and act in the fields of active citizenship for local 
development (rural) and eco-volunteering in penitentiaries. 
7. Visibility 
The NGO Programmes are highly visible in all beneficiary countries. The Operators have invested 
efforts to provide for this through public launching events, presentations at the media and 
publications on the special websites of the Programmes. Publishing the information on selection 
criteria, rules and results has contributed to a good public image of the programmes in terms of 
fairness of selection, transparency and reporting in the majority of the countries. Exclusion is the 
SK03 programme which got negative feedback in this aspect and main criticism related to lack of 
transparency of the selection process in the public space.   
While all the Programmes were implemented in comparatively friendly environment, the case of 
Hungary is different. In 2014 the Programme was under severe attack of the Government and 
especially allegations in the media accusing the Operator in lack of transparency and integrity of 
the selection process. Based on our in-depth assessment of the selection process in Hungary, it  
was done in a very professional and transparent way. While the attacks of Government and related 
to this investigations of KEHI narrowed the normal space for implementing the Programme, in 
fact it raised the public visibility of the Programme as one of the very few in the country 
supporting independent civic thinking and acting. The NGO Fund Operator has been very active 
and professional in responding publicly with its own press statements, interviews and conferences, 
and a few project promoters as well.  
The Programmes are also visible through 
the funded project-related products and 
websites of the project promoters. 
Visibility is among the requirements to 
supported organizations. The visualization 
and promotion requirements are listed in 
the Project Implementation Guidelines 
and the Communication and Design 
Manual which are published on the 
websites of the Operators. In some 
countries these compulsory requirements 
are seen as too complex and rigid 
especially in view of the relatively small 
investments/size of grants (e.g. Bulgaria 
and Latvia).  
A number of projects contribute to the 
visibility of the Programmes as they 
include initiatives for communication to 
the public at large on the issues and causes 
they work for - campaigns at different 
levels or public debates and publications 
in the media. However, in many countries 
a challenge in this direction is the gap 
between the NGOs and the media, which is not always responsive to positive news - of new 
Box 13. Strategic Approach to Visibility of the 
Operator in Lithuania 
A very good example is the NGO Programme in 
Lithuania, where a professional journalist was hired as a 
PR member of the staff. The Operator has a consistent 
approach to communicating the causes of the 
programme to the general public. This is done through 
support to visible activity projects (campaigns), as well 
as intensive capacity building (training and mentoring) 
of project promoters to be more visible in the public.  
The NGO Programme itself is actively present in the 
media. It has a circle of journalists supporting the 
Programme and cultivates partnership with the 
Lithuanian Journalist Union, which is a project 
promoter.  
The NGO Programme hosts a weekly radio broadcast on 
News Radio on human rights, where various issues 
related to human rights are discussed by journalists and 
experts recommended by the Programme.      
The NGO Programme in Lithuania is one of the best in 
developing meaningful case stories. A lot of them have 
been present in the national media, including leading TV 
channels. 
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working practices and approaches. This relates to another aspect of capacity gap in the NGO 
sector related to effective communication to the public and interaction with the media.  
To address this, some Operators have put special attention on communication. For example in the 
second call for proposals (2014) of the Programme in Hungary communications and visibility of 
the projects received greater emphasis in the selection criteria. Applicants were thus clearly 
encouraged to plan and foresee communications in the public space.  
The low capacity of NGOs to work with the media and effectively communicate with the general 
public was addressed in a most consistent way by the Operator in Lithuania. There  a professional 
journalist was hired as a PR specialist and a number of successful public relations training was 
carried out, followed by individual assistance and coaching to help NGOs “tell their story and 
develop appealing and comprehensive messages to the public. Capacity building for organizations 
and groups to attract media, formulate messages, and use diverse and modern social media tools is 
an important area that needs to be addressed by all programmes.   
While Programmes have high visibility on what is funded and how, this is more challenging on 
the level of messaging out the results - or communicating the benefits of the civic actions and 
answering the question of “so what” if projects are funded. At this stage this may be due to the 
fact that in the first half of the Programme the main activities were related to the selection and 
contracting of projects. More substantial visibility will be possible when supported projects are in 
a more advanced stage or finished. 
Among the wide diversity of supported initiatives sometimes their messages remain fragmented 
and do not link strategically with the identity of the Programmes at the national level. Though 
bbeneficiaries put information on their project results on their home pages this is 1/fragmented 
and 2/ it is passive communication. It helps to recognize the program locally but does not give an 
insight into the overall support of EEA/Norway grant programs. 
Box 14. Overcoming fragmented visibility 
A very good practice to overcome fragmented visibility was done in Poland. To strengthen the visibility of 
individual projects, the Operator prepared an overall map of the activities implemented by supported projects on 
its website, divided into voivodships and thematic areas. The Operator’s ambition was to show the activities and 
project results as one whole that contributes to the development of civil society and increases the participation 
of NGOs in building social justice, democracy and sustainable development.  
While the details on approaches and results in terms of visibility are in the country reports a 
question of importance may be outlined here to serve for the strategic learning of the Programmes. 
Based on the interviews with various respondents, the main question is visibility for what? As 
shared by both Operators and stakeholders the majority of other financing Programmes are 
“technically visible” in the public space – how much money have generated how many seminars 
and meetings.  
From the point of view of the objective of the EEA Grants NGO Programmes it is critical to 
communicate out the values and causes they work for, as well as to contribute to increased 
visibility of the role and benefit of civic organizations. This requires communication strategies, 
involving growing the capacities of NGOs to communicate to the general public and to 
communities, developing sector level campaigns and initiatives.  
There are some good practices of the NGO Programmes in some of the countries, which can help 
mainstream this approach in all countries. The overall visibility the Programmes at national 
European levels is also enhanced by the “No Hate speech” campaign clearly communicating to 
the general public the core values of civil society and democracy.  
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8. Potential long term results and effects from provided support as seen from Project 
promoters 
We asked participants in the online survey to estimate in which areas the Programme will 
contribute to the development of their organization. The Table below summarizes the average of 
the rating (1-5) on each of the areas/statement.  
 
Based on the opinions expressed in the survey the main contribution of the Grants will be 
increasing the visibility of supported organizations as part of the NGO sector. This was also 
confirmed by the focus groups, where a number of participants consider that the EEA Grants 
support increases their image as credible and effective organization – within the sector, and with 
other stakeholders and the public. The second important impact of the support is expanding the 
horizon of supported NGOs, beyond their individual activities by increased networking and 
coalition action with other actors in society.  
In terms of capacities, the strongest contribution of the Programmes will be to the NGOs project 
management and implementation. This reflects the priority focus of capacity development 
assistance provided by the Programmes related to project development and management in the 
process of application and implementation. 
 It is followed by increased capacity for diversifying the financial resources of the organizations. 
However, based on the focus groups and interviews – this diversification of resources refers in 
majority of the cases to finding other project financing, and less to other sources of revenue – 
donations from individuals and corporations or income generating activities. Though growing 
capacity for diversified funding is a subject of some of the trainings provided by the Operators or 
envisaged in some of the Predefined projects, sustainability is still in the backyard of the priorities 
of the Programmes. 
The influence of the Programme related to improvements of governance structure, management 
and financial systems of supported NGOs have approximately the same average high rating in the 
survey. Based on the focus groups, the contribution of the Programmes is mostly seen in the area 
of better skills for managing public funds, including sound financial reporting. Improvement of 
the governance structure is part of the attention of trainings of some of the Programmes (e.g. 
What will be the level of contribution of the NGO Programme grant(s) (both project and capacity 
building) to the development of your organization? 
3.95
3.31
3.32
3.29
3.54
4.08
3.26
3.42
3.75
2.96
3.91
Increased capacity for project development and implementation
Improved governance structure and procedures
(Further) development of our management system
Improved financial systems and procedures
Increased capacity for diversifying the financial resources of our
organization 
More visible role in the NGO sector
Increased influence over government policies
Increased recognition as a legitimate actor by government at the level
we work
Increased capacity for cross sector partnerships of interest to the
groups we represent and work for
Increased participation in consultative bodies with government at
different levels
Expansion of our network and coalition action with other actors of
civil society
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Romania), however, such processes require much more process-oriented assistance for 
organizational development, like coaching, mentoring and accompanying advice. This in turn 
requires different level resources for capacity development (to support the pool of consultants or 
giving more time to the Operator for closer monitoring and feedback) which is missing as an 
instrument of the current Programmes.  
The opinions of respondents to the survey differ in terms of effectiveness on growth of external 
capacities, especially related to different roles vis-à-vis government.. On the higher end is the 
increased capacity of NGOs for cross sector partnerships of interest to the represented civic 
groups, which interestingly is the least popular outcome (as fund allocation). As outlined in 
interviews and focus groups, while not stated as a priority outcome, a number of the supported 
projects under other outcomes related to social service provision, social inclusion, and sustainable 
development are opening the doors for cooperation with institutions especially at the local level. 
In a number of countries the fact that an NGO is supported by the Grants is already a serious 
legitimacy contribution – it increases the recognition by Governments about the role of NGOs.  
In Hungary the opposite seems to be a case: some NGOs perceive support from the Programme as 
a potential threat for the organizations, fearing that if they are supported they may come under the 
attack of the Government. This is the case not only for large capital-based advocacy NGOs but 
also for smaller organizations working with vulnerable or discriminated groups. 
On the lowest end is the survey rating on the contribution to the policy capacity of supported 
NGOs - their ability to influence and change policies. Based on focus groups, this relates to two 
aspects. First is the capacity of organizations for advocacy, watchdog and participation in the 
policy process that needs much more investment to develop. The second is rooted in the low 
optimism on the feasibility of an increased influence over government policies, related to the 
political and economic situation in the countries.  
We also asked supported NGOs participating in the online survey to estimate what will be the 
level of contribution of received grants to the impact from the NGOs in their areas of work. The 
Chart below summarizes the average of the rating (1-5) on each of the area/statement 
 
As rated by respondents – the highest will be the contribution of the Grants to changes in attitudes 
and practices of directbeneficiaries – NGOs, informal groups and individuals. Participation in the 
projects will contribute to increasing their capacity to get engaged and initiate effective activities. 
Projects have the potential to positively influencing the life of targeted individuals and 
communities. This is a very good finding about the projects and organizations - their core values 
and approaches are oriented towards activating and empowerment of various target groups to get 
engaged in social change. This is also very promising for progress towards the objective of the 
What will be the level of contribution of this grant to your impact in your area of work?
4.09
4.11
3.87
3.18
3.16
2.75
3.73
3.69
Our initiative will positively influence the life of concrete people in
concrete life situation
Our beneficiaries (NGOs, informal groups and individuals) will have
increased their capacity to carry out activities effectively
Our beneficiaries will be more capable of voicing out their interests and
to influence the decision making related to their interests
There will be more openness of government at the level of our work to
hear and adopt input from citizens
There will be improved government policies and practices in the area of
your work
New services to vulnerable groups that we developed will be adopted and
mainstreamed by government
Society at large will have increased awareness and positive attitude to
the issues we work on
Additional and more diverse resources will be mobilized towards solving
of the issues in your area of work 
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Programme which relates to change of attitudes and behavior of citizens and organized civil 
society. 
Again, much lower is the optimism of supported organizations related to impacting policy 
improvements. Still not so high will be the impact on the capacity of served by supported NGOs 
beneficiaries to voice out their interests and influence the decision making process. This also 
relates to the much lower scoring on the effectiveness of the projects as increased impact on 
policy level and interaction with government. The organizations are less optimistic about the 
effectiveness of support in the direction of more openness of government to hear and adopt input 
from citizens, as well as on the visible improvement of government policies and practices in the 
relevant areas of work. On the lowest end is the belief that developed new services to vulnerable 
groups will be adopted and mainstreamed by governments. 
Respondents of the survey have much more optimism on the level of contribution of the Grants to 
changes in broader society – raising awareness and growing positive attitude to the issues and 
causes of supported initiatives. This also relates to the relatively high rating on the potential 
contribution of supported initiatives to mobilize broader support and resources for resolving 
important issues in it. 
This is very promising in terms of the objectives of the Programmes. Usually the question on 
impact of projects on the broader society generates more pessimistic answers in similar surveys. 
The higher self-confidence for the potential of impacting broader groups of society expressed by 
respondents may be related to the approaches of the Programmes. In a number of the visited 
countries the Programmes have supported projects that involve targeted visibility actions like 
campaigns, media presence, public meetings or a variety of community facilitation activities at the 
local level. This is expanding the effects beyond the “project boxes” and contributes to the 
visibility of the new values, approaches and results promoted by the projects to broader circles of 
the public.  
9. Sustainability 
What will stay after the end of the funding is a legitimate question for any Programme investing 
in social change. The issue of sustainability was raised in a number of interviews, both with 
Operators, NGOs in the beneficiary countries and the representatives of the Norwegian 
Embassies. This was in two aspects; a/ sustainability of the supported initiatives and b/ 
sustainability of supported organizations.  
a) In terms of sustainability of supported projects: 
Based on the survey with project promoters, the majority of them are optimistic about the 
sustainability of the supported projects. About 67% of them forecast it a. s high, and 26% as very 
high. Only 10% of the respondents consider the sustainability of supported initiative as not high 
enough or low, requiring much more work in the future. This is an interesting finding as usually 
the project sustainability questions generate extremely pessimistic answers in most of the 
beneficiary countries.  
However, based on the interviews and focus groups the meaning of this optimism is different. In 
the majority of the cases, organizations see as an indicator of the sustainability of their projects 
that they will raise additional project funds to continue the initiatives. Another frequent 
sustainability indicator is that beneficiaries will continue using the skills and experience gained in 
similar initiatives. In fewer occasions they see sustainability resulting from mainstreaming 
suggested approaches, models and improvements into the relevant policies and practices of 
institutions. This relates to the above mentioned low optimism about the policy related aspect of 
the impact of the Programmes. In the areas of democracy, human rights and equality there is a 
long-term need to change attitudes, behavior and policies of institutions. This requires much more 
consistent work for expanding capacities of relevant institutions in the area of sustainable 
development and good governance - both related to respect to human rights, inclusion and 
interaction with civil society.  
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This can hardly be done only by the Programmes targeted at NGOs. It will be critical that this 
serious gap for designing and implementing rights based policies for development inclusive to 
citizens input and scrutiny is addressed by all the relevant Programmes of the EEA and Norway 
Grants supported in the beneficiary countries. The chance for optimizing the investments will 
increase if it involves work from both ends - targeted support to expanding capacities of NGOs 
and civil society through the NGO Programmes and increased attention to expanding capacity of 
institutions to accept and work better with civil society through the other EEA and Norway Grants  
The same, though in a different way applies to the social service provision areas. Though there is 
much more public funding for social services, it is designed and managed in a way that it does not 
reach those who are most in need. Even if some countries social contracting is well developed, it 
remains rigid in terms of space for innovation – new services or new approaches to old services.  
As shared in interviews, the main source for innovation is from the EEA Grants and very few 
other donors. New services can become more sustainable if they are accompanied by advocacy for 
adopting and mainstreaming emerging good practices by governments. This relates to another gap 
that needs addressing. The majority of the service provision NGOs does not have too much 
experience and capacity for advocacy, and still have the mentality of implementer of state tasks, 
rather than initiator of change and improvement.  
In this respect it will be critical to stimulate new thinking of institutions and their openness to 
innovation suggested by civil society. This is a long process and will need investment from both 
sides again - to support service provision NGOs to be able to advocate models to be 
mainstreamed, and to support change of attitudes and practice of institutions to be open to 
consider input from NGOs and to work in partnership with them. The latter will benefit from 
more attention to capacity development of relevant institutions (including more partnership 
projects with NGOs) in the other EEA and Norway Grants projects. 
b) In terms of sustainability of supported organizations: 
The Programme objective is to strengthen organized civil society to be able to stimulate societal 
changes in priority areas. This needs strong civic actors of organized civil society – viable 
(sustainable) NGOs and civic infrastructure to be able to work on these issues in the long term. 
From this perspective the issue of sustainability is a serious concern. The majority of 
organizations are far from sustainable; they can hardly maintain their human resources and 
completely depend on project funding. Based on the survey only 28 NGOs participating in the 
survey say that they engage in different resource mobilization (fundraising from Individuals 
and/or corporations).  
To get a more coherent picture of the financial viability of the supported NGOs we also asked in 
the survey about the share of all grants from the NGO Programme in the total annual budget of 
the project promoters for the period of their implementation. For almost 40% of the NGOs this 
share can be considered insignificant (0–20%) and for 29% of the respondents average (20%-
60%). Only for 21 % of the grantees it is above 61 % and for 10 % of the grantees the Programme 
financial contribution is above 81% of their budgets. This also corresponds to the type of 
organizations supported by the Programmes. As outlined in previous chapters of the report,24 
more than half of the supported by the Programmes NGOs are small to medium sized, with annual 
budgets less than € 100 000 (with half of them less than € 50,000 annual turnover). The 
Programmes are also successful in reaching to the local level. Locally based NGOs are 44% - 
65% of all project promoters in the different countries, except Lithuania where they are almost 
missing. 
The greatest number of project promoters for which the share of the NGO Programme funding is 
over 61% of their annual budget is in Bulgaria (42%), Poland (28,6%), Malta (25%), Latvia 
(22.1%) and Romania (21,4%). The least dependency is observed in Estonia, (0%), Slovenia (0%) 
and Spain (0%). For the rest of the countries this share is between 10 and 20%. At the same time, 
                                                 
24 See IV.1. Mapping results 
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the dependency of the small organizations is higher. In Poland this is valid for 56%, in Bulgaria 
and Latvia for 50 %, In Lithuania for 43% and in Romania for 35 %. 
Sustainability of project promoters is an indicator under two of the FMO standard indicators of 
the Programmes - the outcome sustainable development (sustainability plans) and the outcome 
increased capacity of the NGOs and promoted enabling environment (a focus on developing 
income generating activities). We could find very little evidence of how progress towards this 
indicator will be achieved. There were a few cases coming from the focus groups (e.g. Slovenia) 
where some NGOs have used the capacity building support (as % of their project funding) to 
identify new methods for generating income beyond project funding.  
Box 15. Investing in Sustainability: the Community Foundations in Hungary 
The Community Foundations in Hungary project is about bringing local people from different sectors together 
for the common good. Community foundations both raising and giving money locally.  
By cultivating a philanthropic culture, structure and practices in a community, the community foundations have 
good potential to be a sustainable model to support meaningful local initiatives. In addition to supporting the 
establishment and suport of local community foundations, the project will also set up a national organization to 
manage and network the community foundations. Funding from the NGO Fund has served to leverage follow-
up core support for comminity foundations from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. 
In some countries, there are Predefined projects aimed at addressing issues of sustainability of 
NGOs and generating other sources of income (e.g. Lithuania) but they are at a very initial stage 
and too early to estimate future effectiveness. It is questionable whether mere training can bring 
visible results in the most challenging area of civil society development. 
 In principle, the question of sustainability of NGOs remains of minor concern to the Programmes. 
Expanding contribution of the Programmes in this direction will require much more focused and 
diversified strategic approach, as well as flexibility of procedures to accommodate it 
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Chapter 5. Effectiveness of Specific Components Common for all 
Countries 
 
I. Effectiveness of Capacity Building 
1. Effectiveness of capacity building approaches applied by Operators 
Strengthening the capacity of individual organizations and of the NGO sector in general is of 
critical importance for meeting the overall objective of the Programme to strengthen civil society. 
Among the diversity of capacity building strategies and applications in the different countries 
there are several types of approaches and emerging lessons that can be grouped as follows: 
1.1. Direct assistance to NGOs by the Operators 
At the pre-financing stage all Operators provided on-going individual direct or phone and online 
consultations to applicants and in a number of countries (e.g. Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and 
Hungary) consultation seminars or workshops were also organized thus assisting the capacity of 
applicants to generate good ideas and projects in response to the calls for proposals. For example, 
the Operator in Slovenia organized 6 regional project development workshops with project 
consultants to work with participants to develop their initial idea. This type of counseling was 
considered by NGOs as very useful25.  
After approval of projects all Operators had individual work and/or workshops with grantees to 
assist project planning, provide administrative and financial consulting. On-going interaction with 
grantees and mentoring to grantees in the course of implementation was also evidenced in the 
practice and plans of the visited Operators. However, for some of them it was more confined to 
administrative and financial matters, while others also focused on the assistance to the substantial 
and/or functional effectiveness of the initiatives. 
The assistance provided to individual NGOs is mostly in the area of growing skills for project 
development, project management and reporting, as well as compliance with the procedures of the 
EEA grants. In other words, it is strengthening the capacity of supported NGOs to apply and 
manage grants from public fund sources. As shared in interviews with both Operators and 
grantees, more mentoring and coaching, as well as more on-site content monitoring will be very 
beneficial for supported initiatives.  
A second aspect of capacity building support provided directly by Operators were various forms 
of specialized trainings and/or facilitated meetings focusing on specific areas related to the 
priorities of the Programme. They were done on a group level and invested in thematic or 
functional areas, identified as needed across projects.  
For example, the Operator of the NGO Fund in Romania organized trainings on organizational 
development issues, as well as three thematic sessions (Inclusion and innovation in the social 
area; Active citizenship and respect of human rights; Advocacy and watchdog for sustainable 
development). In Slovenia, the Operator organized thematic workshops to share experiences and 
identify what additional support might be needed. “We called them self-help meetings, it is critical 
that organizations learn together – this can open doors for more cooperation”. In Lithuania, the 
Operator organized specialized trainings in PR and fundraising which was praised by participants 
as very useful and needed. What was also good is that the Operator provided follow up and on-
going individual coaching and mentoring of supported NGOs to increase the effectiveness of their 
communication to the public. 
                                                 
25 Focus Group with Grantees Slovenia 
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Interactive training and facilitated issue based meetings were considered as a very good approach 
to capacity building in two aspects. It brought introduction of new ideas and skills, but also helped 
learning and sharing among supported organizations. 
1.2. Share of project support allocated specifically for capacity building  
In the majority of the countries the Operators provided an optional 15-20 % of the grant that can 
be used by applying NGOs for their capacity development in areas of importance. We have no 
exact statistics of how this option was used in all countries. In some of the countries the number 
of projects that used capacity building as part of their project was quite high – for example 82% of 
the supported NGOs in Poland. In others, e.g. Bulgaria, it was lower26.  
There were other practices as well that were practically not supportive to using this opportunity 
for capacity development. For example, in Slovakia SK (03), the Operator initially stimulated 
NGOs to apply for bigger grants, including capacity building, but later during the assessment 
when budgets were severely cut, capacity building elements were the first to go.  
The majority of the grants provided by the NGO Programmes are project activity grants. They 
support mostly initiatives, not organizations. In most of the cases projects include capacity 
building of others (target groups, beneficiaries), not of the implementing NGOs themselves. As 
shared by some NGOs “we did not use this opportunity for capacity building because it is a 
luxury – there was no space for that as projects are small and we needed the budget to provide for 
those activities that will bring the results we promised”.27.  
Another aspect outlined by Operators is that, providing the opportunity for including capacity 
building as part of the projects is only one side of the question. It is also important to what extent 
the NGOs are “ready” to use this opportunity. As reported by NGOs, sometimes it was initially 
difficult to even understand what is meant by this percentage for capacity building. “We could not 
believe that this share of the budget is for us – to identify what we need to further develop as 
organizations”.28 As shared by the Operator in Slovenia “We had to facilitate NGOs to start 
thinking organizationally, out of the project activities box. This is a process by itself and requires 
attention, time and resources”.  
The same message came from the findings of this evaluation in other countries too. Based on 
discussions with Operators the “readiness” for optimal use of capacity building depended on the 
stage of development of applying NGOs, which was different among different programme areas. 
Bigger and better established NGOs were much more aware of their own needs for organizational 
improvement. They approached more strategically the opportunity to further develop their 
organizations. Smaller organizations seemed not to be used to this type of thinking and in many 
cases understood capacity building in a more narrow way. They focused primarily on short-term 
investments to meet immediate needs – buying equipment, providing for rent etc.  
In some countries like Poland, due to identified limitations of the suggested capacity building in a 
great number of the approved projects, the Polish Operator provided additional targeted training 
on various aspects of using capacity development and also gave participating NGOs the 
opportunity to update this part of the projects. Though according to NGOs this training “was eye 
opening of how we can expand capacities in critical areas”, in practice only a small number 
participants made changes of initial plans.  
Provided opportunity to include a small share for capacity building inside the project was a good 
approach, however, not sufficient by itself to really tackle the issues of capacity growth of the 
supported organizations. First, it is very small as most of the grants are small or medium sized in 
order to really make a difference. Second, small organizations need much more intensive support 
for capacity building. Assuming that they will come with good organizational plans may be too 
optimistic and different schemes of support (combining seed funding and capacity development 
                                                 
26 Only 14% of the participants in the online Survey and none of the sample of interviewed organizations. 
27 Focus Group supported NGOs, Bulgaria 
28 Focus Group supported NGOs, Slovenia 
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assistance) may be more appropriate. And last but not least, capacity building is usually a process 
As it was best phrased by the Polish Operator, “real capacity building requires much more time 
and resources for activating different thinking and approaches of supported NGOs”.  
1.3. Specific grant-making components for support of capacity building 
In some of the countries capacity building support was provided in specific components and 
grants. This was done differently and depended on the relevant country strategies. We chose 
several cases which can provide interesting learning of direct investment in the development of 
organizational and institutional capacities: 
• In Bulgaria, there was a special priority area “Capacity building for NGOs”.  
NGOs were allowed to implement a capacity building project in addition to one in the other 
priority areas. This instrument was used towards three of the outcomes: (a) Strengthened capacity 
of NGOs and an enabling environment for the sector promoted, (b) Advocacy and watchdog role 
developed and (c) Developed networks and coalitions of NGOs working in partnership.  
 
Based on interviews, more established NGOs and networks best used this opportunity using 
support for membership development, strategy development and testing new approaches for 
income generation. Smaller NGOs were using it for more immediate needs (training of the 
manager, retreats, rent or other costs). 
• In Hungary, the strategy involved support to macro projects aimed at expanding 
capacities at the overall sector level in key areas.  
It was providing support to leading NGOs in priority areas and bridging them with smaller 
organizations and informal groups. A core principle for support of a project was the clear 
identification of plans for: a) the long-term development of the leading organization, and b) the 
development of groups or the sector.  
We consider this as a good approach as it creates an explicit framework for fostering greater ties 
and experience transfer from mostly Budapest-based organizations to smaller groups and 
organizations in the countryside. The effectiveness will be closely monitored by the Operator to 
generate learning. One challenge noted was that in some cases the NGOs with macro projects 
might be good in their thematic area (e.g. Human rights and transparency) but with relatively little 
experience in capacity building of others.  
Another challenge was related to the actual number of quality macro project proposals. Due to 
fewer quality proposals than anticipated, a total of 1,294,614 Euro were not granted in the first 
round. The funds were therefore reallocated to the next calls, though it meant that there are fewer 
macro projects than originally intended. 
• The NGO Activity Support Measure in Latvia is a unique practice for the NGO 
Programmes practice of providing core or institutional support to NGOs in priority 
areas.  
The aim was to strengthen the institutional and human resources capacities of mainly advocacy 
NGOs via long term financial support for regular participation in processes of policy development 
and decision making. The component allowed for up to 3 year financing at micro (local) level – 
up to € 1500 /Month, as well as a macro (regional and national) level – up to € 2000 /month. 
Selection was done in a two-step process and was based on 3 years strategy of the organisation 
and annual activity plans. Support was provided for hiring and maintaining expert staff, covering 
some core costs, organising public debates, consultation with constituencies, campaigns in social 
media, as well as for engaging in coalitions, partnerships and international networks.  
The Activity Support Program in Latvia has provided opportunity for long term strategic work to 
42 organisations promoting democracy (16 of them at the local level and 26 at the national level), 
5 in human rights; 11 in good governance, 6 in restricting discrimination, 3 in gender equality 
(1/2) and 10 in Environment. 
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• Another good practice is the Predefined project on capacity building under the Area 
of Support “Active citizenship” in Slovakia (SK10).  
Project promoter Partners for Democratic Change (PDCS) Slovakia was selected based on an 
open call and is one of the best NGOs in the area of capacity building. The budget of the pre-
defined project is € 97,088. The project is a very good example of a professional and meaningful 
approach to capacity building by tailored training modules based on careful needs assessment. It 
involved training for consultants for NGOs from the entire country, not just the capital; capacity 
building sessions with NGOs focused on sustainability – in creative management, innovative 
approaches to fund-raising and self-financing, cause-related marketing, professionalization of 
services etc.  
Another interesting aspect of the project was its networking component – it was linking well 
established organizations with newly created initiatives, which use virtual networks and 
innovative approaches in their activities. Last, but not least, is the component for networking and 
peer coaching meetings for leaders of key non-profit and civic initiatives.  
2. Feedback from NGOs on Capacity Building – what works?  
Based on feedback from supported NGOs (interviews and Focus Groups) the capacity building 
aspects of the NGO Programmes are “outstanding” and make the EEA Grants support unique. 
Resources for organizational development and strengthening of NGOs are so much needed but 
missing almost completely in other funding programmes in the beneficiary countries. 
Though the majority of the grants were in support to project initiatives, the capacity development 
elements provided space for thinking and investing in critical areas of importance - strategic 
planning, learning new approaches for fundraising outside public funds and projects, learning new 
skills in different areas needed for more effective work with citizens and governments, linking 
with other NGOs and civic groups, and effective work with members and volunteers.  
In some countries this support allowed NGOs to hire more specialized staff in needed areas 
(experts in key areas, fundraising and public relations specialists, etc.). This was considered as 
“oxygen” for the organizations. As outlined in some of the Focus Groups, NGOs can hardly be 
effective if they don’t have active and skillful teams. Keeping people in organizations is a critical 
challenge across countries and is dependent on project funding. Especially appreciated was the 
institutional support in Latvia, which provided space for effective functioning and growth of the 
legitimacy and visibility of supported organizations.  
In the online survey we asked NGOs “Which capacity building support and tools do you consider 
most useful for the development of your organization?” We gave 13 options extracted from the 
practice of the programmes and participants could chose up to five of the most relevant ones. The 
results of the answers of 345 NGOs (35% of all supported NGOs in all countries) are in the chart 
below.  
 
Which capacity building support and tools do you consider most useful for the  
development of your organization?
225
75
66
82
91
78
59
78
155
55
104
77
24
Support for the NGO operational costs
Specialized trainings in civil society work
Trainings/TA project design & implementation
Trainings/TA strategy development
Trainings/TA fundraising/resource mobilization
Trainings/TA communication and advocacy
Trainings practical skills for the project
Trainings management and governance systems
Sharing/ learning with other NGOs
Small-scale interventions to learn from doing 
Study tours
Mentoring by experts or other NGOs
Others (please specify)
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As can be seen from the Chart, the supported NGOs consider the capacity support for the 
operational costs of their organization as most important. The second in rating is sharing and 
learning with other NGOs, as well as study tours. From the options related to training in different 
areas, most needed and useful are training in fundraising and resource mobilization, as well as 
strategy development. Other trainings related to organizational development (management, 
governance, specific skills in the area of work, as well as mentoring provided by experts or other 
NGOs) are also important but have a more average rating. On the lower scale of usefulness are 
training for project design and implementation, or support to learning from doing, as well as 
growing specific skills needed for the project.  
3. Effectiveness of the Capacity Building Matrix Developed Centrally and Applied Locally 
The development of streamlined Capacity Building (CB) tools and approaches across the 
Programmes in the different countries was initiated by the FMO due to the growing strategic 
importance of capacity development in the framework of the Programme. It was designed by 
outside consultants, hired by the FMO and piloted in three countries: Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Slovakia. The results of the pilot were discussed at the regional meeting of Operators in March 
2013 and later the CB tool was mainstreamed for all the NGO Programmes. 
 
The CB tool pack is elaborated in the Briefing for Fund Operators, which provides a 
comprehensive overview of various approaches to capacity building, as well as tools and a menu 
of ideas of integrating learning, self-reflection and sharing into the approaches of Operators. What 
is very valuable is that capacity development is interpreted as a holistic process. A core tool in this 
pack is the Capacity Building Matrix. It is a list of standards in five organizational areas and 
systems related to internal organizational capacity, seven aspects of external organizational 
capacity, as well as four areas of organizational competence and skills (staff and volunteers). The 
matrix is an extensive table of 17 pages with over 34 statements/standards in the above areas. 
Each statement has four stages showing the progressive aspect in the relevant area.  
As explained in the documents the Capacity Building Matrix has a set of ambitious objectives at 
different levels. It is designed to help the self-assessment of supported NGOs to identify capacity 
building needs and priorities and to map progress for the period of the grant. It is to serve the 
Operators to identify needs of individual NGOs and needs at the national level which will help 
better targeting of resources and support. It is also to provide a country baseline at the start of the 
Programme in a variety of capacity areas and respectively - to assist the assessment of CB 
outcomes at both the country and Programme level.  
A second important part of the CB pack is the set of capacity building indicators to be used across 
Programmes. This includes: 
• three compulsory indicators related mostly to the internal organizational systems and 
links with beneficiaries: 1/ Number of organisations able to evidence good governance 
and management procedures; 2/ Number of organisations demonstrating robust financial 
procedures in place and diversifying their funding sources; and 3/Number of 
organisations regularly consulting with users, beneficiaries and other stakeholders 
• six optional indicators related mostly to values, crosscutting principles, external capacity 
of the organizations to influence policies, and to strategically communicate and network. 
The guidance for using the CB Matrix encourages Operators to adapt it, but to follow its 
principles. It is also stated that “There is no requirement to use it if you have better ways of 
evidencing capacity building. It is a draft tool that the FMO will want to treat as a developing 
project, and feedback on its usefulness will be welcome”.29  
                                                 
29 Christine Forester, Sarah del Tufo. Briefing Document for Fund Operators. EEA and Norway Grants for NGO. 
March 2013, p.6 
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While the use of the CB Matrix is not compulsory, all Operators have to report on the CB 
indicators at the Programme level. A number of Operators have already applied or are in the 
process of introduction of the tool. Based on the interviews it was applied differently. In all 
countries, the Matrix needed to be seriously adapted in order to make sense in the local contexts. 
Some Operators applied it as a survey sent to grantees (e.g. Bulgaria, Slovakia), and in other 
countries the matrix was used as a background for interviews of supported organizations done by 
the Operator (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania).  
In some countries the CB Matrix was introduced as an obligatory requirement to grantees who 
had to fill it in at the start and at the final report stage (e.g. Bulgaria). In others it was used only 
with NGOs that had targeted support for organizational development. This was the case in 
Hungary, where the CB Matrix is used by the NGOs leading the Macro projects, which in turn 
will use it with the group of small NGOs they are providing with CB assistance.  
Based on the Warsaw meeting of Operators (June 2014), as well as individual interviews with 
Operators, the feedback on the effectiveness of the CB matrix is mostly critical. While in principle 
such an instrument can be useful, a number of critical points were outlined related to challenges of 
the design, the timing of introducing the tool, the feasibility of the multiple purposes of the tool 
and the approaches for its application in the context of the nature of the Programmes: 
• Challenges of the design 
The CB matrix is considered by the majority of the Operators as not completely adequate to the 
realities in the beneficiary countries. The standards as described can be partially applicable for 
large NGOs with established organizational systems and policies, but it is “rocket science” for 
small organizations. As outlined by a number of Operators, a main shortage is that the matrix was 
developed from the outside with a limited perspective of local contexts. Real consultation with 
Operators at the stage of design was missing.  
The CB matrix is cumbersome and long. The standards are often unclear and the progressive 
stages for the different statements (indicators) are sometimes artificial, which can be confusing for 
NGOs. The majority of the Operators have worked a lot in adapting it, and some have chosen only 
some of the numerous statements (indicators). For example in Slovenia, the Operator chose only 
10 out of the 34 statements.  
• Late timing of introducing the new tool 
The CB Matrix came late for a number of the NGO Programmes at a time when the first call of 
proposals was already finished. Putting an additional requirement to already supported grantees 
was challenging for both the Operator and the grantees. As stated by some of the Operators, it was 
practically changing the message to the sector. Capacity building, especially as a share of the 
supported projects was announced as optional. Some organizations chose not to have it in their 
projects. A great majority of the grants are project activities and it would be unfair and unrealistic 
to ask for measuring progress of change in organizational development based on that.  
• Multiple purposes that are not feasible - a different approach is needed 
It can hardly be anticipated that the Matrix can contribute to a baseline of the Programme in the 
area of capacity building at the national level. This will require different tools and approaches 
which are developed by the Operators themselves within planned predefined projects or the 
consultations done during the design of the strategy for the Programme.  
As we have already said, the NGO Programme is mostly providing project activities support and 
much less targeted support for organizational development. Any tool for measuring progress of 
organizational change in the duration of the grants will make sense only if these grants are 
explicitly targeting organizational development and provide an accompanying mentoring 
programme to assist needed areas. It will also be beneficial if NGOs have the resources for 
potential external facilitation and for the ‘internal time’ to devote to organizational renewal, 
training and strategy development.  
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Feedback from interviewed NGOs is also confirming some of the above concerns. A number of 
the NGOs did not understand this tool and some referred to it as “another administrative 
requirement we had to meet” or “the other questionnaire to fill in”. The majority the NGOs 
supported by the programme that participated in the evaluation found it irrelevant to their current 
situations and hard to even comprehend. Only a few of them NGOs reported that they have used 
the CB Matrix for internal discussion which has assisted their organizational thinking.  
Based on the findings from most of the countries the introduction of the CB Matrix seems more 
imposed from the outside than supportive, which may be counterproductive to its intended 
function. It seems like it is accepted as a requirement rather than an opportunity for learning. This 
is valid for both Operators, as well as grantees. We consider it is completely counterproductive to 
use the Matrix as another questionnaire to all grantees, no matter whether they receive capacity 
building support or not. It is much better when it is applied as a tool for interactive discussion or 
interviews on organizational areas.  
 If the CB Matrix is to be used it needs to be carefully reviewed and strategically fit into a new 
approach to supporting organizational development consistently integrated into the Programme.  
It will be beneficial if its redesign is done “from within”, rather than just from the outside. An 
option can be developing a working group involving Operators, as well as some of their partners 
in providing capacity development (predefined projects or others). This can help adjust the Matrix 
and the approach of its application so that it “lands” better in local realities and local strategies. 
In regard to the chosen compulsory CB indicators, as stated in some interviews, though structure 
(management, governance and finances) is important, it is even more important to develop other 
aspects of organizational culture and performance related to values, citizens based approach and 
democracy nature of organizations and their mission driven interaction with the external 
environment. For example, the Operator in Hungary, “moved up” some of the optional capacity 
building indicators related to human rights values in organizational culture, which became 
compulsory.  
 
II. Bilateral relations 
1. Why Bilateral cooperation among civil societies 
Like in all EEA Grants, Bilateral relations with Donor State Partners (both NGO and other 
stakeholders) are also encouraged through the NGO Programmes. This can expand strategic links 
and cooperation among stakeholders in the beneficiary and donors countries and to stimulate good 
working partnerships and pro-active work together beyond only seminars and workshops.  
In principle learning, exchange and partnerships among different cultural settings is a good way to 
expand vision, develop new ideas and approaches, even if the contexts might be very different. 
Based on the interviews with the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Icelandic Human Rights 
Centre which are facilitating the contacts with potential partners in their countries, the NGOs in 
the donors countries have a lot to offer. It relates to the long tradition of work in democratic 
environment and high legitimacy of the NGO sectors by both Governments and the citizens: 
• In both countries civil societies are well developed and supported by government with 
funding, but free to provide critical feedback without repercussion. They have access to 
institutions and are legitimate with government to monitor policies; they take part in 
hearings and give opinions which are taken into serious consideration, and they are invited 
as partners in policy implementation. The NGOs in both countries have strong capacities 
in advocacy, monitoring of policies and raising public awareness. Collaboration and joint 
work is an important part of the culture of the sectors. 
• A major strength of the NGOs in both countries is that they have broad-based civic 
support and participation which makes them strong and independent. For example, the 
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115 000 NGOs in Norway are supported by 10 million memberships and 80% of the 
people in the country are members of at least one NGO, and 50% of the population 
participates in voluntary work annually. Contributions from membership payments and 
income generating activities make a bit less than 2/3 of the funding of NGOs, only one 
third of the support is from Government and less than 10% from private businesses.  
• Some of the NGOs, especially in Norway, are very professional with resources and staff 
varying between 20-100 people. Half of all NGOs are more volunteer based, with annual 
turnover of € 7,000. In Iceland, the majority of the NGOs are small organizations; some 
do not have employees but work on volunteer basis. In both countries, people involved are 
very knowledgeable, committed and passionate about causes, and well educated and 
organized.  
Civil societies in beneficiary countries generally have quite a different situation. While there are 
positively many committed and well qualified people involved in the organizations and projects, 
current challenges seem to overshadow this strength. The critical challenges relate to 
sustainability and funding, as well as cooperative relations with Governments. A fight for survival 
is dominating the NGO sectors. Governments are closed and not allowing for any criticism. There 
is a need to strengthen the role of NGOs as actors activating citizens and increasing their trust, 
participation and support.  
Despite the differences, as phrased by the Icelandic Human Rights Centre “there is no difference 
in dedication. This is the common ground - commitment, enthusiasm for causes, common areas of 
concern - people with disabilities, women, etc.” Based on the feedback from Norwegian NGOs30, 
their motivation for Bilateral Cooperation is to provide support to partners and contribute to their 
means, transfer competency, gain international working experience and expand networking. This 
is seen as contributing to their own development, self-reflection and new ideas. In particular, 
joining efforts to meet common European challenges, such as right-wing extremism, was also 
noted as a benefit to cooperation.  
2. Implementation and Results 
Specific funding within the NGO Funds has been set aside to support Bilateral Relations.  At the 
Programme level it is part of the Complementary Action involving stimulating peer-to-peer 
exchange of practices among Operators and similar entities in the Donors states. At the project 
level Bilateral cooperation is stimulated by a Seed fund to facilitate the search for partners and 
development of partnerships (measure A) and by Bilateral Cooperation Projects to facilitate 
networking, exchange and transfer of knowledge and experience within the Programmes approved 
projects (measure B).  
The combined allocation of funds for these two measures is € 2,728,744. In the majority of the 
countries the committed allocation is around 1,5% of the eligible programme expenditure, while 
in the Programme in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia (10) it is higher (2% - 2,7%) 
with highest share of 3.7% in the second Programme in Slovakia (SK03). However, in the 
countries with small Programme the actual committed amount is very small to make any 
difference. 
In all countries, there were a number of promotional events - matchmaking meetings bringing 
together NGOs from the donor countries and from the beneficiary countries. In addition, the NHC 
and IHC have stimulated promotion of the opportunities provided by the EEA grants in each of 
the countries. There is a special NGO Partnership Portal where organizations from the donor 
countries and the beneficiary countries can register. Partnership opportunities are also promoted 
by the Operators of the Funds in the beneficiary countries. 
                                                 
30NHC. Feedback and recommendations from Norwegian Civil Society on the EEA Grants and the NGO 
Programmes. December 2013 
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Different Operators applied different approaches in implementing this part of the Programme, 
which are described in more detail in the country reports. These included a variety of approaches 
for learning and exchange, like group and individual study trips of NGOs from beneficiary 
countries to the donor countries, and internships for NGO activists. A good practice of the 
Romanian Operator is to organize thematic group study trips. In the majority of the countries this 
opportunity was open only for project promoters already supported by the NGO funds, but in 
others (e.g. SK10) this was open to other NGOs too.  
Box 16: Innovative approach to Bilateral Relations of the NGO Programme in Hungary 
 
Among the practices for exchange and learning the approach of the Hungarian Operator is very interesting. It 
involved support for three to six month internships of Hungarian NGO leaders and activists to learn about the 
work of NGOs in donor states and to bring back experiences, insights and new methods. To date, a total of 
eleven interns from two calls have been supported, some of them are from the Macro Projects, which are also 
providing capacity building support to other civic groups and organizations. Thus, the experience gained in 
donors countries in different fields, including community organizing, communications, professional 
development and fundraising - has a lot of potential for multiplication.  
 
A second very innovative practice of the Hungarian Operator is the “On the Spot” reporters funding scheme. 
These are youth study trips of at least two weeks to learn and “report” through various social media tools on 
examples that can be used to tackle different social problems in Hungary. Thematically, this initiative is linked 
with the horizontal concerns.  
There were also different practices to stimulate involvement of donor partners in projects 
supported by the core areas of the NGO Funds. In some countries this was done by adding 
additional points for this in the selection criteria, in others an additional % could be added to the 
eligible budget in order to be able to include donor partnership (e.g. 10% in Hungary and 20-30% 
in Slovakia). 
As a result, there are currently 112 projects with donors project partners with the highest number 
in Poland (24 projects partnerships), followed by Latvia, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia 
(SK10) (between 22 and 10 projects). In the rest of the countries the projects are below 10 or 
missing31.  
Thematically, the projects with donor partners are very diverse, with the majority of them related 
to the democracy and human rights area and horizontal concerns. These are areas, where NGOs 
from the donor countries have a lot of experience and innovative approaches that can be shared in 
the beneficiary countries. 
3. Effectiveness and Bottlenecks 
Based on the NHC report on the feedback of 30 Norwegian NGOs, the interviews with Operators 
of the NGO Funds, as well as focus groups with supported NGOs in 10 countries, the following 
effects and benefits of bilateral cooperation projects can be outlined: 
• Exposure to new approaches and models was an eye opener for participating NGOs from 
beneficiary states. They could gain new knowledge and learn from different practices in 
specific issues of interest. Learning how things can be done differently in a different 
environment helped in opening new thinking and approaches. 
• Having a donor partner increases the legitimacy and credibility of the initiative and the 
implementing NGO in the beneficiary country. “Both government and the public take you 
more seriously if you have a donor partner”. 
• It was very useful to learn about different models of cooperation and relations between 
government and NGOs, including how financing from government can support active civil 
society and critical voices 
                                                 
31 Data is based on DoRIS Master Report of 30.06.2014. However, this may be incomplete as findings from 
country levels reported projects that are missing from DoRIS. For example, the majority of the NGOs Focus 
Group in Slovenia had donors partners, and according to DoRIS - there are no such projects there.  
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• It was very useful learning about different organizational thinking and acting “not to try 
to fit your organization in project boxes but to follow your mission and strategy” 
On the more challenging side the following bottlenecks were outlined: 
(1) Bilateral relations are project application driven rather than demand or strategy 
driven which makes them less effective. 
For NGOs in the beneficiary countries the search for partners while meeting the deadline for 
project applications was energy consuming and stressful. There are areas where expertise in 
donors country is missing (e.g. fight against corruption, minorities etc.).  
Adding a percentage to the project costs in order to stimulate donor partnerships in projects is 
making this more feasible, as including partners is usually costly, especially in view of the 
relatively small size of the grants provided by the NGO Programmes. However, it also fits into the 
project driven nature of the partnerships and does not necessarily make them more genuine. In 
many cases, much more time is needed to create such genuine partnerships, which can hardly be 
done under the pressure of quick project design and application.  
The NGOs from donor countries are overwhelmed by waves of partnership requests from 16 
countries. Requests are always urgent to meet deadlines, but not always well justified. Based on 
the interview with the NHC, some Norwegian NGOs which were initially in the database for 
bilateral relations are currently requesting to sign out, to avoid unsolicited requests for project 
partnerships from the beneficiary countries. 
This fatigue of the NGOs in the donor countries was felt in the beneficiary countries too. As 
phrased in one of the Focus Groups, “in the beginning Norwegian NGOs were friendly, but 
gradually got tired and ended up being cold and non-responsive. Sometimes they just hang up the 
phone when we call”. 
Project led nature of partnerships does not provide enough room for process to develop quality 
partnership relations. NGOs from donor countries would not get involved just formally without 
clarity on common ground - values, commitment and approaches. More successful were 
partnership projects that emerged from a previous cooperation.  
(2) The Design of the Bilateral fund with two measures A and B is too complicated.  
This makes the process of application confusing. Time is not enough and partnership efforts are 
killed by numerous deadlines. It will be better to have just one fund with simplified procedures  
(3) Local projects have to “pay” the Norwegian partners, but these projects are small 
and donor partners are costly.  
Norwegian experts require € 150- 400 per hour which in some cases can represent the project 
payment of the local coordinator for a month. With limited funds the partners from the donors 
countries in most of the cases get just reimbursement for travel. Some will do it regardless of the 
limited money as they have resources and are motivated to contribute. Others that are smaller 
cannot afford this. This limits the participation of otherwise very good NGOs that can contribute 
to beneficiary countries.  
(4) Developed procedures, criteria and payments that are developed are considered by 
NGOs on both sides of the partnership as very complicated and can sour relationships.  
There are considerable administrative differences among the countries. As phrased by the IHRC 
and NHC “Issues with requirements are killing the enthusiasm and the initiative”. Sometimes 
very little money is allocated the Norwegian partner, and the process for reclaiming this can be 
hard (“costing more than it is worth”) due to the bureaucracy.  
4. Rethinking and redesigning Bilateral Cooperation 
Based on sources from both beneficiary and donors countries, the Bilateral Relations fund needs 
rethinking. Some of the suggestions relate to improving the design of the Bilateral relations 
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funding as it is in two directions. The first is simplifying and consolidating the measures (seed 
fund and project fund into one). The second relates to the size of the funding. Based on opinion of 
the NGOs from the donor countries, the funding is too small in order to raise interest and needs to 
be increased.  
The second group of suggestions proposes complete rethinking and redesign of the Bilateral 
funding. The following aspects can be outlined in this direction:  
• The Bilateral relations fund will be more effective if it is strategically driven and issue led, 
stimulating networking of organizations around similar causes. This can help create 
meeting space for like-minded people and develop interactive platforms of NGOs from 
multiple beneficiary countries and from the donor countries. Multilateral projects for 
capacity development in key areas can also be considered. This will be a much better use 
of the resources of NGOs from donor countries. It will also meet the need of linkage, 
learning and joint action among NGOs from similar environments. If connectedness and 
common ground are created, projects will follow and future joint initiatives can mobilize 
larger funding, including from EU sources. 
• It needs to include more focus on innovation and experimentation especially in areas of 
priority for the beneficiary countries. In addition to priority areas of the NGO Programmes 
like democracy, human rights, and advocacy, bilateral cooperation can be very beneficial 
to functional areas like sustainability, fundraising and links with civic constituencies, 
volunteering, effective work with the media, as well as cooperation among NGOs. All 
these are areas of strength of the NGOs in donor countries and are much needed in 
beneficiary countries. 
• Study trips and internships seem to be very beneficial and need to continue, but they can 
be open to other NGOs too, not just project promoters. They also need more funding, 
rendering account of the costs of living in donor countries. Again, it will be good to 
coordinate this and organize study groups involving participants from different 
beneficiary countries. This will be a better use of resources of donors countries NGOs and 
will stimulate linkage and learning among participants from beneficiary countries. 
• More public presentations and communication can raise awareness both in donor and 
beneficiary countries. Bringing groups of activists from beneficiary countries (NGOs 
supported) in donor countries for more public presentations and discussions will help 
better awareness in the donor countries about issues, achievements and potential of civil 
society in the beneficiary countries. Initiatives like “On the Spot” youth study trips and 
reporting in social media of lessons from donors countries in approaching issues of society 
are very innovative and need to continue. 
• It may be considered to develop a fund facility in Norway with additional funding to the 
Bilateral Relation Fund, where NGOs from donor countries can apply for some of the 
Bilateral cooperation initiatives. This can save resources within local funds, and will 
reduce the resentment caused by large discrepancies in daily rates, as well as the diverse 
administrative requirements which do not apply in the context of the donor countries.  
 
III. Complementary Action 
The Complementary Action (CA) is a new component of all NGO Programmes as compared to 
the previous Financial Mechanism. It has a special budget allocation as a fixed percentage on top 
of the management fee ( up to 30%) and a maximum ceiling (not exceeding 15% of total eligible 
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cost of the Programme together with the management fee)32. In total € 2 989 640 have been 
allocated for Complementary Action in all beneficiary countries.  
However the principle of proportional share of its budget made its distribution among the different 
programmes very uneven. Thus, six of the programmes have budgets for CA below €100,000 euro 
(some of the smaller ones with budget between € 10,000-50,000), while some of the large 
programmes like Poland and Romania have much more significant budgets ( respectively € 
700,000 in Poland  and  € 919,000 in Romania).  
At present the CA includes activities in two main directions: 1/ in-country activities that are 
complementary to the grantmaking components of the Programmes and 2/  activities that are 
regional and are stimulating exchange and learning.  In many occasions these two directions are 
linked, as the initiatives organized in-country also involve the presence of Operators as well as 
project promoters from other beneficiary countries. 
The initiatives under the CA undertaken by the different Programmes depend on the level of 
available budget. In the majority of the programmes, these involve in-country initiatives 
proactively one of the horizontal concerns, i.e. hate speech. They were strategically linked with 
the European campaign “No Hate speech” led by the Council of Europe as a strategic partner of 
the EEA and Norway Grants. 
• In Bulgaria a representative survey of the public attitudes was conducted in 2013, 
followed by “Hate speech and the role of civil society”  international conference 
organized by Operator.  
• In Poland an international conference on hate speech was held and a portal providing 
information on hate speech in Poland was launched (www.mowanienawisci.info). There 
are also studies of hate speech and workshops for young bloggers. Further, a series of 
debates on hate speech, a competition for a press article about discrimination and hate 
speech as well as the activities of the National Forum of Polish Non-Governmental 
Organisations’ are also planned.  
• In Romania the event Civil Society: Trends in working with children and youth focused on 
education including no hate speech/ tolerance and anti-discrimination;  
The in-country activities are of critical importance for more strategic operation of the funds, 
working with the entire sector (not just of supported grantees). Strategically it can be linked to the 
clarity of the role of the Operators - proactive in developing civil society, not just disbursing 
grants. 
In Romania a number of strategic events, meetings, forums and discussions have been organized 
or planned that stimulate expanding the strategic capacity at the NGO sector level while also 
including intensive international presence from supported NGOs and Operators from other 
beneficiary countries. These include: 
• the Civic Arena, an original forum for discussions and debate about new trends and 
developments in the recipient and donor countries’ NGO sectors; 
• regional conference on Roma and discrimination to analyze perspectives on Roma 
inclusion;  
• thematic conferences on democracy, social policies, children and youth, and environment; 
• the NGO Fair in 2014 with various workshops and group discussions on innovation of 
NGO work. 
The regional level activities included in the CA are mostly meetings, seminars, conferences 
organized by Donors, Partner Organizations, POs from other Beneficiary States, etc., to 
                                                 
32 EEA Financial Mechanism 2009-2014. Guidelines for NGO Programmes. p. 16 
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demonstrate the progress made and to share experiences related to the implementation of NGO 
funds.  
Very useful were meetings initiated and organized by the Operators focused on learning and 
improving the programmes. We attended the meeting in Warsaw (June, 2014) focused on 
discussing the potential and challenges to the effectiveness and impact of existing grant-making 
practices and their fit with existing procedures. This served as a strategic focus group that 
informed this midterm evaluation. The conclusions and recommendations from the meeting are 
attached to this report.  
Sharing practices and learning from different countries is also considered as very valuable. This 
relates to the exchange of good practice among the Operators, as well as to the opportunity for 
project promoters to meet with  NGOs from other countries. Interacting and learning is helping 
boosting innovative thinking and ideas by opening to new experiences. Civil societies in the 
different beneficiary countries have diverse experience and are at different level of development 
of pilots, innovative approaches and practices in different areas. Exchanges and lessons learnt 
among them is key for further expanding the horizon and capacity of organizations. 
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Chapter 6. Making a Difference? Conclusions and Emerging 
Lessons learned. 
 
I. Programmes Policy and Strategic Modalities 
1. The EEA Grants NGO Programmes have met the donors key political concern of support 
to the NGO sectors in the beneficiary countries. 
• At present, the NGO Programmes of the EEA Grants (2009-2014) are the most significant 
investment in the strengthening of civil society across Europe. It is unique not only as size 
of support (€ 160 million), and geographic coverage (16 countries), but also as a 
consistent message of the importance of active citizens and organized civil society as 
checks and balances that make democracies truly functional.  
• The overall and concrete country strategies are of very high relevance to the context and 
the needs of civil society in the beneficiary countries. The NGO Programmes came at a 
challenging time for Europe of increasing negative trends of rising xenophobia, 
discrimination, populism and growing social frustration and mistrust in the functionalities 
of democratic institutions. This is also a critical time for the NGO sectors in the 
beneficiary countries that are facing the challenges of narrowed constituency support, 
legitimacy and recognition with government, reducing funding sources and an increased 
fight for survival.  
• Support of the Programmes is considered by NGOs as “the oxygen for real civic work”, 
keeping the civil society meaning of the NGOs sectors alive. In the majority of the 
beneficiary countries the EEA Grants are the primary donor in areas related to functional 
democracy and human rights, as well as in assisting the capacity of NGOs and the NGO 
sector to play their true civil society role of catalysts of active democratic citizenship for 
social justice, equality and human rights, sustainable development and increased 
accountability of governance policies and practices.  
• However, even though considerable in funding size, the EEA Grants NGO Programmes 
are not able to meet the enormous demand for support in the given priority areas. So far 
the Programmes could support on average only 10% of the coming proposals in all the 
countries. It is below 10% in Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary and the lowest is 
in Slovenia, where only 4% of submitted proposals could be supported.  
2. The level of cooperation and strategic coherence among the NGO Programmes and the 
other EEA Norway Grants Programmes is low or missing in the majority of the countries 
2.1. Coordination with the NFPs is low and fragmented and confined mostly to their function 
of observers of the selection process and receivers of information on the progress of the Funds. If 
the Programmes are not contracted through the NFPs, their comments on the programmes varied 
between genuine interest and some level of collaboration to polite indifference or complete 
detachment.  
2.2. The effectiveness of interaction among the Operators of the NGO Programmes and the 
NFP depends on the pro-activeness of the Operators, as well as on the quality, capacities and 
understanding of the importance of civil society of the people working in the NFPs. It also 
depends on the political climate and the extent to which it is enabling for civil society. While in 
most of the beneficiary countries civil societies are functioning in normal environments with more 
or less challenges, the recent events in Hungary of politicized attacks targeted at the Operator and 
the NGOs supported by the NGO Programme puts serious questions on the political risk 
management of the NGO Programmes. 
2.3. The level of co-financing provided by the Governments to the NGO programmes is very 
low for those contracted through the NFPs and completely missing for the ones in direct contract 
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by the FMO. If support to civil society is part of consistent Governments policies, then support to 
the NGO Programmes (including co-financing) will be natural even if the Programmes are not 
under direct control of the Governments.  
2.4. The level of cooperation and strategic coherence among the NGO Programmes and the 
other EEA Norway Grants Programmes is low or missing in the majority of the countries. This 
will limit the effectiveness of putting in practice the cross cutting principles of the EEA and 
Norway Grants of good governance and sustainable development which are valid for all 
Programmes. Some aspects of their substantial meaning are directly linked with civil society – 
consulting and involving citizens, inclusive policies and civic participation. From this perspective, 
civil society and NGOs are a natural part of these cross cutting principles and need to be part of 
the programming in the relevant other areas, in addition to the specialized NGO Programme.  
2.5. Collaboration with the NGO Programmes is needed not only to avoid duplication, but on 
a strategic level - identifying the best ways to support a different culture of good governance and 
sustainable development based on accountability to citizens and partnerships with the 
organizations that represent them. Using the specific expertise of the Operators of the NGO 
Programmes can be of help in designing and managing some of the small grants schemes that can 
stimulate participation of NGOs and their partnership with institutions in different thematic areas.  
3. The overall strategic framework is broad to accommodate the diverse needs and the 
plurality of civil society, but overcomplicated by priorities, outcomes and indicators that 
lack clarity in linkage and hierarchy among each other. 
• The overall strategic matrix was designed to ensure more civil society meaning and focus 
of the NGO Programmes. Due to the complexity of issues and diversity of contexts and 
needs it ended as a multiple set of priorities of different natures evolving over time 
(priority areas, outcomes, donors horizontal concerns, cross cutting issues, functional 
aspects across priority areas like capacity building, attention on youth, bilateral relations, 
CA, etc.).  
• Outcome-led design of the overall strategy is its main strength, but also among its biggest 
challenges. Focus on anticipated social change is critical, but the ten predefined outcomes 
are too broad and often overlapping in meaning, or with priority areas and activities.  
• While the country strategies and calls for proposals were developed by Programme areas, 
the reporting systems, including budgets, were based on outcomes. This resulted in an 
overcomplicated system of reporting based on ten outcomes and over 160 indicators, the 
majority of which are quantitative and practically on an output level. The system as 
designed is a serious challenge to learning on the outcome level and needs careful 
rethinking and simplification. 
4. Among the diversity of local contexts and priorities the NGO Programme have a common 
focus on the effective functioning and contribution of civil society towards social change. 
• The focus of the country strategies differs depending on their size and the chosen 
approaches to match the NGO sector demands with the Donor priorities. Some Operators 
chose all or multiple outcomes and programme areas; others organized their strategies on 
just a few of them. A legitimate question is whether the Programmes are not spreading too 
thin among the multiple priorities.  
• Based on the evaluation, less priorities and outcomes do not necessarily mean more focus. 
Focus depends more on the strategic capacity of the Operators to develop a coherent 
intervention that is relevant to the needs, but also feasible for the level of overall funding 
available. Some of the larger Programmes are more complex with multiple but 
strategically coherent components to expand the impact towards the overall objective. The 
smaller sized Programmes have a more narrow focus to avoid spreading too thinly the 
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limited available funds. However, in cases more focused approach is seen by the NGOs as 
a too narrow interpretation of the overall objective of the Programme.  
• There can hardly be a uniform answer on what is the best option - narrower or broader 
focus. The high demand for support from all segments of civil society in the beneficiary 
countries is a serious challenge for both big and small Programmes but especially stressful 
for the smaller ones that have high level of oversubscription. With the NGO Programmes 
as a primary or only donor for civil society in many of the countries any attempt to narrow 
the focus will be criticized by the segments of the NGO sector that are left out. 
• Pre-defining a more narrow focus or priorities from the outside has also its challenges. It 
can reduce the opportunity to include the most pressing needs and opportunities for the 
development of civil society in the different countries. In cases this can overlap with 
existing funding for the predefined priorities. This was the case in Slovenia with the 
mandatory 10% share of the programmes in support to youth, when this priority is over 
funded by other sources.  
• Keeping the focus broad leaves space for bottom up rather than top down definition of the 
strategies. The Operators have to define and justify the focus of their strategies in the 
process of negotiation at the start of the Programmes. At this negotiation stage it will be 
critical to have enough time for stakeholders meetings and discussion on focus to make 
sure that selected approaches will bring for best investment of provided resources to 
ensure maximum effectiveness towards the desired change in the local contexts. 
• What brings the diversity of Programmes together is the common focus on support to 
growing the functional capacity of NGOs across programmatic priorities. We find this 
approach of functional rather than thematic focus very relevant to the objective of the 
Programme 
• The core priority area of “Democracy and human rights (with all its sub-areas) and the 
additional area of Sustainable Development, have focused attention on increasing the 
functional capacities of the NGOs and the NGO sectors to facilitate processes of change in 
these areas - the ability of NGOs to mobilize citizens, to expand collaborations and 
partnerships and to effectively interact with governments at the local or national levels.  
• The area of “Basic and welfare service provision” is focused on support to services to 
defined vulnerable groups which are missing or limited. This is very much needed as with 
the current economic crises and austerity measures many  vulnerable groups remain with 
limited or no access to basic services. While the need is obvious, the question is what will 
be the best value for the money of the EEA Grants towards the objective of the 
Programme - investment in services, or investment in the capacity of service provision 
NGOs to empower those served and to advocate for better services based on evidence 
from good NGOs and partnership practices.  
5. Focus on capacity of civic organizations and the NGO sector is of critical importance for 
meeting the overall objective of the Programme to strengthen civil society. 
5.1. The capacity building aspects of the NGO Programmes are what make the EEA Grants 
support unique as compared to other funding Programmes. Resources for capacity development 
provide space for “thinking organizations” not just projects. They fill in a strategic niche for 
strengthening civil society - visioning and strategy planning, keeping and expanding their human 
capital (teams, volunteers, members and supporters), learning new skills and identifying 
innovative approaches for mobilizing constituencies, raising support outside public funds and 
projects, more effective interaction with decision makers, and increased collaboration with other 
NGOs and sectors for increased impact on social change.  
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5.2. Among the diversity of capacity building strategies and applications in the different 
countries there are several types of approaches and emerging lessons that can be grouped as 
follows: 
• The direct assistance provided by Operators to the supported NGOs is highly valued. It 
helped individual NGOs with new ideas and skills during the on-going interaction, 
organized issue based meetings and trainings to share and learn with other NGOs. Such 
interactive assistance was important at the pre-financing stage, especially for smaller 
organizations to expand their ideas and develop good initiatives, as well as in the course 
of implementation by content related on-site monitoring. For a number of small and/or 
young NGOs the application process by itself has been a contribution to their 
sustainability, preparing them to apply for other, mainly EU programmes. 
• Providing a share of the individual grants for capacity building of the applicants is an 
innovative and valuable approach. However it is very small as financial contribution (up 
to 15% of usually smaller grants) to meet the needs of organizations. A number of NGOs 
did not include it as they preferred to use the entire grant for the activities needed to reach 
the promised results. A second aspect relates to the readiness of the NGOs to develop their 
capacity growth. In principle, larger NGOs approach this more strategically as they know 
better their organizational needs. Small and less experienced NGOs tend to cover short-
term funding gaps instead of strategically planning for longer-term sustainability. For all 
NGOs, thinking organizationally is not always easy when they are fighting for survival 
and in many cases can hardly keep their staff. 
• There is a need for targeted capacity building for small and less experienced 
organizations. It can involve more intensive assistance in the pre-financing period to assist 
developing ideas into projects, as well as coaching and mentoring during the 
implementation phase. Based on the experience of other grant-making programmes 
capacity development programmes combining seed grants and accompanying capacity 
development assistance are very instrumental. 
• Specific strategies and components targeted at expanding capacities in key areas and 
segments of the NGO sectors have a lot of potential for effectiveness towards the 
strengthening of civil society. Especially effective are approaches including: long term 
institutional support to key organizations in the priority areas,; bridging more established 
leading organizations with smaller organizations and informal groups, specific calls for 
support to networks and coalitions, as well as targeted at capacity building predefined 
projects .  
6. Developing strategic capacity of the NGO sectors and systemic change requires a more 
comprehensive approach including an increased proactive role of the Operators 
•  The objective of the NGO Program is to “strengthen civil society development”. In the 
current mechanism, the role of Operators is largely limited to re-granters disbursing funds 
to project promoters. Their role in building capacity for the sector was mostly confined in 
designing the calls for predefined projects or for other measures for systemic change at the 
sector level. 
• Even if well designed, calls for proposals may not generate quality proposals from the 
NGOs, especially in the area of systemic change. This was the case with systemic projects 
in Poland, as well as the macro projects in Hungary. In both cases the lower number of 
quality proposals resulted in underspending of otherwise excellent and well planned 
strategic components. From this perspective, addressing change at systemic level may 
need work to prepare the sector to come with strategic ideas.  
• If the Programme is to contribute to the development of civil society (developing what is 
missing as new thinking and acting) and not just to its survival (keeping what is there the 
way it is) some proactive developmental work might be needed to get the field ready to 
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come with innovative responses (projects). In this, the capacity of the Operator ( skills, 
people and resources) to act as facilitator and convener will be very important. 
• The funding provided to Operators to build the capacity of the sector was inadequate. 
Funds reserved for capacity building within management costs have largely been used for 
project-specific capacity building. Capacity development should not be limited to building 
technical skills of project promoters to submit applications and manage grants.  
• Using a portion of the CA for proactive work at the NGO Sector level contributed to 
addressing some of the deficits of civil society related to lack of systemic thinking and 
fragmentation. This proves to be a very useful approach in stimulating meetings, 
discussions and the search for new solutions at the sector level. Some of the Operators 
(e.g. Poland) organized it in strategic partnerships with other key NGOs with expertise in 
the area, instead of taking over areas where others had good record of years of effective 
work. 
• Some of the predefined projects have strategic activities in key identified areas that are of 
importance to the development of the sector - mapping of civil society, intensive capacity 
building in specific areas, organizing important discussions on critical issues. The 
majority of them is still in a more initial phase, but seems promising to contribute to the 
objective of the Programme. 
• Last but not least, there is a need to reflect deeper on what systemic change at the sector 
level. While it relates to sector level initiatives (advocacy, shared vision, developing 
processes and products of benefit to the whole sector) it also relates to the key elements of 
strengthened civil society - strong organizations that are able to provide leadership for 
social change. These are both the “elite” NGOs acting for systemic changes or outcomes 
at sectoral level and the “base” – the variety of active grassroots organizations and citizens 
groups. From this perspective, the strategies for systemic change are also linked with the 
effectiveness of approaching the different levels of civil society and stimulating the 
linkage and collaboration among them.  
 
II. Management level 
1. The EEA Grant NGO Programmes can serve as an innovative model of effective 
management of public funds by outsourcing them to organizations independent from the 
governments with commitment, experience and knowledge of civil society and trust within the 
NGO sectors. 
• The design of the Programmes and selection of the Operators of the NGO Programmes 
was developed based on consultative processes with civil society in the beneficiary 
countries which is an innovative  practice for the EEA and Norway Grants Mechanism 
and broader -  for the design of public funds related to civil society..  
• The majority of the selected 16 Operators of the NGO Programmes in the 15 beneficiary 
countries covered by the evaluation are legitimate and highly visible actors for social 
change recognized for their professionalism and integrity. The major asset of most of the 
Operators is their professionalism, independence from Government, commitment to the 
priorities of the Programmes and belonging to civil society.  
• The selected Operators are the key success factor for the NGO Programmes 
implementation. Among the diversity of selected Operators and local contexts, most 
effective are those that are close to the NGO sector and have strategic vision and 
commitment to its development. Experience and ability to facilitate the capacity of the 
NGOs and the sector is another important factor for the success in design and 
implementing the programmes. Established consortiums prove to be an effective approach 
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to meet the multiple and demanding tasks of management of the Programmes. They are 
more effective when based on shared vision, similar culture and approaches and history of 
previous cooperation among the participated organizations.  
• Based on feedback from NGOs in the beneficiary countries the Operators that are closer to 
the NGO sectors and independent from Governments are more effective in managing 
public funds than Ministries and/or government agencies due to their specialized 
expertise, vision and commitment to civil society development. 
• Despite the delay of the start-up, the NGO Programmes are more efficient and effective in 
delivering grants as compared to the rest of the Grants Programmes. About 60% of all 
projects funded to date by the EEA and Norway Grants are supported by the NGO 
Programmes. 
2. Direct contracting of the NGO Programme Operators by the FMO is a much more 
effective and efficient management set up.  
The majority of the Operators of the NGO Programmes (12 out of 16) are already directly 
contracted by the FMO of the EEA Grants, and only four - through the National Focal Points. 
Based on the evaluation direct contracting by the FMO is more efficient and effective. It provides 
a more streamlined line of communication avoiding a double administrative burden of reporting to 
two authorities with different requirements (the FMO and the NFP). It also ensures better strategic 
coherence of the Programmes across countries, and is a safeguard for the independence of the 
Programmes from attempts for political control by the Government.  
3. The FMO had to adopt a new demanding Role of Programme Operator subcontracting 
the NGO Programmes in 13 countries to local Operators.  
3.1. The new role of PO is much more demanding for the FMO due to the different nature and 
the innovative character of the NGO Programmes, as well as the size of the project portfolio. 
They require more strategic and operational oversight to ensure effective guidance and coherence 
with donors objectives, monitoring of the selection process, and compliance with the EEA Grants 
regulations and risk management.  
3.2. While the FMO was effective in in terms of contracting, oversight and assistance of the 
NGO Programmes, there were also some challenges related to insufficient human resources and 
rotation of people over time. Despite the increase in the number of civil society sector officers 
from 1 to 3, about 70% of their time is allocated to technical and compliance monitoring and 
information processing.  
3.3. Overall, the communication and interaction among the FMO and the Operators has been 
dominated by technical and procedure related matters, as well as concerns on control and risk 
prevention. Space for discussions on substance and strategic learning on civil society development 
has been limited. This was also due to the very short time frame to put the Programmes effectively 
running due to the overall delay of the Programmes.  
3.4. The management set up at the FMO level needs better structure with clarity of role and 
responsibilities in the interaction with the subcontracted Operators of the Programmes. This will 
help finding the right balance of how much hands-on interference is not too much and does not 
lead to micromanagement of the process, as well as how much consistent hands-on FMO 
involvement is feasible with its limited human resources. This also relates to the already 
mentioned broader questions of ownership and space of allowed risk taking.  
4. The main bottleneck of the effectiveness of the Programmes is their late start which 
reduced their initial five year commitment into 3 years timeframe for actual 
implementation. 
4.1. Long negotiations with governments to agree on the MoU and on the process and results 
of the selection of the Operators of the NGO funds is among the key reasons for the significant 
delay in the start of the NGO Programme in most of the countries. The late start put a lot of stress 
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on all aspects of the management of the NGO Programmes - developing all the procedures, 
organizing calls for proposals and the selection process, management and monitoring of grants, 
reporting etc.  
4.2. The delay is negatively affecting the potential for impact of the Programmes. Fast 
disbursement of large funds is in clash with the initial idea of the Programmes to support 
processes of change which require time. It also contributes to arrhythmic support to the NGO 
sectors - years with intensive funding and “dead” zones of limited or no funding at all. 
5. A second challenge to the effectiveness of management was the misfit of the EEA and 
Norway Grants legal framework and procedures with the nature and substance of the NGO 
Programmes. 
• The EEA Grants legal framework and procedures were designed for different types of 
Programmes which are much larger and managed by public institutions. The NGO 
Programmes are much smaller grants aimed at seeding innovation, capacities and social 
change. This requires developmental approaches and a lot of flexibility in order to provide 
for innovative ideas, actions and organizational development. 
• With no single specific document regulating the NGO Programme, the clarification of 
confusions with rules and procedures has been accompanying the implementation of the 
Programmes and was time consuming for both the FMO and the Operators.  
• Major issues hampering effectiveness are the insufficient management fees and 
programmatic resources beyond the grant-making budget (capacity development, work 
with the sector, strategic communication). Due to the applied principle of a flat percentage 
of the overall EEA/N Grants funding for the countries, the management fees are very low 
especially for the smaller Programmes. They are also insufficient to provide for more 
proactive capacity and sector development role for all Programmes.  
• The NGO Programmes have much higher risk management measures as compared to 
other EEA and Norway Grants Programmes – a bank guarantee or retaining % of the 
management fee of the Operator. This put a lot of stress and costs on the financial system 
of a number of Operators. This way, covering the risk for the donor can bring risk for the 
cash flow and sustainability of the Operators.  
•  Project selection has very detailed and uniform compulsory procedures with little room 
for innovation and a limited role of the Selection Committees and the Operators in the 
decision making process despite their expertise in grant-making.  
• Some of the provisions related to Project Promoters are challenging to the NGOs and do 
not contribute to sustainability, which is part of the objective for strengthening civil 
society. These include the 10% co-financing requirement, low % for indirect costs, as well 
as the economic benefit provision (to spend all money from any income generating 
activity in the course of the project). 
 
III. Operational level 
1. The application process was carried out in an effective and efficient way by ensuring 
outreach to different segments of civil society in the beneficiary countries  
1.1. Broad promotion and interactive communication with NGOs including meetings in and 
outside of the capitals made the Programmes accessible to both centrally based and local 
organizations. The comprehensive guidelines and the dynamic communication with the Operators 
in the application process were valued by NGOs participating in the process as different and 
unique as compared to other funding Programmes.  
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1.2. The application process was organized in either one stage or two stages (a concept and a 
full proposal for the selected concepts). In the majority of the countries, where the concept 
proposal was simple in format and the process of selection efficient, this was considered as a 
better approach, saving time for applicants and allowing for better design of the full proposal 
based on the feedback from the Operator. 
1.3. A great number of the Operators had differentiated approaches to small, medium and 
large grants, in some cases, with simplified conditions for small and micro projects. In principle, 
this was a better approach making the Programmes more accessible to small and less developed 
NGOs. However, in some cases, due to lack of funding, it was reported that bigger and better 
established organizations were also applying for small grants, thus competing with smaller civic 
organizations. 
2. The selection processes were transparent and effective but with evolving clarity on 
allowed flexibility within the tightly prescribed procedures and rules. 
2.1. The selection process was highly effective and efficient. For a year and half since their 
official start the NGO Programmes have reviewed 8916 applications and have selected and 
approved 957 projects in total value of € 53,793,561 in 13 countries. 
2.2. The Selection procedures were tightly prescribed to ensure transparency, but with limited 
clarity on allowed innovation to ensure effectiveness towards social change. This gave little space 
for Operators to use their own grant-making expertise and/or devise and apply selection 
procedures that will best ensure the achievement of their strategies. Some Operators were on the 
safe side tightly following the procedures as prescribed, others were more proactive in suggesting 
new approaches. 
2.3. Some Operators faced challenges at the operational level especially in applying the EEA 
Grants procedures for the selection process. In some cases this was due to less general experience 
with grant-making (e.g. Lithuania where the leading partner was an operational NGO), in others 
this related to missing or limited experience with management of public funds despite of the 
extensive record in grant-making with funding from  private funding (e.g. Poland,  Bulgaria). 
Most effective in organizing the selection process were the Operators that combined extensive 
knowledge of both private and public grant-making with concrete knowledge of the EEA Grants 
procedures due to the fact that they managed the NGO Funds in the previous Financial 
Mechanism (e.g. Hungary, Romania).   
2.4. The procedures ensured transparency of the selection process but faced challenges that 
relate to the effectiveness of the process:  
• Missing clarity on the role of the Selection committee and what are the “justified” cases 
when it can modify the ranking of projects offered by the external experts caused issues 
between the FMO and the Operators. This, in turn, delayed the finalization of the calls 
which affected the NGO sectors in the relevant countries.  
• While external assessment is to ensure equal treatment and impartiality, it is critical that 
invited outside experts have a shared vision and understanding of the objective and 
approaches of the Programme.  
• Individual experts have diverse views and interpretations based on their background and 
preferences. This has led to 30-40 % involvement of third external experts due to 
difference of the scores above 30% in the majority of the countries.  
• A shortage of the external experts is that they have the narrow view on the Programme 
through the lenses of individual assessment of a limited number of projects. They may 
miss the bigger picture of the portfolio and Programmatic level. This can result in 
fragmented results - projects reflecting individual assessment rather than strategic 
portfolio translating the Programme objective.  
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2.5. Some lessons from practices introduced by Operators to overcome the above deficits 
include: 
• Selection committees are critical for the effectiveness of the selection process. They bridge 
the individual views (scoring of outside experts) with the strategic meaning of the 
selection of projects (portfolio or program strategies). The most effective were SCs that 
were strategically reviewing the ranking list of from the projects assessed by the 
individual experts, rather than technically approving the arithmetic of individual scoring. 
• Introductory meetings organized by the Operators with all external experts at the start of 
the selection were very instrumental. Longer and more consistent process of introducing 
external experts to the Programme can  coherence in approaches, especially in cases when 
the Programme is working with completely new experts. 
• Allocating a larger number of projects for review by the same expert broadens their 
comparative look at the diversity of suggested for funding initiatives in regards to the set 
of objectives and outcomes in the relevant component. However, this is possible only with 
external experts with high expertise and clear understanding of the Programme, as well as 
it depends on their availability. 
• Bringing together outside experts after the individual review of projects - the pair 
assessing the same project or as an evaluation panel per component- provides a more 
coherent approach and better quality of the assessment. It also provides for more 
comparative look at differences and the justification for them.  
• Organized feedback from the external experts after each call on the quality of applications 
and the selection process has contributed to improving the design of the consequent calls 
and fine-tuning the selection criteria. 
 
IV. Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability Prospects 
1. The NGO Programmes were very effective in meeting the donors political concern of 
support to the NGOs in the beneficiary countries by targeted fund allocation to meaningful 
initiatives according to leading outcomes.  
1.1. The Programmes were effective in focused investment in the priority areas of the 
Programme. The biggest share of awarded projects and funding (826 projects in total value of € 
45,404,379) are in support to strengthening the multiple roles and capacity of civil society in 
various aspects of democracy, human rights, antidiscrimination, gender equality, youth 
empowerment, social inclusion and empowerment, good governance and sustainable 
development. Only 16% of the allocated funds are in support to welfare and basic service 
provision to the most vulnerable groups as defined by the Programme.  
1.2. The Programmes were successful in reaching out to different segments of the NGO 
sectors in the beneficiary countries. The Project promoters are both centrally based and local 
NGOs with different ratios in the different countries. 
1.3. Though it is too early to measure the effectiveness of projects which are at a very initial 
stage, supported initiatives have a great deal of potential to contribute to key outcomes. Based on 
this evaluation, approved projects are well grounded, have strong coherence with the objectives 
and clear prospects for realizing intended outcomes of the Programmes. Various supported 
initiatives apply methods that will be activating important processes at different levels - 
mobilizing civic engagement for more participation and making governments accountable, 
increased NGO collaborative culture and joint action, and sensitizing the broader society on issues 
critical for democracy and social justice values and rights.  
1.4. Key success factors at the project level are the supported NGOs and especially their 
expressed deep commitment to the issues and causes they work for. In most of the cases the work 
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on supported issues will take much longer than the timeframe of supported projects. From this 
perspective the commitment and capacity of the implementing NGOs is critical.  The investment 
in capacities of the supported NGOs is another important factor that is contributing to success, 
especially in regard to strengthening the policy influence role of civic organizations to make 
governments more open to citizen input and accountable to their constituencies. This is helping 
the growing visibility of NGOs as representative voice and increases the trust among beneficiaries 
and communities served in .organized civil society. 
2. Are the NGO Programmes making a difference towards the objective of strengthened civil 
society and enhanced contribution to social justice, democracy and sustainable development? 
2.1. The objective of the NGO Programmes is very ambitious and can be achieved only in the 
long term. Its success will depend on activating complex change processes at different levels - 
within the NGO sector, among citizens and the public at large, within decision makers and 
institutions. All these change processes relate to nurturing new attitudes and behaviour within 
communities, at the country level and regionally. In this respect, inputs (supported projects), 
outputs (emerging immediate results from supported projects) do not translate immediately and 
automatically into outcomes (change of attitudes and behaviour) and impacts (positive 
improvement of the situation.) Change in attitudes is a long-term endeavour, especially in an 
environment of negative counteracting tendencies of fragile democracies, intolerance and low 
civic trust in democratic institutions. 
2.2. At this early stage of the Programmes, they have good potential for “moving the needle” 
towards desired social change at several levels: 
(a) At the level of organized civil society:  
• The main focus of the Programmes is strengthening of organized civil society. This is why 
they are called NGO Programmes. They are directly investing in strengthening the way 
the NGOs work to implement their mandate as catalysts for social change and for 
activating citizens. Provided funding is supporting value driven organizations to increase 
their links with the citizens they represent, to improve their management and accountable 
governance. It is also growing new infrastructure of joint action which makes the sector 
more vocal and legitimate.  
• The increased ability of NGOs to activate citizens and represent their interests with 
governments is a critical factor for achieving the objective of the Programme. The central 
place of the outcome active citizenship as underlying for all other outcomes stimulates the 
contribution of the Programmes in growing social capital. Critical in this is increasing the 
trust of citizens in the power of civic participation, as well as in NGOs as actors 
representing effectively civic interests.  
• Sustainability of civic organizations remains a fragile area that needs targeted attention. 
Strong civic actors will be needed in the long term. A culture of survival is still blocking 
the vision and energy for change and innovation. The Programmes are critical in 
“providing oxygen” for the civic meaning of NGOs by supporting initiatives and areas 
that are controversial and missing in other sources of support - human rights, advocacy 
and watchdog, and participatory democracy. But to keep the “civic breathing” in the long 
term more focus is needed on targeted support to innovative approaches that will increase 
the sustainability of NGOs as critical voices independent from governments.  
• At the level of organized civil society the main contribution of the Programmes is growing 
civic infrastructure – contributing to strong civic organizations, networks, coalitions and 
joint action. Initiatives that link established national NGOs with local grassroots 
organizations are especially effective in raising the capacity of the latter. The investment 
in the ability of NGOs to activate citizens and represent their interests vis-à-vis 
governments is especially valuable. 
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• Last but not least, the Programmes contribute to growing a new type of infrastructure for 
assistance to civil society development which will be needed in the long term. By 
expanding the capacity of independent grant-makers within the beneficiary countries, the 
EEA Grants demonstrate a more effective approach to public funds distribution by 
independent non-profit actors, closer to the sectors and able to strategically combine 
funding with capacity building support.  
(b) At the level of broader society in the beneficiary countries:  
• Supported by the Programmes projects reach out and bring benefit to a wide variety of 
groups in society - the broader public and citizens, youth and children, various 
vulnerable groups like LGBT communities, Roma, other minorities, people with 
disabilities, victims of trafficking or of gender based violence, women, residents of 
isolated and deprived communities, teachers and students, etc. These wide varieties of 
groups are changing attitudes and behavior towards embracing democratic values and 
practices and more empowerment.    
• The value added aspect of the Programmes is the focus on investment in key processes 
of change of attitudes and practice of individuals, vulnerable groups, government and 
broader society. Fostered active democratic citizenship is leading. Provided funding is 
supporting civic engagement in communities and causes (participation, volunteerism, 
membership), as well as participation of citizens in decision making that affects their 
life. This will lead to more empowered vulnerable groups, more accountable policies, 
and more sustainable development.  
• The improvement of the situation in key areas of social justice, democracy and 
sustainable development will depend on the viability of activated key processes of 
change in society. Impact will depend on a change of attitudes in different circles around 
the issues – people involved to become more empowered, decision makers to have 
empathy but also vision for solution, the public at large to be supportive, and individual 
citizens and businesses to contribute. In other words, it will take aggregating and 
expanding communities and practices of change. 
• On the one hand, this will be more likely to happen if there are strong NGOs that work 
together in coalitions and partnerships and have strong capacity to influence 
governments for more openness to citizen input and more accountable and responsible 
policies. 
• On the other hand, there is growing importance of “the other civil society” – not 
formally organized, spontaneous ad hoc groups of active citizens, new movements and 
social media aggregated communities of change. As of now, by default the Programmes 
were focused mostly on support to NGOs and the NGO sectors. They were partially 
reaching out to these groups through the NGOs initiatives within the different priorities 
(especially active citizenship). A few of the NGO Programmes have involved more 
directly these segments within some of the projects of “traditional” civil society 
(Hungary, Slovakia). Further focus on bridging the organized NGOs with informal 
groups and broader civil society can expand the impacts on changes of attitudes and 
behaviour in broader society.  
(c) At the regional and European level: 
The NGO Programmes have also added value as regional funding across beneficiary countries: 
The strategic coherence of the NGO Programmes around the same strategic framework across 
beneficiary countries is a good background for expanding its regional impact in several aspects: 
• European campaigns on critical issues for society like the participation of all NGO 
Programmes in the country implementation of the No Hate Speech Campaign led by the 
CoE as a strategic partner of the EEA and Norway Grants 
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• Opportunity for exchange and learning among the Operators and among project 
promoters, through the various activities within the CA - forums, conferences, site visits 
• Solidarity action for critical issues related to democracy and civil society at European 
level. 
An unplanned result at regional level was the campaign of support to the Hungarian civil society 
and the Operator of the NGO Programme who is undergoing political attacks by the Hungarian 
Government. This emerged as an initiative of the Operators of the Programmes in the different 
beneficiary countries. The majority of them signed a joint statement that was sent to the EC and 
the representatives of Governments in support to the integrity of the Operator and NGOs 
supported by the EEA Grants NGO Programme in Hungary. 
This, together with other broader solidarity action of other over 900 NGOs from all over the world 
indicate that there are problems that do not recognize borders - democratic challenges and threats 
are one of those and the new member states as fragile democracies are particularly vulnerable. 
Situations as the one in Hungary cannot be tackled effectively only internally because they are in 
practice a European concern. 
3. Contribution of Bilateral relations funding to the overall objective of the NGO 
Programmes 
3.1. Bridging civil societies from donors and beneficiary countries has a lot of potential to 
expand vision, and develop new ideas and approaches and meaningful partnership initiatives. 
NGOs in the donors countries have a lot to offer especially due to their long tradition of work in a 
democratic environment and their high legitimacy with Governments and remarkably broad 
citizens support (volunteerism, membership and donations). 
3.2. Based on the evaluation, the most instrumental were the exchange visits, study trips and 
internships to the donor countries. The 112 projects with partners from the donors countries had 
both added value and challenges. On the positive side, they are an opportunity to acquire new 
knowledge and skills, opening new thinking and approaches. A weakness of project partnerships 
is that it is project application driven rather than strategically driven. This, together with 
complicated procedures, has hampered the development of quality partnership relations, and 
respectively the effectiveness of the partnerships. 
3.3. Based on feedback from NGOs from both beneficiary and donors countries, the Bilateral 
Relations fund needs rethinking and redesign towards more strategically driven and issue led 
initiatives stimulating regional networking among NGOs around similar causes and including 
more focus on innovation and experimentation.  
 
V. Visibility and communication 
1. The NGO Programmes are highly visible in the public space due to various activities for wide 
promotion of the objectives of the Programmes, as well as through visibility requirements to 
supported projects. An asset of a number of the Programmes is that they go beyond “technical 
visibility” of what is funded and what activities are implemented but also communicate the causes 
and the values underlying the Programmes.  
2. Some of the Operators have put a special attention to communication (e.g. Lithuania, Hungary 
and Poland). Based on emerging practices most instrumental are:  
• developing clear strategy on communication and visibility 
• hiring professional journalist as part of the team to assist the overall communication 
strategy and the capacity of supported NGOs to effectively tell their story and get the 
media interested,  
• creating circles of journalists around the programme 
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• intensive and consistent presence of the Operator and supported organizations in the 
mainstream media.  
• developing and publishing on the site of the Operator a map of supported projects and 
their results to overcome fragmented visibility of the programme among the different 
projects  
3. The overall visibility the Programmes at national and European levels is also enhanced by the 
“No Hate Speech” campaign clearly communicating to the general public the core values of civil 
society and democracy. However, this is very uneven across countries, depending on the level of 
active engagement of the National coordination committee of the No Hate Speech Campaign. 
Other in-country events with international participation implemented in the framework of the CA 
also contribute to the visibility of the Programmes. 
4. A major shortage of the Programmes is that they have limited budgets that can be allocated for 
strategic communication and visibility. The current management costs include some support for 
communication but it is mostly for promotion of the programmes and their public launching. 
Consistent strategy for communicating the values, issues and emerging benefits of supported civic 
initiatives as part of building broader public support to civil society requires much more resources 
which can be part of the CA. 
 
VI. Systems of Monitoring and learning 
1. There is a general agreement of both the FMO and the Operators of the NGO 
Programmes that the current strategic matrix and systems of learning need simplification 
and improvement. 
• The FMO wants to see less and more consolidated outcomes and indicators, as the current 
system of learning is very complicated and challenging (10 outcomes, 160 indicators).  
• The Operators want improvement of the formulation of the core areas as currently some of 
them are very general (e.g. “Democracy”) while others are much more specific (e.g. 
“Gender-based violence”). They suggest 8 more focused thematic priorities to achieve 
greater clarity and consistency of content and facilitate achievement of tangible outcomes. 
Some of these priorities are thematic (Participatory democracy; Good governance and 
transparency; Human rights and anti-discrimination Social justice/inclusion; Environmental 
protection and sustainable development). Others are based on a specific target group (Youth 
empowerment). A third group is related to strengthening civil society (Civil society growth 
and NGO Sector development)33.  
• There is a growing agreement that budgeting and reporting of spending per outcomes is not 
effective, as Programmes are designed around priority areas of support and respectively 
calls for proposals and supported initiatives follow this design. At the same time, there is 
also agreement that it is good to have outcome orientation of the strategies of the 
Programmes. This way they are more focused on the change processes that the invested 
support needs to contribute to.  
2. The Capacity Building Matrix developed by the FMO as an overarching tool to grasp the 
effectiveness of investment in capacity development in all countries was a good intention, 
with limited usefulness. The problem is rooted in a number of aspects.  
• Firstly, it relates to its design as process and product. It was done from the outside, thus not 
always adequate to the level of development of local civil societies. The matrix itself ended 
up cumbersome and long and difficult to understand from local NGOs.  
                                                 
33 Memo from the meeting of the Operators of the Ngo Programmes. Warsaw, 2014 
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• Secondly, it relates to the timing - for some countries the Matrix came late in the process 
after first call was already announced.  
• Thirdly, although the Matrix will provide some basis for mapping the NGO capacities and 
needs, its benefit will be rather limited, as (a) it is targeting almost exclusively Project 
promoters and (b) there is no time to analyze in depth the results and refine the Operators’ 
capacity building approaches. 
• And last but not least relates to the nature of support of the Programmes which are mostly 
providing project activities support and much less targeted support for organizational 
development. Any tool for measuring progress of organizational change in the duration of 
the grants will make sense only if these grants are explicitly targeting organizational 
development and provide an accompanying mentoring programme to assist needed areas.  
• Based on the findings from most of the countries the introduction of the CB Matrix seems 
more imposed from the outside than supportive, which may be counterproductive to its 
intended function. It seems like it is accepted as a requirement rather than an opportunity 
for learning. This is valid for both Operators, as well as grantees. 
• We consider some of the practices of using the Matrix as another questionnaire to all 
grantees, no matter whether they receive capacity building support or not as completely 
counterproductive. More effective were the approaches of application of the Matrix as a 
tool for interactive discussion or interviews of supported NGOs by the Operator on 
organizational areas. A serious gap in the current programmes in this direction was the 
limited resources of both the Operators and the grantees for potential external facilitation 
and for the ‘internal time’ to devote to organizational renewal, training and strategy 
development.  
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Chapter 7. Looking forward: Recommendations. 
 
I. Recommendations for the current Financial mechanism (2009-14) 
 
1. It is important to keep the consistency of strategy designs in the remaining 2 years for 
implementation in order to ensure optimal effectiveness upon completion of the Programmes. 
2. Integrate some of the lessons from good practice in project selection and contracting 
wherever possible in the remaining calls for proposals: clarifying and increasing the role of the 
Selection Committees, introducing a set of strategic criteria at the portfolio level which are 
publicly announced with the new calls for proposals; organizing meetings of external 
assessors/experts as panels to discuss the proposals on a portfolio level and to provide feedback 
on quality of proposals;  more individually tailored approach to defining the conditions of the 
grants especially the scheme for installments of payments.  
3. Analyze the results of the assessments done by using the Capacity Building Matrix and 
further review it for future application. An option can be developing a working group involving 
Operators, as well as some of their partners in providing capacity development (predefined 
projects or others). This can help adjust the Matrix and the approach of its application so that it 
“lands” better in local realities and local strategies in the next financial mechanism. 
4. More efforts and if possible more resources need to be focused to increase the strategic 
communication and visibility of the Programmes. It needs to become a priority for the remaining 
two years of the implementation and to be linked with the improved system of learning. Consider 
applying some of the good communication practices: developing interactive maps or public 
Calendar of events of the funded projects; expanding partnerships with journalists; training and 
assistance to supported NGOs for visibility and effective public communication. 
5. Use the resource of current Operators to inform the strategy for the next Financial 
Mechanism. Well facilitated meetings with the current Operators as a strategic stakeholder group 
can better integrate lessons from the implementation so far into the new strategic thinking. The 
discussion on the findings of this evaluation can serve as a good start in this direction. 
6. Improve the learning system of the current Financial Mechanism. Focused discussion 
specifically on the overall strategic framework and the linkage among priority areas, and 
outcomes and outputs will help learning at outcome level. As changing the predefined outcomes 
framework will not be possible in the current period, a good first step will be assessing the 
achievement in two or three consolidated clusters (outcome areas) according to their meaning to 
the objective of the Programme. 
7. Use the regional events planned within the Complementary actions to discuss critical areas 
of learning related to common gaps of civil society development. This will inform strategically 
the new Financial mechanism. Some of the topics may include: civic innovation (stimulating 
innovative approaches of NGOs; approaching broader civil society- informal groups, social media 
communities, bloggers); new avenues for sustainability (new sources of funding beyond projects; 
social entrepreneurship, stimulating individual donations and philanthropy); strategic 
communication and mobilizing public support; effectiveness of policy influence and interaction 
with Governments etc.  
8. Start rethinking and testing of potential redesign of Bilateral Relations Fund towards more 
strategically driven and issue led initiatives by focused regional discussion of the Operators and 
the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Icelandic Helsinki Committee, as well as piloting support 
to some multilateral issue based networking initiatives.  
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II. Recommendations for the Next Financial Period 
 
The recommendations for the next financial period are based on the views of stakeholders 
expressed in interviews and focus groups, as well as on the analyses of the lessons emerging good 
practice from the implementation of the NGO Programmes in the different countries. They were 
developed as a menu of potential options that can serve the discussion and the thinking towards 
updating the future strategy of the NGO Programmes.   
 
A. Programme Scope and Policy Modalities 
1. Continue and expand the support to the NGO Programmes in the beneficiary countries: 
1.1. Continued support of the EEA Grants to the NGO Programmes will be of critical 
importance for building upon the created positive momentum of multiple social changes 
started in the current Financial mechanism. This will provide for continuity in the 
strengthening of civil societies in the beneficiary countries to enhance their contribution to 
social justice, democracy and sustainable development. It will also help rescue the civil 
society in countries with democracies at risk like Hungary.  
1.2. Increase the level of support for the NGO Programmes as a share of the overall EEA 
and Norway Grants funding allocation in the beneficiary countries. This will help respond 
more effectively to the enormous demand for support in the priority areas of democracy, 
human rights and social justice as well as for the advocacy and watchdog functions of civil 
society. Funding for these areas, as well as for support to capacity development of civic 
organizations, is completely missing or limited. 
1.3. Introduce a Bridging Fund facility to avoid the risk of the anticipated two year gap 
between the end of the current NGO Programmes and the start of the next ones, especially 
where other support for civil society is completely missing or democracy is at risk. Bridging 
fund can utilize some of the under spent funds from other EEA Grants Programmes. It can be 
designed on the principle of Action grants for quick reaction on critical issues with an 
extended date beyond the project close off date of end of April 2016.  
2. Provide for five years implementation of the NGO Programmes in order to ensure their 
effectiveness and impact. It is critical to avoid replication of the main challenge to the 
Programmes – a reduced time framework for implementation due to long negotiations and delay 
of their start up. Measures can be in two directions: 
• Seven year commitment of the Programmes with five years for actual implementation 
•  Earlier start of the negotiation of the programmes, if possible in 2015 after the last 
projects are funded, not waiting until projects are finalized in April 2016. 
3. Ensure better strategic coherence and coordination of the support to civil society within 
the overall EEA and Norway Grants Funding.  
3.1. Optimize putting in practice the EEA Grants cross cutting principles of good 
governance and sustainable development by ensuring civil society involvement in all 
relevant Programmes of the EEA and Norway Grants and respectively in the indicators for 
their success.  
3.2. A special quota from other thematic Programmes of the EEA and Norway Grants can 
be specifically allocated to support NGO initiatives implemented in partnership with 
relevant institutions. These “partnership thematic funds” can stimulate better cross sector 
collaboration and joint work on resolving issues and/or developing new services to vulnerable 
groups. This can be done under the small grants schemes within the relevant Programmes. 
 100 
Some of them can be entrusted to be managed by the Operators of the NGO Programmes, or 
by other independent non-profit actors.  
4. Continue the main lines of the current strategy with a clear focus on support to 
strengthening the functional capacities and contribution of civil society in key areas with 
some modifications based on the learning from this Financial Mechanism.  
4.1. Continuation of current strategy of the NGO Programmes will respond to the long term 
needs of developing a strong and active civil society. Continuity of the current approach of 
the Programmes to invest in developing strong civic actors, able to facilitate key processes at 
both the local and national levels and in key areas of democracy, social justice, human rights 
and sustainable development will foster and sustain current investments.  
4.2. Keep the current programme areas and priorities but with a better formulation and 
some adjustments including: 
• The areas “Active citizenship and good governance” and “Human rights and 
antidiscrimination” need to continue to be at the core of the programmes.  
• Continue support in the area of “Environmental protection and sustainable development” 
as an avenue to mobilize citizens and especially youth movements and developing 
community based models for sustainable development 
• Redefine the “Welfare and basic service provision” area into a more focused area on 
“Social inclusion and empowerment of vulnerable groups”. Service provision can be 
fostered through the suggested targeted support to NGOs in the small grants schemes of 
the other thematic EEA and Norway Grants Programmes. The NGO Programmes need to 
focus on the capacity of both service provision NGOs and NGOs representing vulnerable 
groups to empower them and to influence policies to mainstream innovation emerging 
from NGO practices.  
• Introduce “Sustainability of the NGO Sector” as a new core area as a focused investment 
in systemic change and sustainability. 
• Horizontal concerns will be addressed in a more effective way if they are present as 
specific targeted measures within the core priority areas related to democracy, human 
rights and social justice. 
4.3. Scope of the Programme needs to be left broad and open to the diverse needs and 
opportunities for intervention in the different countries. This will provide space for the 
Operators to suggest the focus depending on the needs of the NGO sector, the available 
overall funding, identified niches for interventions and the capacity of the Operator. Part of 
their assessment will be how suggested approach are justified, also avoiding spreading too 
thin within available funds, or overlap with other existing funding programmes.  
4.4. The primary focus of the strategies needs to be on the strengthening of the functional 
capacities of civil society as a safeguard of democratic values and practices within the 
chosen programmatic areas. The following key priorities in this respect were outlined as 
common for the beneficiary countries: 
• Provide support to a plurality of civic action at different levels:  support to both  key 
organizations with strong capacities for advocacy and nationwide action, as well as to 
growing strong community based organizations  
• Broaden the NGOs citizen base and support- linkage and mobilization of civic 
constituencies (informal groups, grassroots initiatives, volunteers, members and 
supporters base).  
• Expand the capacities for effective communication to building public support – visibility 
of causes and values in the public space and debate, campaigns to overcome stereotypes 
and negative attitudes 
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• Continue expanding the policy influence capacities of NGOs by intensive support for 
advocacy and watchdog activities 
• Expand the collaboration and culture of joint actions of NGOs – strengthen existing ones 
and stimulate new networks and ad-hoc coalitions around issues and causes, not around 
projects; stimulate linkage and networking among strong NGOs and small, new ones; 
• Priority focus on sustainability of civic organizations which is critical for their 
independence – expanding skills, capacity and infrastructure for innovative ways of 
raising support beyond project funding from individuals, business, using new technology 
– crowd funding, campaigns, philanthropy development, community foundations 
• Stimulate developing a new generation of young civic leaders through targeted support to 
innovative youth initiatives, internships and various capacity development initiatives. 
4.5. Civic innovation (innovative approaches and outreach to new civic groups) and 
sustainability need to be of high priority in the new strategies: 
•  Innovation and sustainability will require providing for more flexibility and risk taking to 
experiment and learn with applying new grant-making and capacity development 
approaches.  
• Consider introducing the principle of incentives for sustainability into the grants 
instruments stimulating income generation activities, social entrepreneurship, fundraising 
and developing reserve funds that can make the organizations more independent. 
• Consider alternative approaches (not offering formal grants, but different types of support) 
to new groups, e.g. bloggers that are not organized and prefer to remain informal. 
5. Simplify and streamline the overall strategic framework with clear links and hierarchy of 
priorities. We suggest that leading outcomes are consolidated in three outcome areas as desired 
social change across the five priority programme areas. The links among suggested outcome and 
programmatic areas are in the matrix below: 
Programme Priority Areas  
(priority areas of NGO contribution to social change)  
Priority Outcome Areas 
(For all programme priority areas: strengthened 
civil society to contribute to social change ) 
1. Active citizenship and good governance 
Focus on:  
Citizen participation/participatory democracy; Civil scrutiny 
and monitoring of public institutions 
A. Engaged citizens 
Focus on: 
 Increased involvement in causes (volunteerism, 
campaigns, supporters, individual donations) 
 Increased participation in dialogue and/or 
pressure on governments (letters, campaigns, 
self organizing, consultative bodies) 
B. Strengthened NGOs and civic 
infrastructure 
Focus on: 
 Increased membership and supporters base 
 Policy influence capacities 
(advocacy/watchdog, policy dialogue, 
partnership) 
 Expanded networking and coalitions 
 Diversified support (beyond only projects) 
C. Enabling environment 
Focus on: 
 Improved policies and legal frameworks; 
 Accountable and inclusive to citizens input  
institutions 
2. Human rights and antidiscrimination: 
Focus on:  
protection of human rights, including the rights of women, 
children and minorities: ethnic, religious, sexual, etc.; 
counteracting discrimination, combating racism, xenophobia, 
hate speech, hate crime, extremisms, etc 
3. Social inclusion and empowerment of vulnerable groups: 
Focus on:  
counteracting social exclusion (because of ethnicity, gender, 
age, disabilities, place of living - rural areas, poverty); access 
to quality and innovative services and empowerment of 
vulnerable groups; inclusive community development 
4. Environmental protection and sustainable development. 
Focus on: 
Increased NGO involvement in environmental protection, 
educating and mobilising citizens and especially youth to 
protect the environment,; community development models for 
sustainable development 
5. Sustainable NGO sectors 
Focus on:  
Enabling environment for civil society work; vision forward;  
Strategic communication to the public 
 102 
Developing infrastructure for philanthropy and individual 
donations,; Innovative income generating initiatives; social 
enterprises, fundraising from individuals and corporations 
 Broadened public support  
Operators will define their own specific and relevant outcomes within the Outcome Areas and 
define specific indicators. After selecting the Operators, the FMO will (in coordination with them) 
group the similar outcomes and indicators within the outcome areas, redefine them appropriately 
and come up with lists to be used for tracking the Programmes progress and success. 
 
B. Recommendations Related to the Bilateral Funds: 
1. Consider redesign of the bi-lateral funds for the NGO programs in a more coordinated 
and strategic manner. This could be done by considering two types of measures: (1) bi-lateral 
exchange and learning measures and (2) strategic regional measures 
1.1. Easy and flexible scheme for bi-lateral exchange and learning measures:  
• Continue support to study trips of groups of NGOs from the beneficiary countries in the 
donor countries and vice versa.  
• Greater focus should also be given to using bi-lateral funds for raising awareness of 
citizens: 1/ in donor countries on the importance of the support to civil society in 
beneficiary countries and 2/ in beneficiary countries on good practices of partnerships 
with civil society and its legitimacy as an important factor in the donor countries. This 
can be done by identifying ways of involving journalists or requirements for publicity 
activities as part of the study trips and exchanges. 
• Extend the definition of bi-lateral exchange to include study visits among the beneficiary 
countries facing similar problems but applying different approaches to solve them. The 
exchange of experience from similar socio-political contexts is not less meaningful than 
the traditional transfer of knowledge from donor to beneficiary. This can be accompanied 
by involvement of partners from donor countries, to assist the process of exchange and 
learning.  
1.2. Introduce strategic regional measures. They will support multilateral issue-based and 
thematic NGO networking and platforms involving like-minded NGOs from more than one of 
the beneficiary countries, as well as relevant NGOs from the donors countries. This will result 
in more strategic learning in the priority areas of the Programmes among beneficiary countries 
and together with donors countries. It also has potential for developing regional action and 
advocacy at a European level. 
2. The Bilateral fund is more effective if it is open for the duration of the entire Programme 
not just on a call to call basis, as well as to other NGOs outside the group of Project 
Promoters. This will reduce its nature of being project driven, rather than interest driven. 
3. Allow for NGOs from the donor countries to apply for bi-lateral funds in Norway, rather 
than through the country NGO programmes.  
 
C. Management Set Up Recommendations  
Management set up at the FMO level 
1. Promote the Civil Society Programme into a Global Civil Society Fund hosted by the 
FMO working with entrusted strategic implementing partners/Operators in the beneficiary 
countries.  
1.1. Streamlining the Programme into a Global Civil Society Fund will increase the 
strategic meaning of the NGO Programmes both at country and at European level. The 
innovative character of the NGO Programmes led by a common overarching strategy requires 
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much more strategic oversight beyond monitoring of compliance with procedures. They have 
a lot of potential as a European regional fund with country specific strategies developed in 
consultation with local stakeholders by the selected country Operators which will ensure the 
ownership of the Programmes by civil society on country level.  
1.2. The Global fund will be managed and/or hosted within the FMO, but with a clear 
structure, level of staffing and procedures and rules.  
1.3. Establishing a Strategic Oversight Board will contribute to outcome oriented focus and 
processes rather than an administrative monitoring of the Programme. This Strategic 
Oversight Board can involve representatives from the FMC, leading NGOs from the donor 
countries and experts from the beneficiary countries with knowledge of civil society. 
Combining expertise from both the donors countries and from the region, can contribute to 
a.better strategic oversight of the effectiveness of the Programme across Europe.  
1.4. Regular strategic communication with the National Focal Points will ensure strategic 
partnership needed to foster increased good governance and sustainable impacts from the 
overall EEA Grants investments in the countries. This can be done by improved strategic 
coordination with the NGO Programmes Operators at country level, or by including 
communication on the Global Civil Society Fund during the regional meetings of the NFPs. 
This way the NFPs can serve as strategic stakeholder advisory group for the performance of 
the Global Civil Society fund. In addition, this strategic partnership approach can provide for 
discussing co-financing issue on a more strategic level by identifying areas of support of 
importance to optimize the application of the good governance and sustainable development 
principles. 
1.5. This set up will bring a number of benefits:  
• The Civil Society Programmes will not depend on the negotiations with national 
governments individually. It will be included in the MoU as a general overarching rule 
agreed at a macro-level. This will reduce the delay of the start of the country NGO 
Programmes and will increase the time for their actual Programme implementation.  
• It will provide for clear cut separate specific rules and procedures, which are adequate 
to the objectives and nature of the Civil Society Programme. 
• It will ensure better strategic oversight and coherence, and will clarify the level of 
responsibilities and needed capacities at the FMO level and in the beneficiary 
countries 
• It will expand the possibilities for strategic partnerships and alliance with other donors 
in the region OSF, OSIFE, EC civil society Programmes, other European foundations, 
etc.  
• It will ensure better regional linkage and learning among the different Operators and 
developing strategic European regional initiatives  
2. If the Idea for a Global Civil Society Fund is not considered, then it will be important that 
the FMO clarifies the management set up of the Programme within the FMO: 
2.1. There needs to be a clear strategy of the positioning of the Civil Society Programme as 
part of the overall EEA and Norway Grants Funding. This will help improve synergies with 
other programmes. 
2.2. Priority needs to be given to strategic oversight, rather than monitoring of compliance 
with procedures and control 
2.3. More human resource capacity with substantial knowledge on civil society and the 
context in the beneficiary countries should be allocated to provide for this strategic oversight, 
especially in view of the potential increase of the Programmes directly contracted by the 
FMO.  
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2.4. Employing a small number of junior officers will help free the time of current sector 
officers for substantial work by providing back up for the technical aspects of the Programmes 
management. This will not require a considerable increase in the FMO budget and is quite 
justifiable from the point of view of proportionality – the NGO projects constitute 2/3 of all 
EEA and Norway Grants funded projects. 
Management set up at country level 
1. Continue the good practice of entrusting the management of the NGO Programmes to 
Operators in the beneficiary countries which are organizations independent from the 
governments with commitment, experience and knowledge of civil society and trust within the 
NGO sectors. 
2. Streamline the status of all NGO Programmes to be directly contracted by the FMO, not 
through the National Focal Points. Based on the evaluation, this practice is more effective in 
terms of strategic coherence, reduced administrative burden and better regional complementarity.  
3. Ensure strategic level communication and coordination between the NGO Programmes 
and the National Focal Points. This will help potential synergies among the different EEA 
Grants Programmes, as well as overcoming alienation and bridging the gap between traditional 
“sectors”.  
4. Allow for re-appointing strong Operators of the NGO Programmes who had already been 
selected by an open tender based on performance evaluation. Re-appointment of the Operators 
may be conditional based on requirements for improvement coming from the performance review 
(expanding and/or re-adjusting the responsibilities in the consortium and improving certain 
aspects of the strategy for the new Financial Mechanism). The main advantages of this approach 
will be: 
• Minimizing the delays associated with competitive bidding, as well as the shortage of 
potential partners in many countries.  
• Continuity of the strategies of well performing Programmes in the countries which will 
increase potential for long-term impact 
• Better use of already developed fund management capacities, thus reducing the time and 
potential challenges of new-comers to the rules of the EEA Grants. 
• Transparency will be ensured, as the Operators have already been selected by an open 
public tender in the past.  
5. The selection of new Operators (due to unsatisfactory performance review of current ones or 
missing public tender in the past) needs to be based on clear criteria ensuring: 1/knowledge and 
expertise for civil society and its capacity development, 2 / independence from Governments and 
3/ capacity for management of the funds.  
6. Develop a shared vision on the role of the Operators as strategic facilitators of civil society 
development, not just technical re-granters of funds to project promoters. Due to the numerous 
gaps in civil society capacity, a more proactive role of the Operators is needed to convene various 
groups and stimulate the search for new solutions, as well as to assist strategically the capacities 
of the sector in different areas.  
7. It is better if there is one NGO Programme per country. We suggest that the two current NGO 
Programmes in Slovakia are consolidated into one managed by a consortium with the most 
competitive advantages. 
D. Recommendations at the operational level 
1. Diversify the types of grants support to accommodate the different needs for 
strengthening civil society 
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1.1. Continue the diversification of grants by their size - small, medium and large in order to 
ensure better outreach to different segments of civil society 
1.2. Increase the focus on support to organizations and strategies, not only to projects. 
Include in the assessment of proposals the organizational capacity of applicants and 
respectively their needs for capacity development, as well as targeted instruments for 
supporting organizational development. 
1.3. Envisage further diversification of grants instruments per type of NGOs depending on 
their role in the strategy implementation and on their needs for capacity development. The 
following type of grants may be considered: 
a) Institutional support to key actors in core areas for key processes. This will be 
strategic grants (2-3 years) investing in the institutional capacity of leading 
organizations and networks to carry out their mission and linking it with levels of 
impact and change in the environment. Grants can be conditional with certain 
requirements and benchmarks for organizational development and sustainability 
stimulating organizational innovation - new approaches, links to constituencies and 
other NGOs, strong communication, and partnerships. Application will be by three year 
strategies (and not projects) contributing to meeting the Programme objectives. 
b) Capacity development support to strengthen NGOs in priority areas based on clearly 
set objectives. These will be project grants (combining capacity development and 
activity grants). They will be contributing to developing new initiatives and solutions, 
and to growing the capacity of various layers of civil society. Capacity development 
can be ensured by specific grants, or by optional share of the overall project activity 
grant. The applications will be by projects, including assessment of the organizational 
capacity and needs of the project promoters. Specific goals of the capacity building 
grants should be defined in line with the Programme objectives. 
c) Developmental support to grow new actors. These will be small seed funds to support 
grassroots initiatives of small local organizations and/or informal groups combining 
seed action grants with intensive coaching for capacity development.  
d) Action Grants to support quick and visible civic response to emerging issues. These 
will be grants supporting campaigns and innovative civic action of various 
organizations and  informal coalitions and groups of dedicated activists.  
e) Potentially the instrument of Challenge grants (conditional on certain requirements for 
fundraising) can be also used especially targeted at growing sustainability of more 
established organizations. The introduction of challenge grants will also decrease the 
risk of donor dependency. 
2. Earmark separate funds for strategic capacity development of the civil society sector. 
Potential instruments may include: 
2.1. Better focus the Complementary action in its part related to in-country activities for 
expanding the strategic capacity of the NGO sectors. More funding needs to be allocated to 
support proactive capacity building, networking, targeted discussions and other work with the 
entire non-profit sector (not only grantees), as well as strategic public promotion of the results 
of the Programme and the funded projects.  
2.2. Consider introduction of a New Initiatives Seed fund. This funding will be seed money 
at the discretion of the Operator to stimulate proactive search of innovative solutions of key 
identified issues. This may include: 
• developing coalitions of different segments within the NGO sector and with other 
stakeholders around key issues 
• developing new types of collaborative initiatives based on interdisciplinary 
approaches, combining efforts and different perspectives in identifying solutions.  
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• Growing innovative capacity for resource mobilization, fundraising and financial 
sustainability 
• Advocacy and engagement with government-led policy processes 
• Exchange among civil society actors to incubate and scale up innovative approaches  
2.3. Include funding to support strategic communication initiatives stimulating public 
awareness of the role and achievements of civil society (incl. project promoters), building 
trust and public support in NGOs as catalysts for change, engaging citizens in public debate 
on critical issues of society; better interaction with the media and growing new type of citizen 
journalism. 
2.4. Better focus predefined projects to optimize investments at a systemic change level. 
Some possibilities to consider: 
• Some of the predefined projects can accommodate systemic capacity building in key 
areas of the sectors including seed grants accompanied with mentoring and coaching 
for capacity growth 
• Consider also predefined projects on key issues that are of importance to all 
countries. This will help comparative analyses and expand the opportunity for 
regional actions. Some themes coming from the current period are: mapping of the 
sectors (this can be done by similar methodologies); sustainability of the sector 
(identification of new methods and working practices); linkage and outreach to 
broader civil society (active informal groups, movements, and social media 
communities) 
• Allow strategic selection instead of a project application approach of promoters of the 
predefined projects (which is the practice of other EEA Grants Programmes) This will 
allow strategic partnership approach to implementation of predefined projects on a 
systemic level. 
3. Better focus and regional design of the Complementary actions related to regional level 
actions. Currently a fixed % for Complementary Actions leaves some programs with too much 
money and others with very limited resources. Instead, a common fund can be allocated for 
regional level initiatives. It can be more strategically designed based on joint regional planning of 
use of funds with the active participation of the Operators. This way the funding will be allocated 
based on strategically justified requests from fund Operators from more than one country. 
 
E. Recommendations related to Regulation/Procedures 
1. Develop a single document with rules and procedures for the management of PA10 Funds 
for NGOs. A possibility is upgrading the existing Guideline for NGO Programmes and making it 
an Annex to the Regulation  
2. Update existing procedures based on shared vision among the Donors, the FMO and the 
Operators on what is the possible flexibility and risk taking which can enable the NGO 
Programmes to accommodate innovation and to better respond to the specific needs for the 
development of civil society in their countries. .  
Management resources: 
3. Provide adequate funding for support to 1/ management costs of the Programmes and 2/ 
to strategic programming costs of the Operators to grow the capacity of the sector. 
3.1. Increase the level of management resources for smaller Programmes. Set a sliding scale 
for management costs reflecting the size of the allocation for smaller Programmes below 10 
million euro. It is recommended to allow for 20% for Programmes up to € 3 million, (b) 15% 
for Programmes between € 3-6 million, (c) 12% for Programmes between € 6-10 million. 
 107 
3.2. Retain the existing additional cost for capacity assistance to project applicants within 
the management costs, as they ensure effectiveness of the management of the grant-making 
schemes by supporting project-specific capacity 
3.3. Allocate additional support for the operational costs of the Operator of earmarked 
separate funds for capacity development of the civil society sector (e.g. facilitation of new 
initiatives, strategic meetings of the sector, strategic communication with the public, targeted 
coaching and capacity development of specified segments of civil society). Funding for this 
category should be provided based on the quality of proposals and suggested initiatives.  
4. Continue individual approach to guarantees. Either request a bank guarantee or retain part of 
the management fee (at a reduced level, e.g. 10%). Assess together with the Operators which is 
the best option. Consider a regional reserve fund to cover the risk for Operators of small 
Programmes with no (or limited) reserve funds,  
Grant-making and selection: 
5. Allow re-granting by intermediaries (community foundations, issue specific NGOs or 
capacity providers) to provide micro and small grants to active civic and grassroots groups 
without legal registration and to small organizations. This will be more efficient outreach to 
broader civil society and will ensure more targeted assistance for growing capacities of new 
actors. Simplified but clear rules for these micro grants will need to be further developed (eg 
separate bank account, etc.; or making the payments directly from the intermediary) 
6. Provide for more flexibility in the procedures for selection of projects to accommodate 1/ 
the diversified grants instruments and 2/ the experience of Operators.  
• Base the selection process around the obligatory principles of transparency, quality and 
impartiality, but provide space for the Operator to suggest how these principles will be 
operationalized in the selection process within diffeent funding instruments. In other 
words, allow Operators to suggest their own selection procedures based on a set of 
minimum requirements defined by the FMO. 
• Introduce simplified procedures for seed funds and action grants. 
• Allow for more proactive involvement of Operators in the selection process of strategic 
and innovative sector level initiatives 
• In the selection process the input from external evaluators should be at least 50% (in the 
case of two assessors – 1 from the PO and one from the outside. 
• Assessors reviewing the same project are allowed to communicate and share their 
argumentation for the scorings, based on the specific selection criteria. 
• Assessors are allowed to meet after scoring their individual projects to assess the ranked 
list against the objectives of the call and the portfolio criteria before recommending it to 
the Selection Committee.  
7. Ensure more strategic coherence of the selection process by delegating more decision 
power to the Selection Committee on portfolio level. An option is that each Operator develops 
publicly announced overarching selection criteria (portfolio criteria), e.g. geographic distribution, 
innovation, or other strategic considerations. Based on these the Selection committee can suggest 
modification of the ranking lists. 
8. Encourage a two-stage application process which can also be linked with targeted 
capacity building. Simplify the concept format, focusing on capacity of the applicant, practical 
expected impact from the project, general intervention logic (not activities) approximation of 
funds needed (not budget). Ensure that the full proposal will be reviewed by the same assessors. 
Provide the applicants selected at the concept phase the possibility to use technical 
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assistance/guidance/advice from a pool of experts supported by the Operator in the preparation of 
the full proposal. 
9. Change the “economic benefits” provision (Regulation, Article 5.4.2.). Interpreting sources 
from fundraising and revenue generating activities as profit and forcing organizations to use it 
within the project is in conflict with the purpose of strengthening civil society, an important part 
of which is sustainability of NGOs. Allow that raised income and support to be used to support 
the NGOs mission and long-term work. Exclude the NGO Programmes from the rules on state 
aid. 
10. DoRIS will benefit from a participatory review. Questions can be sent to the NGO 
Programmes in all countries (or broader to other EEA Grants Programmes too). This will provide 
critical feedback on bottlenecks and challenges and will help improve the utility of the system.  
11. External audits of the projects to be provided by the Operators: Include this requirement 
in the ToR so that the Operators plan for the related costs. 
12. Management and Control Systems: Assist the Operators to define together with the auditors 
reasonable levels of risk to be accommodated in the MSCs. 
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